Christopher Hedlund v. State ( 2014 )

Opinion issued January 7, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00378-CR
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CHRISTOPHER HEDLUND, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 8
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1749885
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Christopher Hedlund, of misdemeanor assault
causing bodily injury, and the trial court assessed punishment at three days’
confinement and a $500 fine. In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends the
trial court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction on self-defense. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant and his next-door neighbor, Steve Northcutt, had an ongoing
dispute over a ceramic plate that appellant used as a birdfeeder, which he placed on
a common brick wall behind their houses. Appellant testified that the plate had
been broken “about fifty times.” Although he never saw Northcutt do so, appellant
believed that Northcutt was repeatedly breaking the birdfeeder. Northcutt denied
ever breaking the birdfeeder.
On the evening of April 10, 2011, appellant discovered that the birdfeeder
had been broken again, so he gathered up the broken ceramic shards and walked
next door to confront Northcutt. Northcutt, who had been away for the day at his
teen-aged son’s track meet, was sitting on the couch when he heard the doorbell
ring. Believing that it was his dogsitter, Northcutt opened the door to find
appellant standing there with something clenched in his fists. Appellant testified
that he told Northcutt, “Steve, you guys have to stop this,” and Northcutt
responded by saying, “I don’t know what you’re talking about,” and laughing at
appellant. In contrast, Northcutt testified that he asked, “Chris, what are you doing
here?” What happened next is undisputed.
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Both appellant and Northcutt agree that appellant threw the shards of
ceramic in Northcutt’s home without any prior physical provocation by Northcutt.
Appellant testified that he threw the ceramic pieces because he was frustrated
when Northcutt laughed at him. He said that it was his intention to “make a mess
in [Northcutt’s] house,” and denied hitting Northcutt with any of the shards. In
contrast, Northcutt testified that when he asked appellant why he was at his house,
appellant “took a step forward into the house and threw [the shards] into my face.”
Northcutt further testified that the shards hit him in the face and chest, causing pain
and cuts on his face.
A fight then ensued, with each man providing a different version of the facts.
Appellant testified that after he threw the ceramic pieces, Northcutt lunged at him
and began grabbing and punching him. The fight continued into the street until
Northcutt’s 18-year-old son intervened and put appellant in a chokehold until he
passed out.
Northcutt, however, testified that after appellant threw the ceramic pieces at
him, Northcutt’s dog ran outside, where appellant kicked it. Northcutt testified that
he came outside to get appellant off of his dog, when appellant grabbed Northcutt’s
shirt and slung him down on the ground. When Northcutt tried to get up, appellant
pulled the shirt over Northcutt’s head, spun him around, and threw him into the
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street. Northcutt’s son, who had heard the altercation and the dog yelping, came
outside, jumped on appellant’s back, and choked him until he lost consciousness.
When appellant came to and sat up, Northcutt and his son went back inside
and called the police. Appellant’s wife also called police. After a brief
investigation at the scene, appellant was arrested and charged with assault causing
bodily injury.
SELF-DEFENSE
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
regarding self-defense. Our review of alleged jury charge error involves a two-step
process. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994); see Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Initially, we determine whether an error occurred, and then “determine whether
sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal.” Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at
731–32; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.
The trial court shall “deliver to the jury . . . a written charge distinctly setting
forth the law applicable to the case [and] not expressing any opinion as to the
weight of the evidence. . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14 (Vernon 2007). The
trial court is required to instruct the jury on statutory defenses, affirmative
defenses, and justifications when they are raised by the evidence and requested by
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the defendant. Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 208–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
see also Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding trial
court has no duty to sua sponte instruct jury on unrequested defensive issues). A
trial court’s decision to deny a defensive issue in a jury charge is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a requested defensive
instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s
requested submission. Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if he requests it and
the issue is raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak,
unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think
about the credibility of the defense. Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987). “[A] defense is supported (or raised) by the evidence if there is
some evidence, from any source, on each element of the defense that, if believed
by the jury, would support a rational inference that that element is true.” Shaw v.
State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Analysis
Appellant argues that he was entitled to a charge on self-defense because he
testified that Northcutt “hit him first and he was merely defending himself.”
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However, the jury charge in this case required the jury to convict appellant of
assault if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he “[d]id then and there
unlawfully intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to STEVE
NORTHCUTT, hereinafter called the Complainant, by throwing an object at the
complainant.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the issue is not who threw the first punch,
but whether at the time appellant threw the plate—the offense with which he is
charged—his use of force was justified.
A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree
the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the
actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 9.31(a) (Vernon 2011).
Here, the evidence is undisputed that Northcutt did not use or attempt to use
any force, lawful or not, against appellant before appellant threw the ceramic
pieces. Both appellant and Northcutt testified that before appellant threw the
ceramic pieces, Northcutt had taken no aggressive physical action against
appellant.
[Prosecutor]: It wasn’t until after you threw those pieces that Mr.
Northcutt made any aggressive move towards you, correct?
[Appellant]: That’s my recollection.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, as we must,
Northcutt had merely laughed when confronted by appellant about the broken
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birdfeeder. However, the use of force against another is not justified in response to
verbal provocation alone. Id. § 9.31(b)(1); Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 494
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (recognizing that verbal provocation alone does not justify
use of self-defense).
Because the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
appellant, shows that Northcutt never threatened to use, attempted to use, or used
any unlawful force against appellant before appellant threw the ceramic pieces,
appellant in turn was not lawfully entitled to use any physical force against
Northcutt. See Jackson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding that trial court did not err in denying self-defense
charge when “[a]ppellant testified [the complainant] did not hit him. And there is
no evidence she hit appellant or that she even threatened him. In short, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, we are left with a picture in
which appellant assaulted a person who never used or attempted to use unlawful
force against him.”).
Because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant
establishes as a matter of law that appellant’s use of force was not justified, the
trial court did not err in denying his request for a self-defense instruction.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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