Malcolm Dean Scott v. State ( 2011 )

NO. 07-10-0193-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
JUNE 14, 2011
______________________________
MALCOLM DEAN SCOTT, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
NO. B18075-0906; HONORABLE EDWARD LEE SELF, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
CONCURRING OPINION
I agree with the majority in its conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing
to admit evidence of Appellant's previous acquittal in the trial of an extraneous offense,
however, I write separately to address the issue from the perspective of the admissibility
of that acquittal.1
As the majority notes, Appellant relies exclusively on Kerbyson v. State, 711
S.W.2d 289 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd), to support his position that a trial court
errs in excluding evidence of an acquittal on an extraneous offense when the State
offers evidence of that offense. But there is a problem with Appellant's contention --
that's not what Kerbyson held. In Kerbyson, over the appellant's objection, the trial
court admitted evidence of an extraneous offense for which the appellant had been
acquitted. Id. at 290. The court then refused to admit evidence of that acquittal. Id. By
two separate issues, the appellant contended the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of the extraneous offense and in excluding evidence showing his acquittal on that
offense. Id. Without clearly specifying its ground for reversal, the Dallas Court of
Appeals concluded the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the extraneous offense
and then concluded that the prejudicial effect of that error was exacerbated by excluding
evidence of the acquittal. Id. To the extent that Kerbyson can be read as saying the
exclusion of evidence of an acquittal is reversible, I would respectfully disagree.
Furthermore, because this case is factually distinguishable (here Appellant did not
object to the admission of the extraneous offense), Kerbyson is inapposite.
1
In an apparent attempt to justify its dubious decision to offer evidence of a previously acquitted
extraneous offense in the first place, the State misdirects the issue presented by arguing that the
evidence it offered was "same transaction contextual evidence" rather than an extraneous offense.
Because Appellant did not object to the admission of the evidence offered by the State, a decision
counsel may very well have made for strategic purposes, the issue was never about the admissibility of
that evidence. What is really at issue here is the admissibility of the acquittal.
2
Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. An
acquittal is nothing more than one jury's collective opinion as to whether or not the
prosecution proved that particular offense to their satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt. Whether the prosecution did or did not meet its burden in a previous trial does
not make the existence of any fact that is of consequence in this case more or less
probable. Because evidence of Appellant's acquittal was inadmissible under Rule 402
of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the trial court did not err in excluding that evidence.
.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
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