Rene Peralez v. Noe Peralez ( 2011 )


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  •                              NUMBER 13-10-562-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,                                       Appellant,
    v.
    MARIO ALBERTO CERDA,                                                      Appellee.
    On appeal from County Court at Law No. 4
    of Hidalgo County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Vela
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
    This is an interlocutory appeal brought by appellant, the Texas Department of
    Public Safety (―DPS‖), from an order granting a temporary injunction in favor of Mario
    Alberto Cerda, the appellee. The injunction order requires the DPS to return Cerda’s
    driver’s license to him.   Cerda’s license had previously been suspended when he
    refused to take a breath test after being arrested for driving while intoxicated. The DPS
    first urges that the trial court erred ―by implicitly overruling the Department’s plea to the
    jurisdiction based on Cerda’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.‖ By its
    second issue, the DPS complains that the trial court erred in finding Cerda had a probable
    right to have his driver’s license restored based on Cerda’s claim that he was acquitted of
    the driving while intoxicated charge.      We vacate the trial court’s order granting a
    temporary injunction and dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The underlying facts are not in dispute.      On December 4, 2009, Cerda was
    arrested for driving while intoxicated. On that same date, he was given notice that his
    driver’s license was being suspended for failure to take a breath test. See TEX. TRANSP.
    CODE ANN. § 724.032 (Vernon Supp. 2010). Cerda did not appeal the suspension in
    accordance with section 724.041 of the transportation code. See 
    id. § 724.041
    (Vernon
    Supp. 2010). On June 28, 2010, the trial court granted Cerda’s motion to suppress and
    then granted the State’s motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence in the driving
    while intoxicated case.
    Cerda then attempted to have his license returned, but DPS denied his request.
    He then filed an ―original petition for writ of mandamus and request for injunctive relief,‖
    claiming that, because he was ―acquitted‖ of the driving while intoxicated charge, he was
    entitled to have the suspension lifted. See 
    id. § 524.015(b)
    (Vernon Supp. 2010). DPS
    responded by filing a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Cerda failed to exhaust
    mandatory administrative remedies.
    2
    The trial court held a hearing, after which it granted Cerda the relief he requested,
    stating in its order that Cerda had a probable right of recovery and would suffer
    irreparable injury if his license was not returned to him. Implicitly, the trial court overruled
    DPS’s plea to the jurisdiction.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    When reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, appellate
    courts review the trial court’s ruling de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
    
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 228 (Tex. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to
    have authority to decide a case; it is never presumed, cannot be waived, and can be
    raised any time. See Alfonso v. Skadden, 
    251 S.W.3d 52
    , 55 (Tex. 2008); Tex. Ass’n of
    Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 
    852 S.W.2d 440
    , 443-44 (Tex. 1993).
    This case is also an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction. We
    review the trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction under the abuse of discretion
    standard. Davis v. Huey, 
    571 S.W.2d 859
    , 861-62 (Tex. 1978); Matagorda Hosp. Dist. v.
    City of Palacios, 
    47 S.W.3d 96
    , 99 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
    III. ANALYSIS
    When an individual’s driver’s license is suspended, the right to appeal is set forth in
    chapter 724 of the transportation code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.041 (Vernon
    Supp. 2010). If an individual fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the trial court lacks
    subject matter jurisdiction and it must dismiss the case. See 
    id. § 724.044
    (Vernon
    1999) (stating that the department’s suspension is final and may not be appealed if the
    person fails to request a hearing under section 724.041); see Thomas v. Long, 207
    
    3 S.W.3d 334
    , 340 (Tex. 2006); see also Kurtzemann v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No.
    01-08-00543-CV, 
    2009 WL 2396112
    at *2 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 6, 2009
    pet. denied).      There is no dispute here—Cerda did not exhaust his administrative
    remedies under the transportation code. We hold, therefore, that the trial court was
    without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the temporary injunction and, accordingly, we
    sustain DPS’s first issue.
    Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of this case, Cerda could not prevail.
    He cannot show a probable right to recover because he was not acquitted of the criminal
    charge.1 A license suspension may not be imposed on a person who is acquitted of a
    criminal charge under enumerated sections of the Texas Alcoholic and Beverage Code.
    See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 524.015 (Vernon Supp. 2010). An acquittal is an official
    fact finding that the accused is not guilty of the criminal offense with which he is charged.
    Ex parte George, 
    913 S.W.2d 623
    , 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). However, a pre-trial
    order of dismissal is not regarded as an acquittal. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Nielsen,
    
    102 S.W.3d 313
    , 316 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (holding that the prosecutor’s
    dismissal of criminal charges was not tantamount to an acquittal); Tex. Dep’t of Pub.
    Safety v. Norrell, 
    968 S.W.2d 16
    , 19-20 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (same).
    Here, the evidence was undisputed that the case against Cerda was a pre-trial
    dismissal for lack of sufficient evidence; he was not acquitted. We sustain DPS’s second
    issue.
    1
    In order to prevail on a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action
    against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable
    injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 
    84 S.W.3d 198
    , 204 (Tex. 2002).
    4
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Because the trial court was without jurisdiction to act, we vacate the trial court’s
    order granting the temporary injunction and dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.
    ROSE VELA
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    10th day of February, 2011.
    5