Dwayne Carpenter v. Campbell Hausfeld Co. and Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Company Inc. ( 2014 )

Opinion issued March 27, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-13-00075-CV
———————————
DWAYNE CARPENTER, Appellant
V.
CAMPBELL HAUSFELD CO. AND CAMPBELL HAUSFELD/SCOTT
FETZER COMPANY, INC., Appellees
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1,006,290
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this products liability case, Dwayne Carpenter sued Campbell Hausfeld
Co. and Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Company, Inc. (“Campbell Hausfeld”) for
design defect and negligence arising out of an incident in which a strap securing a
Campbell Hausfeld air compressor broke, causing the compressor box to fall onto
Carpenter. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Campbell
Hausfeld. In three issues, Carpenter contends that (1) the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment by ruling that his lay testimony failed to raise a fact
issue; (2) the trial court’s ruling effectively requires expert testimony in all
products-liability cases; and (3) the trial court erroneously granted summary
judgment on Carpenter’s negligence claim when Campbell Hausfeld’s motion only
sought summary judgment on Carpenter’s design defect claim.
We affirm.
Background
In December 2009, Carpenter shopped for an air compressor at a local
Lowe’s store.1 Carpenter alleged that he attempted to load a “1.2 HP 20-Gallon
125 PSI Electric Air Compressor” manufactured by Campbell Hausfeld into his
shopping cart when a strap around the compressor box unexpectedly broke,
causing the box to fall on him, knocking him to the floor. Carpenter injured his
left hip, leg, shoulder, and arm and sought medical treatment for these injuries.
Carpenter asserted a strict products-liability claim against Campbell Hausfeld,
1
Carpenter also sued Lowe’s for premises liability. Carpenter reached a settlement
with Lowe’s and subsequently nonsuited his claims against Lowe’s after the trial
court rendered its summary judgment ruling in favor of Campbell Hausfeld.
Lowe’s is therefore not a party to this appeal.
2
alleging that the strap securing the box was defectively designed and rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous.
Campbell Hausfeld moved for no-evidence summary judgment. In this
motion, Campbell Hausfeld set out the elements of a strict products-liability claim,
as well as the elements of a claim premised on a design defect and the statutory
requirements for proving a “safer alternative design.” Campbell Hausfeld argued
that Carpenter had produced “no evidence of product defect or legitimate argument
of liability against Campbell Hausfeld.” It further argued that Carpenter could
produce no evidence of a “safer alternative design,” no evidence that Campbell
Hausfeld’s actions were a producing cause of Carpenter’s injuries, and no evidence
of damages.
In response, Carpenter argued that “there is evidence that suggests Campbell
Hausfeld’s product shipped without the requisite number of safety straps as well as
evidence that the safety straps were not strong enough to secure the load of the 108
pound compressor.” Carpenter argued that other air compressor boxes located at
the Lowe’s store, including other boxes for air compressors manufactured by
Campbell Hausfeld, were packaged with two straps securing the boxes, indicating
that two straps were needed and that a safer alternative design existed. He stated,
“Common sense enables one to make the connection that two straps are needed to
secure the 108 pound compressor as all of the other compressors were shipped with
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two straps. However, the compressor that injured plaintiff was only secured by
one strap.” Carpenter attached his medical records as summary judgment
evidence.
The only other evidence that Carpenter attached to support his summary
judgment response was a transcript of a telephone conversation that occurred on
April 5, 2011, between Carpenter and a man named Vincent Griffin, who identified
himself but not his connection to the case. This exhibit is unsworn, and the only
certification contained in this exhibit is from the transcriber of the conversation,
who certified that she listened to the recorded conversation and transcribed “a
complete, full and true record of the entire conversation conducted therein.”2
Carpenter stated that after he decided to purchase the compressor, he looked
around the area for assistance but decided to lift and load the compressor into his
shopping cart on his own when he did not see any Lowe’s employees in the
immediate area. The statement then included the following exchange between
Carpenter and Griffin:
[Griffin]: [N]ow you indicated that a strap broke, explain to
me what you mean by you said a strap broke?
