Mario G. Martinez v. Farmers Insurance Exchange ( 2011 )

NUMBER 13-09-648-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
MARIO G. MARTINEZ, Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Appellee.
On appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Vela, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
This is an appeal from a trial court order dismissing Mario Martinez’s case and
denying his motion to enforce a settlement agreement. In the trial court, Martinez urged
that appellee, Farmers Insurance Exchange (―Farmers‖), wrongfully retained certain
settlement amounts for purposes of withholding taxes, rather than giving him the total
settlement amount.
On appeal, Martinez raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court
abused its discretion in granting Farmers’ motion to enforce settlement agreement; (2)
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the Order of Enforcement and
Take-Nothing Judgment; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Martinez’s motion for new trial. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mario Martinez filed suit against Farmers, his former employer, on August 14,
2006, alleging that he had been wrongfully terminated from his employment due to his
age. In Martinez’s original petition, he claimed unlawful civil conspiracy, unlawful
employment discrimination under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.2585 (West 2006). He
sought damages for physical as well as mental pain and anguish, inconvenience, and
―loss of enjoyment of life for a long time and into the future.‖ He further sued for ―lost
earnings in the past and in the future and for loss of earning capacity.‖
On April 29, 2008, Farmers and Martinez entered into a Rule 11 Agreement
whereby they agreed ―to mediate this case prior to any hearing on Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.‖ TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. On May 27, 2009, the parties executed a
settlement agreement for $21,000. According to the settlement document, the sum was
to be paid to Martinez on or before June 10, 2009. Additionally, the words ―or as soon as
possible‖ were inserted and initialed by Farmers’ attorney in the margin. The settlement
agreement provided that the settlement encompassed all claims in the lawsuit, which, at
the time of the settlement, included a wage claim.
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The settlement was not funded by June 10, 2009. Subsequently, Martinez filed a
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Sanctions on June 18, 2009. At a
hearing on the motion on June 29, 2009, counsel for Martinez complained of the delay in
receiving the settlement check. In response, Farmers' position was because this was an
employment case, it initially wanted to allocate 40 to 50% of the total settlement to wages.
Farmers informed the court that it had to get a supervisor involved in order for the
insurance company to agree ―to get a very minimal amount toward wages,‖ and that ―the
real delay was the fact that we had to get a supervisor—a vice president involved so [it]
could basically get a bigger amount toward his client that would not be taxable and would
be more palatable—.‖
At the hearing, Martinez did not agree withholding any portion of the settlement.
Farmers responded that Martinez had pleaded lost wages, and therefore some of the
proceeds must be withheld for taxes. The hearing concluded without any further
discussion or argument with respect to withholding a portion of the settlement, and the
trial court ordered that the settlement be funded by July 6, 2009. Counsel for Martinez
was asked to prepare an order reflecting the trial court’s rulings. That same afternoon,
after the trial court had ruled, Martinez filed a second amended petition, deleting his claim
for lost earnings and for loss of earning capacity.
As ordered, on July 6, 2009, Farmers delivered two checks, for a total of $20,347
to Martinez’s counsel. $19,000 was made payable to Dale & Klein, LLP Trustee for
Mario Martinez, and $1,347 was made payable to Mario Martinez. Farmers withheld
$653.00 for taxes based on Farmers apportioning $2,000 of the settlement to lost wages.
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On August 18, 2009, Martinez filed a second motion to enforce, claiming that
Farmers wrongfully withheld $653.00 of the settlement proceeds. In that motion,
Martinez contended that he had non-suited the wages claim on June 29, 2009 in his
second amended petition. On August 25, 2009, Farmers responded to Martinez’s
second motion to enforce and filed its own motion to enforce settlement. Farmers
argued that wages had been a claim during the lawsuit for nearly three years and
Martinez had only amended his pleading after the hearing and after the case had already
settled.
Consequently, Martinez requested a telephone conference to be held on his
second motion to enforce. As a result of the conference, which is not of record, the trial
court asked for proposed orders from both sides. The court subsequently determined
that ―the apportionment of $2,000 of the total settlement to lost wages and the withholding
of taxes pursuant to federal law and IRS regulations is appropriate and required.‖ On
August 27, 2009, the trial court signed an order of dismissal with prejudice.
