Terri Lynn Crespo v. State ( 2014 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00379-CR
Terri Lynn CRESPO,
Appellant
v.
The State of
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 2, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. CCL-12-0832
Honorable Frank Follis, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 5, 2014
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Terri Lynn Crespo, was charged by information with the offense of terroristic
threat, a Class B misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2) (West 2011). After a
jury found her guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at 180 days’ confinement in the county
jail, but suspended the sentence and placed her on community supervision for a period of 18
months. In a single issue, Crespo challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her
conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-13-00379-CR
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The complainant, Rai Simonson, testified to the following facts. She and Crespo were
neighbors, each occupying a mobile home separated only by a vacant lot. Before the alleged
occurrence, Simonson stated she and Crespo were friendly and spent a lot of time together, but
their friendship deteriorated after two significant arguments, the first occurring during a trip to Las
Vegas. Simonson stated that, while on the trip, Crespo became angry and yelled at Simonson.
They returned home and did not have contact for two to three months until Crespo apologized.
Simonson stated she remained friendly but “guarded” with Crespo. A second argument later
occurred over whether Crespo was supposed to look after Simonson’s plants while she was away
on vacation. Simonson testified Crespo called her “three or four times yelling at me over and
over.” After the phone calls, they stopped speaking to each other.
On the morning of March 31, 2012, Audrey Munzker and her three children arrived from
North Carolina to visit Simonson. After unloading their car and while visiting on the porch,
Simonson testified Crespo started speaking loud enough for her to hear, calling her curse words.
Simonson indicated that a week before, she had reported Crespo to the police for playing music
too loudly. Their neighborhood property manager subsequently placed a notice on everyone’s
door in the neighborhood reminding all to be courteous per community rules. According to
Simonson, Crespo thereafter played her music even more loudly. While on her porch with
Munzker, Simonson testified that she avoided eye contact with Crespo while Crespo paced back
and forth inside the perimeter of her yard, “saying phrases like nobody tells me what to do” and
“very creative combinations” of curse words, and calling Simonson other obscenities. Simonson
and Munzker went inside, but later returned to the porch to smoke a cigarette and drink coffee.
Crespo was not in her yard, but at some point came back outside and continued to rant and talk to
herself. Simonson testified Crespo “has a very tall stature. Her body positioning was [an]
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exaggerated demonstration of intimidating body postures.” On direct examination, Simonson
demonstrated how Crespo would stop pacing and place her hands on her hips “very
demonstratively, put her foot out and go like this (indicating) and stand there and hold body
positions like that.” Simonson and her guest went back inside and returned outside a third time.
Crespo also returned again, with similar “escalated” behavior. This time, Crespo called Simonson
a pedophile, “telling me that she was going to burn me down, burn my house down, and run me
out of the neighborhood.”
Munzker testified to hearing the same threats, describing Crespo’s demeanor as escalating
throughout the day, with Crespo getting louder and more aggressive, and moving closer to
Simonson’s home. She further testified to hearing Crespo threaten Simonson by saying, “I’m
going to get you,” “I’m going to burn you down,” and “I’m going to burn your house down.”
Afraid for the safety of her friend, Munzker told Simonson to call the police. On cross-
examination, Munzker admitted that in her statement earlier to police she indicated Crespo made
only one threat – to burn Simonson down, and did not mention burning the house down or running
her out of the neighborhood.
Officers Rudy Jimenez and Chris Martinez also testified for the prosecution. Each testified
they spoke to Crespo on different, separate occasions after the date of the incident; each described
Crespo’s behavior at that time as “escalating” and “belligerent; neither testified regarding the
particular statements made by Crespo to Simonson or offered evidence particular to the issue of
threatening imminent serious bodily injury.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Standard of Review
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, viewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
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essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The essential elements
of the crime are the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge,
which is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 536 (2012)
(quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The law “as authorized
by the indictment” consists of the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging
instrument. Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 294; Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The
jury may make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d
742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (jury may draw reasonable inferences from the basic facts to the
ultimate facts). This legal sufficiency standard applies equally to both direct and circumstantial
evidence. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Analysis
Penal Code section 22.07 defines the offense of terroristic threat. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.07 (West 2011). The relevant portion of section 22.07 provides that a “person commits an
offense if he threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with
intent to place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Id. § 22.07(a)(2). In this
case, the information alleged that Crespo unlawfully threatened to “burn down Rai Simonson with
intent to place Rai Simonson in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”
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As we indicated previously in Phillips v. State, the offense of terroristic threat is completed
under section 22.07(a)(2) once the defendant makes a threat to commit a violent offense seeking
the desired reaction of placing the victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Phillips v.
State, 401 S.W.3d 282, 292 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d) (internal citations omitted).
The focus of the intent inquiry is on the intended reaction. Id. It is not necessary that the victim
actually be in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or that the defendant have the capability or
intention to actually carry out the threat of violence. Id. at 293; Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304,
306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Further, the State is not required to prove an admission by the
defendant as to her own specific intent before she can be convicted of a terroristic threat; it may
be inferred from the defendant’s acts, words, or conduct. Zorn v. State, 222 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2002, pet. dism’d). “The desired and sought after reaction of the listener, regardless
of whether the threat is carried out, constitutes some evidence of the intent of the protagonist.” Id.
Crespo contends that for a threat to be “imminent,” it must be “near at hand,” or “at the
point of happening.” Citing to Bryant v. State, she argues that a threat to do some harmful act, not
immediately but in the future, without more, is not a threat of imminent serious bodily injury. See
Bryant v. State, 905 S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (conditional threat
to assault county commissioner if he did not grade road in front of defendant’s house was
insufficient to prove defendant’s specific intent to place commissioner in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury under section 22.07(a)(2)). Crespo argues the alleged threat could not be perceived
as imminent, and the evidence failed to show the threat was a threat of imminent violence against
Simonson. She contends nothing in her words or actions, or in the context in which her statements
to Simonson were made, give rise to an inference that serious bodily injury was imminent. Crespo
points to (1) the lack of physical proximity to enact the threat, (2) the lack of corresponding
behavior to indicate an intent to carry out the threat immediately, and (3) the lack of any physical
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contact with Simonson. Given the context within which the statements were made, Crespo submits
no reasonable inference of imminent serious bodily injury could be made. We disagree.
Considering the words, body language, and tone of voice exhibited by Crespo on the date
in question, as described above, we conclude that a rational jury could reasonably find Crespo’s
statements that she would “get her,” and “burn” Simonson and her house down constituted a threat
of serious physical injury against Simonson. We also conclude that a rational jury could
reasonably conclude the threat was imminent. See Walker v. State, 327 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (evidence to support terroristic threat conviction held sufficient
when defendant, while being escorted to a holding cell, stopped about five feet from Judge
Nekhom, turned toward her, “bowed his chest out,” stared at her, and said, “‘Let's do it, Nekhom.
It’s me and you now.’”). It is immaterial whether Crespo had the ability or intent to carry out her
threat of violence. Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 293. Further, the proximity between the complainant
and the defendant is not dispositive of whether the threat is imminent. See George v. State, 841
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), aff’d, 890 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (rejecting defendant’s argument that because he was “miles away” when he made the threat
to kill the complainant, he could not have intended to inflict imminent serious bodily injury).
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of terroristic threat
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The evidence is thus legally sufficient
to support the conviction. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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