David Joel Saddler v. State ( 2012 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00314-CR
DAVID JOEL SADDLER APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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On June 15, 2012, as part of a plea bargain agreement, David Joel
Saddler pled guilty to theft of property, and the trial court sentenced him to six
months’ confinement in a state jail facility and certified that Saddler had waived
his right to appeal. Saddler filed a pro se notice of appeal on July 19, 2012. On
July 20, 2012, we notified Saddler’s retained trial counsel that Saddler had filed a
pro se notice of appeal, that the trial court’s certification indicating that Saddler
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
had waived his right to appeal had been filed in this court, and that this appeal
could be dismissed unless Saddler or any party desiring to continue the appeal
filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal on or before July 30,
2012. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. This same notification was sent to
Saddler. To date, we have received no response from Saddler.
However, we have received a response from Saddler’s trial counsel, who
has informed us that Saddler entered into a plea-bargain agreement with the
State and that the trial court followed the agreement. Counsel also has informed
us that Saddler was informed that he would not have the right to appeal. Further,
counsel has advised us that he did not file the notice of appeal and that he did
not encourage Saddler to file one.
Texas has long held that a valid waiver of appeal prevents a defendant
from appealing without the trial court’s consent. Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d
794, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). A waiver is valid if entered voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Delaney, 207 S.W.3d at 796–97; Monreal, 99 S.W.3d at 617; Ex
parte Tabor, 565 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In the present case,
the trial court’s certification states that Saddler has waived his right to appeal.
We also note that this was a plea-bargain case in which the punishment did not
exceed the State’s recommendation. In such a case, a defendant may appeal
only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before
trial, or after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2.
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Saddler has not shown that his waiver was invalid or that, despite his waiver, the
trial court nonetheless granted permission to appeal, and he has not advised us
that he wishes to appeal matters raised by written motion and ruled on before
trial. Accordingly, we hold that Saddler has waived his right to appeal, and we
order this appeal dismissed. See Monreal, 99 S.W.3d at 622–23; see also Tex.
R. App. P. 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
PANEL: GABRIEL, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 6, 2012
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