[Carpenter]: From the factory there are two straps around the
box. It had one strap and that strap broke. That’s
why I was trying to pick it up.
2
Campbell Hausfeld did not object to the competency of this exhibit as summary
judgment evidence.
4
[Griffin]: Okay, so the box that you had, it only had one
strap, but the other boxes had two straps?
[Carpenter]: That’s correct.
[Griffin]: Okay, and you are aware that the boxes around it
had two straps. But the one that you were picking
up only had one?
[Carpenter]: Well the other boxes. There were different size
compressors. But the box. The compressor that I
wanted, to the best I remember there was only one
there. Or maybe two. I’m not sure. But the
compressor I wanted, it only had one strap on it.
[Griffin]: And you picked it up by that one strap?
[Carpenter]: And kind of a lid on the box.
[Griffin]: Okay, so after you attempted to pick this up by the
strap, that’s when you lost, what happened at that
point? I don’t want to put words in your mouth.
What happened after you picked it up?
[Carpenter]: Okay, when I picked it up the strap broke and then
that’s when I fell on my left side.
Carpenter did not introduce the box or pictures of the box into evidence. He did
not present any other evidence concerning the incident, the manner in which the
compressor at issue was packaged, the type of strap that was used to secure the
particular compressor, the manner in which Campbell Hausfeld generally packages
its compressors, or any evidence showing whether the compressor at issue was
defectively packaged at the time it left Campbell Hausfeld’s facility for shipment
to the Lowe’s store.
5
In reply, Campbell Hausfeld argued that Carpenter “has no basis or personal
knowledge for knowing who applied the straps around the box, who designed the
set up, or to say that had there been two straps present he would not have been
injured.” It also argued that Carpenter produced no evidence concerning the
intended purpose of the straps, such as whether they were intended to be used to
lift the compressor box. Campbell Hausfeld also objected to Carpenter’s medical
records on hearsay grounds.
After Campbell Hausfeld had moved for summary judgment but before the
trial court had ruled on the motion, Carpenter filed an amended petition. In
addition to his premises liability claim against Lowe’s and his strict products-
liability claim against Campbell Hausfeld, he also asserted a negligence claim
against Campbell Hausfeld. His petition stated, “In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts
that the foregoing conduct of Defendants constituted negligence, as that cause of
action is defined under Texas law.” Campbell Hausfeld did not amend its
summary judgment motion to address this claim.
The trial court subsequently rendered summary judgment in favor of
Campbell Hausfeld on “all claims asserted by Dwayne Carpenter.” After the trial
court signed an order granting Carpenter’s nonsuit of Lowe’s and dismissing
Carpenter’s premises liability claim, this appeal followed.
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Summary Judgment
In his first issue, Carpenter contends that the trial court erred in holding that
his lay testimony did not raise a fact issue on the challenged elements of his strict
products-liability claim.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion.
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848
(Tex. 2009). After an adequate time for discovery, a party may move for no-
evidence summary judgment on the ground that no evidence exists of one or more
essential elements of a claim on which the adverse party bears the burden of proof
at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence
raising a genuine issue of material fact on the elements specified in the motion.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.
2006). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant presents more
than a scintilla of evidence raising a fact issue on the challenged elements.
Flameout Design & Fabrication, 994 S.W.2d at 834; see also Merrell Dow
Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (“More than a scintilla of
evidence exists when the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, ‘rises to a
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level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
conclusions.’” (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499
(Tex. 1995))). To determine if the nonmovant raises a fact issue, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting favorable
evidence if reasonable jurors could do so and disregarding contrary evidence
unless reasonable jurors could not. See Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848 (citing City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).
When, as here, the trial court’s summary judgment order does not state the
basis for the court’s decision, we must uphold the judgment if any of the theories
advanced in the summary judgment motion are meritorious. Providence Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).
B. Strict Products-Liability Claim
In Texas, Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A governs strict
products-liability claims. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex.
