Ex Parte Michael Monaco ( 2013 )


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  • Opinion issued December 19, 2013
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-13-00707-CR
    ———————————
    EX PARTE MICHAEL MONACO
    On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 10
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1912023
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Michael Monaco filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the trial
    court, seeking to avoid extradition following his arrest made pursuant to a
    governor’s warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 2 (Vernon
    2013). Following a hearing, the trial court denied Monaco’s requested habeas
    corpus relief. Monaco timely appealed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31.
    We affirm.
    Background
    On August 8, 2013, Monaco filed his “Application for Writ of Habeas
    Corpus Challenging Legality of Arrest under Governor’s Warrant” in which he
    alleged,
    Defendant is unlawfully restrained of liberty by the Sheriff of
    Harris County, Texas, having been arrested on authority of a
    governor’s warrant under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
    Act. He is currently confined in the Harris County Jail in
    Houston, Texas, awaiting hearing on this writ.
    This restraint is illegal under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
    Act because defendant is not a fugitive.
    Based on the application, writ of habeas corpus issued commanding the
    sheriff to bring Monaco before the trial court on August 9, 2013 to show why
    Monaco was in custody. The sheriff’s office filed a sworn return reflecting that
    appellant was in custody by virtue of a governor’s warrant, which had commanded
    the sheriff “to take the body of [Monaco],” to “safely keep” Monaco, and to take
    him before the trial judge “to answer a charge of fugitive.”
    On August 9, the trial court signed an order, denying Monaco’s requested
    habeas relief. The order provided as follows:
    Today, this Court heard applicant’s application for writ of habeas
    corpus. The writ issued by this Court has been returned and the
    applicant and an assistant district attorney representing the State of
    Texas appeared for a hearing on the application. After reviewing the
    pleadings and hearing the evidence and argument of the parties, the
    Court . . . ORDERS RELIEF DENIED, and remands applicant to the
    custody of Harris County Sheriff’s Department.
    2
    Also on August 9, Monaco filed a notice of appeal, signed by his retained counsel,
    who had represented Monaco in the habeas proceeding.
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 31 governs appeals from an order or judgment
    in a habeas corpus proceeding. TEX. R. APP. P. 31. Rule 31.1 requires the trial
    court clerk to prepare and certify the clerk’s record. TEX. R. APP. P. 31.1. The rule
    also requires the court reporter to prepare and certify the reporter’s record, if
    requested by the appellant. See 
    id. The rule
    further requires the trial court clerk to
    send the clerk’s record and the court reporter to send the reporter’s record, if one
    has been requested, to this Court within 15 days of the filing of the notice of
    appeal. 
    Id. In this
    case, the appellate record was due by August 26, 2013. See 
    id. The trial
    court clerk filed the clerk’s record in this Court on August 21, 2013. The
    reporter’s record, however, was not filed by the due date. On September 12, 2013,
    the court reporter sent notice to this Court indicating that “appellant has not paid or
    made arrangements to pay for the record and is not appealing as indigent.”
    October 24, 2013, the Clerk of this Court notified Monaco that the court
    reporter had informed the Court that he had not paid, or made arrangements to pay,
    the reporter’s fee for preparing the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(b). The Clerk
    further notified Monaco that unless, on or before November 12, 2013, he filed
    proof that he had paid, or had made arrangements to pay, the reporter’s fee for
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    preparing the record, the Court may consider and decide those issues or points that
    do not require a reporter’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c) (stating that, if
    clerk’s record has been filed, appellate court may consider and decide those issues
    or points that do not require a reporter’s record). The Clerk’s notice also informed
    Monaco that, if he believed he was exempt from paying for the reporter’s record
    due to indigence, he should inform the Court by the due date. Monaco did not
    respond.
    After he failed to respond, Monaco was notified by our Clerk that the Court
    would “consider and decide those issues or points that do not require a reporter’s
    record for a decision.” See 
    id. Monaco was
    informed that the appeal had been set
    for submission without briefing, as permitted by Rule 31.1. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    31.1 (indicating that appeal arising from habeas proceeding may be submitted
    without briefing).
