Jonnie Dent v. State ( 2014 )

Opinion issued January 30, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-12-01043-CR
———————————
JONNIE DENT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 184th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1296532
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged Jonnie Dent with aggravated robbery of an elderly
individual, a first-degree felony, enhanced by one prior felony conviction. A jury
heard the case and found Dent guilty of the lesser-included offense of intentionally
or knowingly causing bodily injury to an elderly individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.04 (West Supp. 2013). After finding the enhancement allegation true,
the jury assessed punishment at twenty years’ confinement.
In his appeal, Dent contends that (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in violation of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution;
(2) the trial court erred in refusing to strike the jury panel; and (3) insufficient
evidence supports the court costs reflected in the judgment. We hold that the
record does not support Dent’s charge of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial
court acted within its discretion in refusing to strike the jury panel, and sufficient
evidence supports the court cost assessment. We therefore affirm.
Background
Dent’s great-grandparents, Odessa and Charles Williams, raised Dent from
infancy. As an adult, Dent visited them at their home near Martin Luther King
Boulevard in Houston, but he did not have a key to the residence. At the time of
the incident, Odessa was 83 years old and Charles was 76 years old.
In February 2011, in the middle of the night, Dent came to the home and
demanded money from Odessa. Dent followed her to her bedroom and waited as
she reached under her pillow for her coin purse, which contained about seven
dollars in change. Odessa did not want to count her money in front of Dent, so she
tried to slip by him to go into another room. As she tried to pass, Dent struck her
with his hand. Odessa’s head hit the bedpost. She fell into the wall and then onto
2
the floor. The open coin purse fell out of Odessa’s hand, and coins spilled out onto
the floor. Dent picked up the change and left. Odessa called the police because
she wanted to make sure Dent would stay out of the house for the night.
The police arrived and interviewed Odessa and Charles about the incident.
They photographed the swelling on the left side of Odessa’s head and offered to
call an ambulance, but she refused medical treatment.
Discussion
I. Strickland Claim
Dent contends that his trial counsel failed to represent him effectively
because he behaved rudely in front of the jury during voir dire and because he had
received substantial negative publicity during his campaign for district attorney.
Dent also complains that trial counsel’s hearing impairment prevented him from
providing effective assistance and that counsel’s deficient performance opened the
door to a number of Dent’s prior extraneous offenses. Finally, Dent complains that
his second-chair trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance during the
punishment phase of the trial by failing to raise Dent’s mental illness as a
mitigating factor.
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the defendant must
show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) a reasonable
probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984); see
also Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A
defendant has the burden to establish both prongs by a preponderance of the
evidence; failure to make either showing defeats his ineffectiveness claim.
Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). We apply
a strong presumption that trial counsel was competent. Thompson v. State, 9
S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We also presume trial counsel’s actions
were reasonably professional and motivated by sound trial strategy. Jackson v.
State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Johnson v. State, 176 S.W.3d
74, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).
The record must firmly support a claim of ineffective assistance. Thompson,
9 S.W.3d at 813. Where the record does not offer an explanation for counsel’s
actions, we presume that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in
making all significant decisions. Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771; Broussard v. State,
68 S.W.3d 197, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (en banc).
“Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising such a claim
because the record is generally undeveloped.” Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d
390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Dent raised his Strickland claims in a motion
for new trial, but neither of his trial attorneys testified to explain their challenged
conduct. When the record does not reflect counsel’s reasons for the challenged
4
conduct, an appellate court will assume a strategic motivation if any can possibly
be imagined, and it will not conclude that the challenged conduct constituted
deficient performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent
attorney would have engaged in it. Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440.
Trial counsel’s behavior during voir dire
Dent complains that trial counsel prejudiced the jury against him by
disobeying the court’s directions and requesting a break during voir dire. The
reporter’s record shows the following exchange:
Court: Mr. Oliver, on behalf of the defendant. Are you ready to
go forward?
Counsel: On behalf of the defendant, I request a 10-minute break,
Your Honor.
Court: Counsel, I said I wasn’t going—
Oliver: Can we take a vote?
Court: And I said don’t embarrass me by asking. So, no break.
Let’s go forward.
Counsel: Would anyone join me in my request for a break for a 10-
minute break?
...
Court: The break will be an hour because I have another court to
be in. So, if we take a break for an hour—
Venire member: No.
