Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Bill Head D/B/A Bill Head Enterprises and Titeflex Corporation ( 2011 )


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  •                              NUMBER 13-09-204-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    PETROLEUM SOLUTIONS, INC,                                                  Appellant,
    v.
    BILL HEAD D/B/A BILL HEAD ENTERPRISES
    AND TITEFLEX CORPORATION,                                                Appellees.
    On appeal from the 398th District Court
    of Hidalgo County, Texas.
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Vela
    Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
    I respectfully dissent because I do not believe the death penalty sanctions issued
    by the trial court were warranted. In Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 
    811 S.W.2d 913
    (Tex. 1991), the supreme court set forth the standard governing the
    imposition of sanctions. The court indicated that there must be a direct relationship
    between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and the sanction imposed
    should not be excessive.       
    Id. at 917.
       A sanction must be no more severe than
    necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose and trial courts must consider the availability of
    less stringent sanctions and whether such sanctions would fully promote compliance. 
    Id. A sanction
    order striking an affirmative defense is tested according to the same
    standards, under Transamerican, as the striking of any other pleading. See Lanfear v.
    Blackmon, 
    827 S.W.2d 87
    , 91 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1992, orig. proceeding); see
    also In re Fina Oil and Chem. Co., No. 13-98-640-CV, 
    1999 WL 33589153
    at * 12 (Tex.
    App.–Corpus Christi, Mar. 11, 1999, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).
    The sanctions meted out in this case included striking most of PSI’s claims and all
    of its affirmative defenses. The evidence offered at trial was that Barron took the flex
    connector back to his office. In February 2002, Neally, an attorney, came to pick it up.
    Barron testified the last time he saw it was when he loaded it in to Neally’s vehicle.
    Neally engaged the services of David Hendrix, an engineering expert, to review and
    inspect the flex connector. Hendrix admitted receiving a flex hose connector in early
    2002. He left it with a laboratory to store. More than four years later, Head discovered
    that the underground storage system was leaking and, more than four years later, sued
    PSI. PSI’s attorneys asked for the return of the flex connector. Both Hendrix and PSI’s
    attorneys looked for the flex connector, but could not find it.          Even Titeflex, the
    manufacturer of the underground flex connector, acknowledged in its brief it “has never
    contended that misplacement of the flex connector was deliberate or intentional . . . .”
    Under Transamerican, PSI’s failure to locate the flex connector must have some
    2
    relationship to the trial court’s action of striking all of PSI’s affirmative defenses. This
    Court, in Fina Oil, opined that that “conduct during discovery has no direct link to the
    merits of [defendant’s] affirmative defenses that the relevant limitations period expired . . .
    .” See In re Fina, 
    1999 WL 33589153
    at *13. Even though requested to make findings,
    the trial court did not articulate what connection there was between the alleged discovery
    abuse and the striking of the affirmative defense. And the majority opinion does not
    articulate one, either.
    The majority also disregarded PSI’s argument that it should not be punished
    because it was its expert who lost the connector. Under the circumstances presented
    here, there is no evidence that PSI had anything to do with the failure of the expert to
    locate the connector more than four years later.         There is also no support for the
    proposition that PSI deliberately misplaced the connector.
    Death penalty sanctions should be only severe enough to satisfy the legitimate
    purpose of granting such sanctions. Courts are required to consider the availability of
    less stringent sanctions. Here, the majority opinion does not even suggest that lesser
    sanctions were imposed first. The trial court also gave no explanation with respect to the
    sanctions it did impose. The supreme court has indicated that the record should contain
    some explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed. See Spohn Hosp. v.
    Mayer, 
    104 S.W.3d 878
    , 883 (Tex. 2003). Discovery sanctions that are so severe that
    they inhibit the presentation of the merits of the case should be reserved for a party who
    has callously disregarded the responsibilities of discovery under the rules. 
    Id. Here, PSI
    was prohibited from properly raising its affirmative defenses, such as limitations,
    3
    which, if proven meritorious, would have prevented Head’s recovery on any issue. While
    PSI’s answer was not struck, PSI was absolutely precluded from presenting the merits of
    dispositive defenses. The majority’s conclusion that the trial court could have granted
    greater sanctions does not lessen the reality that PSI went to trial defenseless. In sum,
    the evidence outlined in the majority opinion does not explain conduct that would warrant
    the imposition of death penalty sanctions.
    At the very least, this case should be remanded to the trial court to allow the jury to
    decide the case based upon PSI’s defenses, in addition to the claims pleaded by the
    plaintiff.
    ROSE VELA
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    29th day of April, 2011.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 13-09-00204-CV

Filed Date: 4/29/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015