1997); Zavala v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 355 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2011, no pet.). Section 402A provides:
(1) [O]ne who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 426; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)
(1965). To hold a seller of a product liable, the product must reach the user in
essentially the same condition as when it left the seller’s possession. Zavala, 355
S.W.3d at 368; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt. g (“The
rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”). Section 402A comment g specifies that
a seller is not liable if it delivers the product in a safe condition “and subsequent
mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g. The injured plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that the product was in a defective condition at the time it
left the hands of the seller, “and unless evidence can be produced which will
support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.” Id.
A product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in marketing,
design, or manufacturing. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 426; Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at
368. To recover for a products-liability claim alleging a design defect, the plaintiff
must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it
unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect
9
was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery. Timpte
Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp.,
2 S.W.3d 251, 256–57 (Tex. 1999); Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 369; see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005(a) (Vernon 2011) (providing that, in design
defect cases, claimant must prove by preponderance of evidence that safer
alternative design existed and defect was producing cause of injury). “Safer
alternative design” is defined as “a product design other than the one actually
used . . . .” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005(b); see Honda of Am.
Mfg., Inc. v. Norman, 104 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. denied) (tacitly approving jury charge that followed language of section
82.005). “Proof of a product failure, standing alone, is not sufficient to raise a fact
question as to whether the product was defective or that it was defective when it
left the hands of the manufacturer.” Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 370; see also Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. 2006) (“Texas law does
not generally recognize a product failure standing alone as proof of a product
defect.”).
Here, Carpenter alleged that the air compressor at issue was defectively
designed because it only had one strap securing the box. He thus complains only
about the packaging of the air compressor; he does not complain that a component
of the compressor itself was defective and caused him injury. Carpenter attached a
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transcript of his April 5, 2011 recorded, unsworn statement as summary judgment
evidence. In this statement, Carpenter stated that other compressor boxes in the
area of the store had two straps securing the box, “[b]ut the compressor [he]
wanted, it only had only one strap on [the box].” Carpenter’s statement was the
only evidence that he presented concerning the condition of the particular
compressor box at the time of his alleged injury. The compressor box with the
broken strap was not introduced into evidence.
Campbell Hausfeld sold its air compressors through a third party, Lowe’s,
which required shipment of the compressor from Campbell Hausfeld to Lowe’s
before the compressor could be purchased by a consumer such as Carpenter. Thus,
necessarily, several individuals not involved with Campbell Hausfeld came into
contact with this compressor box and its packaging both during transit and at
Lowe’s. Carpenter presented no evidence of the condition of the compressor box
at the time that it left Campbell Hausfeld’s facility before being shipped to Lowe’s.
He presented no evidence that Campbell Hausfeld, in general, packages its air
compressors with only one strap securing the box as opposed to two straps. He
presented no evidence that this particular compressor box only had one strap
securing it when it left Campbell Hausfeld’s facility. Thus, based on the summary
judgment evidence, as well as Carpenter’s acknowledgment on appeal that other
Campbell Hausfeld air compressors at the Lowe’s store were secured by two
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straps, it is equally likely that, for example, the box had two straps when it left
Campbell Hausfeld’s facility, but one strap was inadvertently removed during
transit to Lowe’s or after the box arrived at Lowe’s and was being displayed for
purchase. See Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 370 (“To raise a genuine issue of material
fact, the evidence must transcend mere suspicion. Evidence that is so slight as to
make any inference a guess is in legal effect no evidence.”); see also Lozano v.
Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (“The equal inference rule provides that a
jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager circumstantial evidence
‘which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than
another.’”) (quoting Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.
1997)).
To establish his strict products-liability claim based on a design defect,
Carpenter had to demonstrate that the compressor box was defective “when it left
the hands of the manufacturer.”3 See Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 370; see also
3
To the extent Carpenter argues that a manufacturing defect, as opposed to a design
defect, caused his injuries, we note that in strict products-liability cases based on a
manufacturing defect, the plaintiff still must establish that the manufacturing
defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer. Shaun T.
Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 237 S.W.3d 851, 858 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2007, pet. denied) (“The plaintiff must prove the product was defective when it
left the hands of the manufacturer and that the defect was a producing cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries.”); Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (“[T]he plaintiff must trace the defect to the
manufacturer.”); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex.