Court: All right. Let’s begin, counsel.
Counsel: All right
...
Counsel: Right. Yes. I was going to say good morning, but good
afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Can we stand up and
maybe stretch. Okay. There you go.
5
Court: I’m going to another court, Counselor. We will take an
hour break. Everybody can go to lunch.
Out of the jury’s presence, the trial court admonished defense counsel for
“disrupt[ing] the orderly proceedings of [the c]ourt.”
When voir dire resumed, trial counsel promptly apologized and asked the
panel whether his behavior prejudiced them against the defense. Some panel
members expressed the opinion that defense counsel had acted extremely rudely to
the court. The trial court asked the panel members to raise their hands if they
would be prejudiced against Dent due to his counsel’s behavior. Most of the sixty-
five panel members responded that their opinion of trial counsel’s conduct had not
prejudiced them against Dent, expressing that they would still be able to sit as fair
and impartial jurors in the case. Twelve panel members responded that they could
not be fair to Dent due to defense counsel’s conduct.
When it came to selecting the jury, Dent’s counsel and the State agreed on
all challenges for cause except defense counsel’s challenge to panel member 21,
who said that defense counsel’s conduct angered her but that she could still be fair
to Dent. Each side received and exercised ten peremptory strikes, and panel
member 21 was not seated on the jury.
Dent compares his situation to that addressed in Miller v. State, 728 S.W.2d
133 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d). In Miller, our sister court
held that trial counsel’s offensive and abusive behavior throughout trial rendered
6
his representation ineffective. Id. at 134. Unlike counsel in Miller, though, trial
counsel’s misbehavior in this case was directed at the trial court, not the panel or
his client. Counsel’s misbehavior was brief, he apologized to the panel for it, and
the trial court and the State worked with defense counsel to ensure that any panel
member who expressed prejudice as a result of it was not seated on the jury. Dent
does not identify any panel member who expressed an inability to consider the
charges against Dent fairly because of counsel’s behavior during voir dire and was,
nevertheless, seated on the jury. We hold that the record does not support Dent’s
burden to show that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding
would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064;
Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 101–02.
Negative publicity connected with trial counsel’s run for public office
Dent claims that negative publicity about trial counsel’s bid for public office
rendered his assistance ineffective. Dent, whose trial took place shortly before
Election Day, points specifically to a community newspaper article that appeared
the day of jury selection and contends that its harsh criticism of trial counsel
influenced the jury against him.
The trial court instructed jury during voir dire not to read or listen to any
story in the media about the case or the defendant. The next day, the trial court
supplemented its prior instruction, admonishing jurors not to read or listen to
7
anything in the media about the lawyers in the case. At the end of each day of
trial, the trial court reminded jurors “not to read or listen to anything about the case
or about the lawyers. So don’t read anything about the attorneys, as well; or if
there is anything on the news about the attorneys, please turn that off.”
Nothing in the record shows that any juror disobeyed the court’s instructions
and heard or read negative publicity concerning Oliver. “We will ‘presume[] that
jurors, conscious of the gravity of their tasks, attend closely the particular language
of the trial court’s instructions in criminal cases and strive to understand, make
sense of, and follow the instructions given them.’” DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d
701, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324
n.9, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1976 n.9 (1985)). The record on direct appeal does not
demonstrate that trial counsel’s run for public office rendered him ineffective in
representing Dent.
Counsel’s hearing impairment
Dent further complains that trial counsel’s hearing impairment made him
unable to follow the proceedings, thereby making his representation inadequate.
Dent likens his situation to that of the defendant in State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540
(Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d). In Gill, the Austin court of appeals affirmed
the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for new trial, holding that
counsel’s ongoing health problems, including hearing loss, rendered him unable to
8
effectively represent Gill. We find Gill inapposite. The record in that case showed
that, in addition to hearing loss, counsel had numerous serious problems such as
senility, cerebral atrophy, continuous alcohol abuse, severe heart problems, and
reduced vision, and he had recently been released from the hospital. Id. at 543 &
n.2. Counsel made a number of significant legal errors during the proceeding that
apparently resulted from his disabilities. See id. at 542–43. The record in this
case, however, does not show that defense counsel’s actions at trial were “so
outrageous that no reasonable competent trial attorney would have done likewise.”
See Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Trial counsel and
the court in this case were proactive in resolving any problems arising from
counsel’s hearing impairment. Co-counsel assisted in pointing out when trial
counsel was having trouble hearing, and the trial court gave co-counsel
opportunities to relay the court’s communications to trial counsel. Instead of
holding whispered bench conferences, which trial counsel had difficulty hearing,
the trial court excused the jury from the courtroom when lengthy issues arose so
that discussions could take place at a normal speaking volume. In one instance, the
court stated on the record that “one of the things I watch for is whether or not
anyone in the courtroom is having trouble hearing, and I have not noticed Mr.
Oliver having any trouble hearing the witness.” The record does not support
9
Dent’s claim that trial counsel’s hearing impairment rendered his assistance
inadequate under Strickland.
Admission of extraneous offenses
Dent asserts that trial counsel opened the door to a number of Dent’s prior
extraneous offenses involving his assaultive and threatening conduct toward his
great-grandparents. The record does not bear out this assertion. It shows that
Odessa, who was reluctant to testify against Dent, denied that Dent hit her during
the incident and denied or minimized past incidents of abuse. The record reflects
that Odessa’s trial testimony led to the trial court’s ruling permitting the State to go
into the extraneous offenses. As rebuttal to Odessa’s denial of the incident, the
State proffered evidence of Dent’s numerous, similar prior offenses against Odessa
and Charles. In seeking admission of this evidence, the State argued that the prior
offenses were relevant to Dent’s motive and intent, and that his conduct was not
the result of a mistake.
The trial court ruled that two of the prior offenses involving Dent’s assault
of his great-grandmother were “[a]dmitted to extent they show mal intent toward
Mrs. Williams; but “if she starts denying these things on the witness stand,
extraneouses, especially where there is a conviction and he pled guilty or no
contest, . . . may well come in to show his intent.” Odessa denied that Dent hit her
in the prior assaultive offenses. In allowing the State to introduce evidence of the
10
remaining offenses before the jury, the trial court explained that it considered other
testimony in addition to Odessa’s denials:
And just so the record is clear, one of the things I’m considering is
that she said she thinks he has changed; and that opens the door to
while after this, after he did X, he didn’t change, did he? And after he
did Y, he didn’t change, did he?”
So, I think the record is pretty clear the State’s entitled to go into all of
those offenses except the one I have already admonished you about.
So, the Defense objection is overruled.
The defense’s cross-examination of Odessa focused on the evidence of the offenses
introduced by the State; it did not open the door to additional evidence of prior bad
acts. Consequently, the record does not support Dent’s claim that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance on this ground.
Co-counsel’s conduct during the punishment phase
Dent complains that co-counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the
punishment phase in two respects. First, Dent contends that co-counsel failed to
investigate and develop evidence of Dent’s mental illness as a mitigating factor
during punishment. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Dent’s new counsel
introduced state records showing that Dent had been diagnosed with psychosis and
bipolar disorder, and that he previously attempted to commit suicide.
In considering whether trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation for
potential mitigating evidence, we focus on whether the investigation supporting
counsel’s decision not to introduce evidence of Dent’s mental health problems as
11
mitigation evidence was reasonable. See Freeman v. State, 167 S.W.3d 114, 117
(Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523,
123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2003)). Counsel’s representation is ineffective if counsel
failed to adequately investigate the issue. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at
2535; see also Freeman, 167 S.W.3d at 117.
The record shows that defense counsel was aware that Dent had mental
health problems. It also shows that Dent was a multiple substance abuser and,
while his mental illness was readily controlled by medications, Dent did not
comply with his medication regimen. In considering the issue during the hearing
on Dent’s motion for new trial, the trial court observed that “the big dispute is, is it
the mental illness that causes the problems, or is it the poly-substance abuse?” The
record shows that Dent’s assaults and threats against his great-grandparents
occurred over a span of a decade. Dent had been arrested thirty times and referred
to detox twenty-five of those times. Odessa’s testimony indicated that she believed
Dent was on drugs when he became violent toward her, and he demanded money
so that he could pay for drugs. These circumstances are not like those in the cases
relied on by Dent. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522, 123 S. Ct. at 2536 (counsel
conducted inadequate investigation of defendant’s background where evidence in
habeas corpus record showed investigation would have revealed that defendant had
limited intellectual capacity and, as a child, suffered from severe physical and
12
sexual abuse at hands of his mother, a chronic alcoholic, and while in care of a
series of foster parents); see also Freeman, 167 S.W.3d at 119–21 (counsel
conducted inadequate investigation where evidence on motion for new trial
showed that defendant had been hospitalized for psychotic episodes and received
treatment shortly before offense, expert opined that condition showed the potential
for insanity diagnosis and defense, and trial counsel’s testimony showed that
defendant’s mental health issues did not play a significant role in trial strategy).