Martinez filed a timely motion for new trial, asking the trial court to vacate the
August 27, 2009 order of dismissal with prejudice because he claims that ―the trial court
reformed an unambiguous contract.‖ He further argued that ―the trial court is not an arm
of the IRS or a taxing entity and acted as a tax enforcing entity which is beyond the court’s
authority and jurisdiction.‖ Martinez argues that because there was no express
agreement between the parties to withhold funds for tax purposes in the settlement, the
settlement cannot be enforced. On September 23, 2009, Martinez’s motion for new trial
was denied.
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II. ENFORCEMENT ISSUE
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision whether a settlement agreement should be enforced as an
agreed judgment or must be the subject of a contract action requiring additional pleadings
and proof is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Mantas v. Fifth
Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1996); Staley v. Herblin, 188 S.W.3d 334,
336 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it renders
a decision that is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial
error of law. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Walker
v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1990). The appellant bears the burden to
establish error in the trial court’s judgment. Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806,
807 (Tex. 1968) (per curiam); Baylor College of Medicine v. Camberg, 247 S.W.3d 342,
346 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
B. Analysis
Martinez’s appeal centers upon his belief that he has not received all of the money
he was owed as a result of the settlement agreement signed May 27, 2009. According to
Martinez, Farmers wrongfully withheld taxes from the settlement, denying him $653.00
out of $21,000 in settlement money. Farmers apportioned $2,000 of the total settlement
for lost wages, and calculated the taxes owed on that amount to be $653.00. He does
not argue that the amount of taxes withheld was not correct. Rather, his complaint is that
no amount should have been withheld for lost wages or taxes. He argues that there is a
fact issue with respect to how the settlement funds were to be paid.
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Martinez argues in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his second motion to enforce the settlement agreement and determining the disputed
issues between the parties. He now claims that the only method available for enforcing a
settlement agreement is through summary judgment or trial. However, it was actually
Martinez who was the original party to seek enforcement of the settlement agreement
through means other than summary judgment or trial. In fact, he filed two such motions.
He cannot now complain that the method he chose to have the issues resolved is
improper. A litigant cannot ask something of a court and then complain that the court
committed error in giving it to him. Northeast Texas Motor Lines, Inc. v. Hodges, 158
S.W.2d 487, 488–89 (Tex. 1942). Error in requesting an action cannot be urged by a
party who requested the same action. Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank v. Gerdes, 551 S.W.2d
521, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A party to a lawsuit
cannot ask something of a trial court and then complain on appeal that the trial court
committed error in granting that party's request. Northeast, 158 S.W.2d at 488; Naguib
v. Naguib, 137 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied); see e.g. Dolenz v.
Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 798 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied);
Shafer v. Bedard, 761 S.W.2d 126, 131 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ). By seeking to
have the judgment enforced by motion, Martinez cannot now claim that the trial court
erred in disposing of the case in the manner Martinez requested. We overrule issue one.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By Martinez’s second issue, he argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the denial of his second motion to enforce and the order of dismissal.
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A. Standard of Review
The test for legal sufficiency is "[w]hether the evidence at trial would enable
reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). An appellant, challenging the legal
sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it had the burden of proof, must demonstrate
that the evidence conclusively established all vital facts. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46
S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). The reviewing court considers the evidence
in the light most favorable to the judgment, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable
fact-finder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder
could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807.
Martinez argues that the only process available for enforcement of a settlement
agreement is via summary judgment or trial. As previously stated, it was Martinez who
sought enforcement of the judgment by motion, not by summary judgment or trial. His
argument is waived. Regardless, a motion to enforce a settlement is a sufficient
pleading to allow a trial court to render judgment enforcing a settlement. Twist v.
McAllen Nat’l Bank, 248 S.W.3d 351, 361 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2007, orig.
proceeding).
