Joseph Earl Francis v. State ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Opinion issued April 15, 2014
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-14-00078-CR
    ———————————
    JOSEPH EARL FRANCIS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 338th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1342243
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Joseph Earl Francis pleaded guilty, pursuant to an agreement with
    the State that punishment be capped at confinement for 35 years, to the first degree
    felony offense of murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2011). The
    trial court found appellant guilty and, in accordance with appellant’s plea
    agreement with the State, assessed punishment at confinement for 35 years. The
    trial court certified that this is a plea-bargain case and that appellant does not have
    the right of appeal.   Nevertheless, appellant, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of
    appeal. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    A plea bargain case is one in which “a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo
    contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by
    the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). In a
    plea bargain case, a defendant may appeal only those matters that were raised by
    written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after getting the trial court’s
    permission to appeal. 
    Id. The appeal
    must be dismissed if a certification showing
    that the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).
    The clerk’s record reflects that appellant pleaded guilty in exchange for the
    State’s recommendation that punishment be capped at confinement for 35 years.
    An agreement to a recommended cap on punishment constitutes a plea bargain.
    See Shankle v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 808
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Wilson v.
    State, 
    264 S.W.3d 104
    , 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Waters
    v. State, 
    124 S.W.3d 825
    , 826–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
    ref’d);. The record of the plea hearing reflects that the trial court so admonished
    appellant and that appellant understood that he would not have the right of appeal.
    2
    The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for 35 years, in accordance
    with appellant’s agreement with the State.1 We conclude that the record supports
    the trial court’s certification. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2; Dears v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 610
    , 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    The trial court did not rule adversely to appellant on any pre-trial matters
    and did not give permission for appellant to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
    Because appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R.
    APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 
    183 S.W.3d 675
    , 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A
    court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who
    plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited
    appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”).
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
    APP. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    1
    The trial court’s judgment states, “Term of Plea Bargain: Without an Agreed
    Recommendation.” Such language does not convert the plea to an open plea when,
    as here, the plea was entered pursuant to agreed sentencing cap. See Threadgill v.
    State, 
    120 S.W.3d 871
    , 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)
    (holding statement in record indicating that there was no agreed recommendation
    did not convert proceeding into open plea when plea was entered pursuant to
    agreed sentencing cap).
    3