The record in this case is silent about trial counsel’s reasons for not presenting
evidence of Dent’s mental health history, and “we will not conclude the challenged
conduct constituted deficient performance unless the conduct was so outrageous
that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440.
The record supports the presumption that co-counsel made a tactical decision not
to raise Dent’s mental illness as a mitigating factor because it would open the door
to evidence that he abused drugs and was violent while on drugs.
Dent also contends that co-counsel’s closing argument at punishment
amounted to ineffective assistance. The challenged portion reads as follows:
Today you’re the Government. The buck stops here. You decide
what happens. What’s the worst thing that can happen? You can let
Jonnie out of jail. He can go home and do violence to his great
grandparents. That’s the worst thing that could happen. That’s the
thing that the Government, you, doesn’t want to let happen.
13
The State waived the right to open and reserved the right to close. That decision
meant that defense counsel had to anticipate the State’s arguments to make an
effective closing argument, and these statements, when read in context, reflect that
effort. Co-counsel recited the State’s position, but then asked the jury to consider
that the State had gone against Dent’s grandparent’s wishes in prosecuting the case
and to respect the Williamses’ trust and love for Dent by “[s]entenc[ing] him to the
minimum time that you possibly can in good conscience.” Viewed in context, co-
counsel’s punishment-phase closing argument reveals a reasonable trial strategy;
thus, Dent fails to show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
II. Failure to Strike Venire Panel
Dent complains that the jury panel was irreparably tainted after it witnessed
defense counsel’s behavior during voir dire and that as a result, the trial court erred
in refusing to strike the panel. As the functional equivalent of a motion for
mistrial, we review the trial court’s ruling on a request to strike the jury panel for
an abuse of discretion. See Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007); see also Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). The trial court made a considered decision during voir dire
and determined that, though the numbers were close, enough panel members who
stated that they would not be biased against Dent as a result of counsel’s behavior
remained to seat a jury. Our review of the record in the context of Dent’s
14
Strickland claim showed no evidence that the trial court seated any panel member
who expressed the opinion that trial counsel’s brief outburst affected their ability to
consider Dent’s claim. Under the circumstances, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the panel.
III. Assessment of Costs
Dent contends that the $334 award of court costs recited in the judgment is
not supported by sufficient evidence. The district clerk must keep a record of each
fee or item of cost charged for a service rendered in a criminal action or
proceeding. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.009(a)(1) (West 2006). If a
criminal action is appealed, an officer of the court must certify and sign a bill of
costs and send it to the court to which the action is appealed. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 103.006 (West 2006). In this case, the clerk’s record contains a
bill of costs.
Because it received the bill of costs after it signed an initial judgment
assessing $279 in court costs, the trial court entered a judgment nunc pro tunc to
correct the assessment to the $334 reflected in the bill of costs. The trial court may
correct clerical, but not judicial, omissions or errors in a judgment after the trial
court loses its plenary jurisdiction through a judgment nunc pro tunc. State v.
Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The complete appellate
record in this case was filed in this court on March 7, 2013—after the nunc pro
15
tunc judgment was signed on February 14, 2013. Accordingly, the trial court had
jurisdiction to sign the nunc pro tunc judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(g);
Meineke v. State, 171 S.W.3d 551, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
pet. ref’d) (trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc after the
appellate record for the case is filed); see also Green v. State, 906 S.W.2d 937, 939
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (interpreting former appellate rule 40(b)(2), predecessor to
current rule 25.2).
Citing Jelks v. State, 397 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, pet. filed), Dent contends that the bill of cost assessment is invalid because it
lacks the required signature. Dent acknowledges that, unlike the bill in Jelks, the
one in his case contains a signature, but he complains that the signature has no
effect because it postdates the date of filing. Jelks examined the language in article
103.001 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
A cost is not payable by the person charged with the cost until a
written bill is produced or is ready to be produced, containing the
items of cost, signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer
who is entitled to receive payment for the cost.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 103.001. The signature of a Harris County
deputy district clerk dated February 2, 2013 appears on the last page of the cost bill
assessment. The trial court entered the judgment nunc pro tunc on February 4,
2013. The cost bill assessment, containing the deputy clerk’s signature, complied
with article 103.001 before the trial court entered the judgment nunc pro tunc. We
16
hold that the judgment nunc pro tunc validly charges Dent with the costs reflected
on the signed cost bill assessment.