2004) (stating that manufacturing defect exists when product deviates, in its
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (providing that seller is liable for
product defect if, among other things, product “is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold”);
Id. cmt. g (explaining that seller is not liable unless product is in defective
condition at time it leaves seller’s hands, that seller is not liable if it delivers
product in safe condition and subsequent mishandling causes defect, and that
injured plaintiff bears burden of establishing that product was in defective
condition at time it left seller). Thus, to survive summary judgment, Carpenter had
to present at least a scintilla of evidence that the compressor box that allegedly
injured him was in a defective condition at the time it left Campbell Hausfeld’s
hands.
Even viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to
Carpenter, as we must when reviewing the trial court’s rendition of summary
judgment, we conclude that Carpenter presented no evidence of the condition of
the box, and thus no evidence that the compressor box was in a defective condition
at the time that it left Campbell Hausfeld. Similarly, Carpenter, who acknowledges
in his appellate brief that “other compressors, including other Hausfeld
compressors, were shipped with two safety bands,” presented no evidence that
Campbell Hausfeld did not generally employ the “safer alternative design” of using
construction or quality, from specifications or planned output in manner that
renders it unreasonably dangerous).
13
two straps to secure its air compressor boxes and did not employ the design on this
particular box when it left Campbell Hausfeld’s facility; thus, he presented no
evidence that a “safer alternative design” existed that Campbell Hausfeld did not
actually use.4
We hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on
Carpenter’s strict products liability claim.
We overrule Carpenter’s first issue.
C. Expert Testimony
In his second issue, Carpenter argues that the trial court’s rendition of
summary judgment in favor of Campbell Hausfeld necessarily imposes a
requirement of expert testimony to survive summary judgment in all products-
liability cases. We do not agree.
4
Although Carpenter stated in his recorded statement that other compressor boxes
at the Lowe’s store were secured by two straps, which he then used as evidence
that a “safer alternative design” existed, he presented no evidence of the type of
straps that secured the boxes, the material out which these straps were made,
whether the straps were designed merely to hold the packaging together or
whether they were designed to be used as “load bearing” or as an aid to move and
lift the compressor boxes, or the type of straps that should have been used to
secure the compressor box. He also presented no evidence that, had the
compressor box at issue been secured by two straps, in “reasonable probability”
that design “would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of the
claimant’s personal injury.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.005(b)(1) (Vernon 2011) (defining “safer alternative design”); MCI Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 272 S.W.3d 17, 31 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008), aff’d, 329
S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2010).
14
Here, the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it rendered
summary judgment in favor of Campbell Hausfeld. Carpenter assumes that the
trial court granted summary judgment because Carpenter presented only his lay
testimony and that the trial court would instead require expert testimony to raise a
fact issue on each element of his strict products-liability claim. We do not agree
that the trial court’s summary judgment ruling necessarily requires this conclusion.
The trial court could have determined, as we have held, that Carpenter presented
no evidence, not even lay testimony, on whether the air compressor left Campbell
Hausfeld in a defective condition, a necessary element of his strict products-
liability claim. Similarly, the trial court also could have determined, as we have
held, that Carpenter presented no evidence that a safer alternative design existed
that Campbell Hausfeld did not actually use in this instance. The trial court
therefore could have resolved the case in favor of Campbell Hausfeld without
requiring Carpenter to present expert testimony on every essential element of his
strict products liability claim.
We overrule Carpenter’s second issue.5
5
We express no opinion on whether securing the compressor box with only one
strap constitutes a design or manufacturing defect, nor do we express an opinion
on whether Carpenter was required to present expert testimony for his claims to
survive summary judgment.
15
D. Summary Judgment on All of Carpenter’s Claims
In his third issue, Carpenter contends that the trial court erroneously granted
summary judgment on his negligence claim because Campbell Hausfeld’s
summary judgment motion “did not challenge a single element of [Carpenter’s]
negligence cause of action.” Campbell Hausfeld argues that Carpenter’s
negligence claim, which Carpenter first asserted after Campbell Hausfeld had
moved for summary judgment, was encompassed by his strict products liability
claim, and, thus, its summary judgment motion addressing the strict products
liability claim sufficiently addressed the negligence claim. We agree with
Campbell Hausfeld.