We note in reviewing whether the evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that
a part of the proceedings before the trial court are not before us in this appeal. The
record reflects that the trial court held an unrecorded telephone conference with both
parties on August 26, 2009. Although Martinez urges in his brief that it was a five minute
telephonic conference at which no evidence was adduced, we do not know if evidence
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was presented or if the conference was merely argument. It was shortly after this
conference that the trial court rendered judgment. The Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure provide that the appellant, or other party seeking review, has the burden to
request that a sufficient record is presented to the appellate court to show error requiring
reversal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34. Without a record of that conference, which occurred
at Martinez’s suggestion, we do not know what additional factors, if any, were considered
by the trial court at the telephone conference to influence it to rule as it did. When we
have no record of a conference or hearing before us, the record is presumed to support
the trial court's ruling. See Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., 972 S.W.2d
26, 31 (Tex. 1998); see also Fort Bend County v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Comm'n, 818
S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ). Regardless, the case was before
the trial court primarily in response to Martinez’s two motions for enforcement. Although
he expressed disagreement at the hearing, counsel for Martinez presented nothing at the
hearing to show that the award of lost wages was improper.
Without a record of what occurred at that hearing, we are unable to say that the
trial court erred in awarding the amount it did toward lost wages. In view of the fact that
this was an employment discrimination case, it is logical that a portion of the award would
be for lost wages and the pleadings supported a claim for lost wages. Martinez alleged
lost wages, which were unquestionably considered as part of the settlement when
formulating a monetary figure for compensation. Further, the motions to enforce, the
responses to motions to enforce, and the hearings gave the trial court ample opportunity
to determine the adequacy of the evidence proffered and make a valid determination in
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favor of apportionment of the settlement.
Martinez argues that he non-suited his wage claim, so it was not part of the
settlement agreement. The trial court found that ―the case was settled at mediation, and
that the settlement encompassed all claims.‖ By signing the settlement agreement, both
parties agreed to:
release, discharge, and forever hold the other harmless from any and all
claims, demand or suits, known or unknown, fixed or contingent, liquidated
or unliquidated (whether or not asserted in this case) arising from or related
to the events and transactions which are the subject matter of this case
Martinez dismissed his claim for lost wages in his second amended petition on
June 29, 2009. This amendment was filed the same day as the hearing which was held
to review Martinez’s first motion to enforce settlement. However, the second amended
petition, deleting the claim for lost wages, was made after both parties had already signed
a valid settlement agreement on May 27, 2009. Lost earnings in the past and in the
future and for loss of earning capacity were specifically pleaded in Martinez’s original
petition. Because lost wages were clearly part of the settlement agreement when it was
signed and because we do not have a complete record of what the trial court considered
when it made its ruling, we will not disturb the trial court’s judgment. We overrule issue
two.
IV. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Martinez argues in his third and fourth issues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for new trial. Specifically, he complains that the trial court should not have
―reformed the settlement agreement to allow for $2,000.00 of the $21,000.00 settlement
to be considered taxable income and allow Farmers to withhold taxes.‖ He also argues
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that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial because he did
not request that the case be dismissed with prejudice.
A. Standard of Review
The trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no
pet.) (citing Dir., State Emps. Worker’s Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.
1994)); Coastal Banc SSB v. Helle, 48 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001,
pet. denied). The trial court has a wide discretion in denying a motion for new trial and
we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See Coastal Banc, 48 S.W.3d
at 800 (citing Dir., State Emps. Worker’s Comp. Div., 889 S.W.2d at 268).
B. Analysis
Martinez cites Meador v. Ivy, which held that a trial court cannot reform an
unambiguous contract unless there are pleadings and proof of mutual mistake or there
was a mistake on one side induced by fraud on the other. 390 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1965, no writ). However, Meador did not involve a settlement
agreement. See id. Rather, Meador involved a disagreement over deposits in a bank
account and who held the right to the funds. See id. Thus, the case is distinguishable.
Furthermore, lost wages were part of the original claim. At the hearing, it was
clear that the trial court and Farmers believed that a certain amount of the settlement
would be apportioned to wages. The fact that Martinez amended his pleadings to delete
the wage claim is of no import. It occurred post settlement.
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With respect to the amount that was withheld, there is no argument. It is possible
that if Farmers failed to withhold a portion of the settlement for tax purposes, it might have
assumed liability. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (a)(1) (―[E]very employer making payment of
wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax determined in accordance with
tables or computational procedures prescribed by the Secretary.‖). Under the
circumstances presented here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant a new trial.
Martinez also argues that, contrary to the trial court’s order, he did not formally file
a motion to dismiss. We agree. However, the settlement agreement itself provided for
an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice upon conclusion of the settlement. The trial
court did not err in dismissing the case with prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Martinez’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
ROSE VELA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
28th day of July, 2011.
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