We therefore proceed to consider whether sufficient evidence supports the
assessment of $334 in costs, reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the
award in measuring the sufficiency of the evidence to support an assessment of
costs. See Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
A defendant convicted of a felony offense must pay certain statutorily
mandated costs and fees, which vary depending on the type of offense, the
underlying facts, and procedural history of the case. See Owen v. State, 352
S.W.3d 542, 546 n.5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (listing Texas statutes
requiring convicted persons to pay costs and fees). The record shows that a jury
convicted Dent of a felony in district court, supporting each of the following costs
listed in the bill of costs:
• $50 “serving capias” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a)(2) (West
Supp. 2013) (“A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay
the following fees for services performed in the case by a peace officer . . .
$50 for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant, capias, or capias
pro fine. . . .”));
• $40 “summoning 08 witness/mileage” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.011(a)(3) (West Supp. 2013) (“A defendant convicted of a felony or a
misdemeanor shall pay . . . $5 for summoning a witness.”));
• $5 “jury fee” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a)(7) (West Supp.
2013) (“A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay . . .
$5 for [services of peace officers in] summoning a jury”));
17
• $5 “commitment” and $5 “release” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.011(a)(6) (West Supp. 2013) (“A defendant convicted of a felony or a
misdemeanor shall pay the $5 for [services performed by peace officers in
connection with] commitment or release . . . .”));
• $40 “clerk’s fee” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.005(a) (West 2006)
("A defendant convicted of an offense in . . . a district court shall pay for the
services of the clerk of the court a fee of $40.”));
• $20 “jury fee” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.004(a) (West 2006)
(“A defendant convicted by a jury in a . . . district court shall pay jury fee of
$20.”));
• $5 “security fee” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 102.017(a) (West Supp.
2013) (“A defendant convicted of a felony offense in a district court shall
pay a $5 security fee as a cost of court.”));
• $133 “consolidated court cost” (TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.102(a)
(West Supp. 2013) (“A person convicted of an offense shall pay as a court
cost, in addition to all other costs . . . $133 on conviction of a felony. . . .”));
• $4 “jury reimbursement fee” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.0045(a)
(West Supp. 2013) (“A person convicted of any offense, other than an
offense relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor vehicle, shall pay
as a court cost, in addition to all other costs, a fee of $4 to be used to
reimburse counties for the cost of juror services as provided by Section
61.0015, Government Code.”));
• $25 “DC records preservation” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.005(f) (West 2006) (“A defendant convicted of an offense in . . . a
district court shall pay a fee of $25 for records management and preservation
services performed by the county as required by Chapter 203, Local
Government Code.”));
• $2 “support of indigent defense” (TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.107(a)
(West Supp. 2013) (“A person convicted of any offense, other than an
offense relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor vehicle, shall pay
as a court cost, in addition to other costs, a fee of $2 to be used to fund
indigent defense representation through the fair defense account established
under Section 79.031, Government Code.”));
• $6 “support of judiciary fee” (TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.105(a)
(West 2008) (“A person convicted of any offense, other than an offense
18
relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor vehicle, shall pay as a court
cost, in addition to all other costs, a fee of $6 to be used for court-related
purposes for the support of the judiciary.”)); and
• $4 “court technology fund” (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.0169(a)
(West Supp. 2013) (“A defendant convicted of a criminal offense in a . . .
district court shall pay a $4 . . . district court technology fee as a cost of
court.”)).
The fine and costs listed in the cost bill assessment total $344, ten dollars more
than the amount assessed in the judgment nunc pro tunc. Because the record
supports assessment of $344, and the bill recites $344 as the “total amount owed,”
we modify the judgment to correct the trial court’s clerical error and assess $344 as
the total amount of costs that Dent owes.
Conclusion
We hold that Dent has not satisfied his Strickland burden; the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the jury panel; and sufficient evidence
supports the assessment of $344 in costs. We therefore modify the judgment to
assess $344 in costs and affirm the judgment as modified.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
19