If, after a motion for summary judgment has already been filed, a party
amends his petition to raise a new theory of liability—rather than merely restating
the same essential elements of the original claims in another fashion—then the trial
court cannot grant summary judgment as to the new theories of liability. See
Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 366, 387 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2003, pet. denied); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 147
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“If the amended petition
only ‘reiterates the same essential elements in another fashion,’ then the original
motion for summary judgment will adequately cover the new variations.”) (quoting
Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
16
Dist.] 1999, no pet.)). However, summary judgment may be proper when a ground
asserted in a summary judgment motion conclusively negates a common element
of both the newly and previously pleaded claims or when the original motion is
broad enough to encompass the newly asserted claims. Rotating Servs. Indus., Inc.
v. Harris, 245 S.W.3d 476, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
denied).
Generally, strict products liability and negligence are separate causes of
action with different elements. Shaun T. Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 237
S.W.3d 851, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles,
141 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (“Traditionally in
Texas law, negligence and strict liability have been distinct causes of action.”).
However, when the plaintiff alleges no negligence other than whether the product
was unreasonably dangerous when it was sold, the negligence theory is
“encompassed and subsumed” in the defective product theory, and the plaintiff’s
burden at trial “would be to prove injury resulting from a product defect.” Shaun
T. Mian Corp., 237 S.W.3d at 857; see also Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 348 S.W.3d
465, 476 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. granted) (“Here, however, because the
only negligence Ruiz alleged related to the design of the product, the negligence
theories were subsumed and encompassed in the defective product theory, and
Ruiz’s burden at trial was to prove injury resulting from defective design.”).
17
Here, Carpenter asserted a strict products-liability claim against Campbell
Hausfeld based on the allegedly defective design of the air compressor packaging.
Campbell Hausfeld moved for no-evidence summary judgment on this claim.
While Campbell Hausfeld’s summary judgment was pending before the trial court,
Carpenter amended his petition to add a negligence claim. Carpenter alleged the
following in his second amended petition:
G. Cause of Action- Products Liability
14. Plaintiff alleges that the product in question, the
Campbell Hausfeld 1.2 HP 20-Gallon 125 PSI Electric Air
Compressor was defective and unsafe for its intended purposes; in that
said defects more specifically identified below existed at the time that
the component was designed, manufactured and/or sold by
Defendants. In this connection, the product was defectively designed
in that such defects rendered the product unreasonably dangerous,
which was a proximate or producing cause of the injuries suffered by
Plaintiff.
15. As a proximate result of the defect(s) and the
unreasonably dangerous condition of the product in question, Plaintiff
suffered serious bodily injury. Plaintiff pleads the doctrine of strict
liability as set forth in section 402(A) RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
(Second). The [packaging] placed into the stream of commerce by
Defendants was unsafe for its intended and reasonably foreseeable use
because it was more dangerous than the ordinary consumer would
have anticipated. It was so dangerous that during foreseeable use the
risk of injury outweighed the utility of its design, and it was defective
and faulty so as to render it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.
H. Cause of Action - Negligence
16. In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts that the foregoing
conduct of Defendants constituted negligence, as that cause of action
is defined under Texas law.
18
Thus, the only act of negligence that Carpenter has asserted is whether Campbell
Hausfeld defectively designed the air compressor packaging, such that the
packaging rendered the compressor unreasonably dangerous when sold. We
conclude that Carpenter’s negligence theory is “encompassed and subsumed” in
his strict products-liability theory, and, thus, his burden at trial would be to prove
that the defectively designed product caused his injuries. See Shaun T. Mian
Corp., 237 S.W.3d at 857.
We hold that, under these facts, Campbell Hausfeld’s original summary
judgment motion addressing Carpenter’s strict products-liability cause of action
sufficiently encompassed Carpenter’s later-added negligence cause of action, and
the trial court therefore properly rendered summary judgment in favor of Campbell
Hausfeld on both of Carpenter’s causes of action. See Rotating Servs. Indus., 245
S.W.3d at 487; Specialty Retailers, 29 S.W.3d at 147.
We overrule Carpenter’s third issue.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Brown.
20