Texas Department of Public Safety v. Rueben P. Allen ( 2011 )

NO. 07-10-0271-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
JUNE 3, 2011
______________________________
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, APPELLANT
V.
RUEBEN P. ALLEN, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF WISE COUNTY;
NO. CV-4750; HONORABLE MELTON D. CUDE, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a hearing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings, the
driver's license of Appellee, Rueben P. Allen, was suspended for 180 days.1 Allen
appealed to the County Court at Law,2 which found that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was not supported by substantial evidence. The
1
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.035(a)(1) (West 2011).
2
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.041(b) (West 2007).
administrative decision was reversed and the Texas Department of Public Safety
appealed that decision to this Court.3 Presenting a sole issue, the Department
questions whether the trial court erred when it reversed the ALJ's finding that the
arresting officer had probable cause to believe Allen was operating a motor vehicle in a
public place while intoxicated.4 We reverse the trial court's judgment and render
judgment affirming the administrative decision to suspend Allen's driver's license for 180
days.
Background Facts
The scant facts are derived from the record at the administrative hearing held on
February 17, 2010. According to the record, in the early evening on December 7, 2009,
Department of Public Safety Trooper Chris Markin was dispatched to the scene of an
accident occurring on FM 730 South, where it was reported that a pickup had rear-
ended another vehicle. Although the pickup left the scene of the accident, it left behind
a license plate near the point of impact. The license plate found at the scene was
matched to a Dodge pickup which was later found abandoned with front end damage.
Allen was identified as the owner of that pickup.
Allen's wife gave a statement that he had called her to pick him up near the site
of the abandoned pickup. She convinced him to turn himself in, and she drove him to
3
A court of appeals has jurisdiction over decisions from county courts at law involving driver's license
suspensions. See State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Barlow, 48 S.W.3d 174, 175 (Tex. 2001). But see Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 524.041(b) (West 2007); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Jenkins, 262 S.W.3d 811, 813
(Tex.App.--Eastland 2008, no pet.).
4
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 73.001 (West
2005). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and that of
this Court on any relevant issue. Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
2
the Wise County Sheriff's Office. Officers at the sheriff's office personally observed
Allen and detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage on him. Allen denied having
consumed any alcoholic beverages that evening.
Allen was arrested on a finding of probable cause to believe that he had been
driving while intoxicated. He was issued a written statutory warning requesting a blood
specimen, which he refused to sign. He was then taken to Wise County Regional
Hospital for a mandatory blood draw. His refusal to voluntarily give a blood specimen
triggered an automatic 180-day suspension of his driver's license. Tex. Transp. Code
Ann. § 724.035(a)(1) (West 2011). Upon notification of the suspension of his license,
Allen timely requested a hearing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings
under section 724.041 of the Code to contest that suspension.
No witnesses testified at the hearing but the Department did introduce two
exhibits: (1) a four-page Peace Officer's Sworn Report completed by Trooper Markin;
and (2) an unsigned Statutory Warning in which a blood specimen was requested from
Allen. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an affirmative finding suspending Allen's
driver's license. Allen's appeal to the County Court at Law resulted in a reversal of the
ALJ's decision and the Department now challenges that decision.
Standard of Review
Administrative license decisions are reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006). Under
that standard, the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
ALJ. Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999). If the ALJ's
3
decision is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, that decision must be upheld.
Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilfeather, 293 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth
2009, no pet.). However, a trial court may reverse an ALJ's determination under certain
circumstances.5
A court of appeals reviews the trial court's substantial evidence decision de novo.
Id. The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the ALJ's decision was correct but
only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the ALJ's decision.
Id. The burden for overturning an agency ruling is formidable. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety
v. Pucek, 22 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
Analysis
Allen's refusal to voluntarily submit a blood specimen implicated section 724.042
of the Texas Transportation Code. Under that section, the Department was required to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the
person;
(2) probable cause existed to believe that the person was:
5
The administrative decision may not be reversed unless it prejudices the substantial rights of an
appellant because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
(B) in excess of the agency=s statutory authority;
(C) made through unlawful procedure;
(D) affected by other error of law;
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and
probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174(2) (West 2008)
4
(A) operating a motor vehicle in a public place while
intoxicated; or
***
(3) the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was requested
to submit to the taking of a specimen; and
(4) the person refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on request of
the officer.
See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (West 2011). See also Texas Dep't of Pub.
Safety v. Torres, 54 S.W.3d 438, 441 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
By its sole issue, the Department maintains the trial court erred in reversing the
ALJ's administrative decision. We agree. In support of its contention, the Department
argues that only probable cause to believe Allen was operating a motor vehicle in a
public place while intoxicated was necessary. As a corollary to that argument the
Department further contends that it was not required to prove Allen was actually driving
while intoxicated. See Partee v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 249 S.W.3d 495, 499
(Tex.App.--Amarillo 2007, no pet.). By its Reply Brief, the Department explains that the
determination whether a driver did in fact operate a motor vehicle in a public place while
intoxicated is a criminal matter with a great burden of proof, while a license suspension
is a civil matter requiring only probable cause to believe the driver was driving while
intoxicated. See, e.g., Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010)
(noting that for evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction for driving while
intoxicated, there must be a temporal link between the intoxication and the driving but,
circumstantial evidence alone can support the conviction). But see Church v. State, 942
S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd) (pointing out that it was
5
beyond the authority of an ALJ to decide the ultimate issue of whether the appellant was
actually operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated).
The issue before this Court is whether it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude
that Trooper Markin had probable cause to believe that Allen was operating his motor
vehicle in a public place while intoxicated when it was involved in an accident on FM
730 South. Probable cause exists when an officer has reasonably trustworthy
information to warrant a reasonable person to believe that a particular person has
committed an offense. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Butler, 110 S.W.3d 673, 675
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
Witnesses at the scene reported to officers that they had observed a pickup rear-
end another vehicle and drive away. A license plate left at the scene was matched to a
pickup owned by Allen. That pickup was later found abandoned. The abandoned
pickup showed front end damage. According to Allen's wife, Allen called her to pick him
up near the site of the abandoned pickup. She convinced him to turn himself in and
drove him to the sheriff's office. While at the sheriff's office, Trooper Markin and others
observed Allen and detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath.6 These
facts sufficiently establish probable cause to believe that Allen was operating a motor
vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.
Allen strongly urges us to uphold the County Court at Law's decision reversing
his license suspension by arguing the Department's failure to show a temporal link
6
During the license suspension hearing, Allen objected to statements contained in Trooper Markin's sworn
report as being inadmissible hearsay. However, hearsay statements may be used to show probable
cause. See Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).
6
between the accident and his interaction with law enforcement when an odor of alcohol
was first detected. See Butler, 110 S.W.3d at 674-76. He contends a "substantial and
significant period of time" passed between the time of the accident and his contact with
law enforcement.7 We disagree with Allen's position.
All that the Department was required to prove at the license suspension hearing
was probable cause to believe Allen was driving while intoxicated. The Department was
not required to prove Allen was intoxicated while operating his pickup at the time of the
accident. Under the substantial evidence standard, we find there was more than a
scintilla of evidence to support a finding of probable cause. We sustain the
Department's sole issue.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is reversed and judgment is rendered upholding the
administrative decision to suspend Allen's driver's license for 180 days.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
7
The record reflects that Trooper Markin was dispatched to the accident scene at 5:45 p.m. Allen's arrival
at the sheriff's office occurred "a short time later."
7