Mark Lee Newby v. Dianne Marie Uhl ( 2012 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00134-CV
Mark Lee Newby § From the 233rd District Court
§ of Tarrant County (324-460819-09)
v.
§ November 15, 2012
Dianne Marie Uhl § Per Curiam
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
the appeal should be dismissed as moot. It is ordered that the appeal is
dismissed as moot.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
PER CURIAM
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00134-CV
MARK LEE NEWBY APPELLANT
V.
DIANNE MARIE UHL APPELLEE
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FROM THE 233RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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The trial court signed an order on March 9, 2012, finding Appellant Mark
Lee Newby in criminal and civil contempt, committing him to jail, and ordering
him to pay child support and health expense reimbursement arrearages. Newby
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the contempt findings, and
we struck the portion of the order holding Newby in criminal contempt and
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
modified the civil contempt part of the order. See In re Newby, 370 S.W.3d 463,
470–71 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding).
In this direct appeal of the March 9, 2012 order, Newby does not challenge
the part of the order awarding arrearages to Appellee Dianne Marie Uhl. See
In re B.A.T., No. 05-10-00593-CV, 2010 WL 3991426, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Oct. 11, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (―Although a party may not challenge a
judgment of contempt by direct appeal, a party may appeal a final arrearage
order provided the notice of appeal is timely filed.‖). Instead, he merely argues
that he should be released from jail.
Uhl has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the appeal is
moot because the trial court ordered Newby released from jail on October 12,
2012. Uhl attached to the motion an ―Order of Release from Jail‖ signed by the
trial court on October 12, 2012. Therefore, notwithstanding that a direct appeal is
not the appropriate method to challenge a contempt judgment,2 the trial court’s
October 12, 2012 order mooted the issue raised in this appeal. We dismiss this
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
2
See Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2001, pet denied) (stating that a contempt judgment is reviewable only via a
petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is confined) or a petition for
writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved)); see also Beeler v. Fuqua, 351
S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) (―We lack jurisdiction
over a direct appeal from a contempt order, even if the contempt order is
appealed along with a judgment that is appealable.‖).
3
PANEL: MEIER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and GARDNER, J.
DELIVERED: November 15, 2012
4