    Analysis
    In his habeas application, Monaco asserted that he had been arrested “on
    authority of a governor’s warrant under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act” and
    was confined in jail. He argued that his restraint was illegal under the act because
    he “is not a fugitive.” The application was not supported by affidavit or other
    evidence.
    4
    Texas has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codified as Code
    of Criminal Procedure article 51.13. That article provides that “it is the duty of the
    Governor of this State to have arrested and delivered up to the Executive Authority
    of any other State of the United States any person charged in that State with
    treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this
    State.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 2. A habeas corpus proceeding
    challenging extradition is “intended to be limited in scope in order to facilitate a
    swift and efficient transfer of custody to the demanding state.” Ex parte Potter, 
    21 S.W.3d 290
    , 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
    A writ applicant bears the burden of proving facts that would entitle him to
    relief. Ex parte Kimes, 
    872 S.W.2d 700
    , 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). When a
    governor has granted extradition, a court considering an application for writ of
    habeas corpus may only consider four issues: “(a) whether the extradition
    documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged
    with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named
    in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.”
    Michigan v. Doran, 
    439 U.S. 282
    , 289, 
    99 S. Ct. 530
    , 535 (1978). Once the
    governor’s warrant, regular on its face, is introduced into evidence, the burden
    shifts to the accused to show the warrant was not legally issued, was not based on
    proper authority, or contains inaccurate recitals. See Ex parte Cain, 
    592 S.W.2d 5
    359, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ibarra v. State, 
    961 S.W.2d 415
    , 417 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). The accused opposing extradition may
    offer into evidence any of the papers that were used to support the warrant in an
    attempt to show a defect. See 
    Cain, 592 S.W.2d at 362
    .
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial writ of habeas corpus for an
    abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 657
    , 664 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006); Washington v. State, 
    326 S.W.3d 701
    , 704 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2010, no pet.). In conducting this review, we view the facts in the light most
    favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See 
    Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664
    ; 
    Washington, 326 S.W.3d at 704
    .
    When seeking appellate review, an appellant has the burden to properly
    initiate the completion of a record sufficient to illustrate reversible error. See TEX.
    R. APP. P. 31.1, 35.3; see also Perez v. State, 
    261 S.W.3d 760
    , 764 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); Cheek v. State, 
    65 S.W.3d 728
    , 730 (Tex.
    App.—Waco 2001, no pet.); Kent v. State, 
    982 S.W.2d 639
    , 641 (Tex. App.—
    Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d, untimely filed).         Although the court reporter is
    responsible for preparing, certifying, and timely filing the reporter’s record, that
    responsibility is conditioned on the appellant’s filing a notice of appeal, requesting
    that the reporter’s record be prepared, and paying for the reporter’s record. See
    6
    TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(b); Rodriguez v. State, 
    970 S.W.2d 133
    , 134 (Tex. App.—
    Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d).
    Here, Monaco failed to request or make payment arrangements for the
    reporter’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31.1, 35.3. As a result, we are left to
    determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Monaco’s
    request for habeas relief based solely on the clerk’s record. See Portillo v. State,
    
    117 S.W.3d 924
    , 929 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In his
    habeas application, Monaco sought habeas relief based on his bare assertion that he
    “is not a fugitive.”
    In this case, a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion
    in denying Monaco’s habeas relief is dependent on the evidence presented during
    the hearing on Monaco’s habeas application. Such evidence would exist only in
    the reporter’s record. It is not contained in the clerk’s record. Thus, without a
    reporter’s record, Monaco cannot demonstrate that the trial court had evidence
    before it showing that Monaco was not a fugitive. It follows, then, that Monaco
    has not demonstrated that the trial court’s denial of his habeas relief constituted an
    abuse of discretion. See 
    id. 7 Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying appellant’s request for
    habeas corpus relief.
    Laura Carter Higley
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Massengale.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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