Rickie Renarld Goodie v. State ( 2013 )

Opinion issued December 19, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00531-CR
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RICKIE RENARLD GOODIE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 23rd District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 64138
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Rickie Renarld Goodie of the state-jail felony
offense of theft of property worth less than $1,500 with two prior convictions for
theft. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D) (West 2011). The trial
court sentenced him to eight years in prison. Goodie challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his conviction and contends that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor theft. We
affirm.
Background
Pearland Home Depot loss prevention officer Mark Guel was standing just
inside his store’s contractors’ entrance when he observed Goodie come into the
store with a five-gallon bucket of paint in his shopping cart. The paint caught
Guel’s attention because the store had been having problems with people
shoplifting paint and later returning it for store credit. Goodie stopped at a cash
register. Cashier Adelita Molina placed security tape on the paint and on a tape
measure attached to Goodie’s belt so other employees would know that he brought
those items into the store. Molina did not place security tape on anything else, and
neither Guel nor Molina saw Goodie bring any other items into the store. Goodie’s
interaction with Molina was also captured by the store surveillance video.
Guel followed at a distance as Goodie went to the tool department to shop.
From an adjacent aisle, Guel saw Goodie select a drill, remove the drill case’s
cardboard sleeve, take the security tape from his tape measure, stick the tape to the
drill case, and put the drill in his shopping cart. A security camera captured video
of Goodie, from the waist down, removing the drill and attaching the tape.
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Goodie then took his shopping cart to the returns register. He left the cart
and went back into the aisles, where he selected some wood. Goodie found his
mother, who had also been in the store, and he brought her to the returns register to
pay for the wood. Goodie told the cashier that he had decided not to return the
drill; then he and his mother paid for the wood and left the store. Guel followed
them to the parking lot and asked Goodie to come to his office. In his office, Guel
confronted Goodie about the theft. Goodie claimed that he had come into the store
with the drill in his cart. When he was unable to verify this story, police arrested
Goodie.
The indictment contained two enhancement paragraphs that elevated the
theft charge from a misdemeanor to a state-jail felony, third offense theft. The
enhancement paragraphs alleged that Goodie was previously convicted of theft in
cause number 9834910 on August 31, 1998 and in cause number 828781 on
November 13, 1999. Goodie pleaded not guilty.
At trial, the State called Marcey Farley, fingerprint examiner for the
Brazoria County Sherriff’s Department. She took fingerprints of Goodie on the
day she testified and attempted to match those known prints with prints contained
in various records of Goodie’s prior theft convictions. Farley testified that she
could not match the known prints with the prints contained in State’s Exhibit 12, a
certified copy of the judgment in cause number 9834910. Farley also
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acknowledged that Exhibit 12 named the defendant as Gerald Wade Williams not
Rickie Renarld Goodie. Farley also could not match the known prints to the prints
in State’s Exhibit 13, a certified copy of the judgment in cause number 798058.
However, Farley matched the known prints with the prints contained in State’s
Exhibit 11, a pen packet containing a copy of the judgment in cause number
828781. In that cause of action, another third-offense theft conviction, Goodie
pleaded true to 798058 and 9834910 as jurisdictional priors.
A jury found Goodie guilty of theft of property worth less than $1,500 with
two or more previous convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years
in prison after the State introduced another prior conviction to enhance
punishment. Goodie appeals from this conviction.
Analysis
Goodie raises two separate arguments challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the judgment. First, he contends that State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he stole the drill. Second, he contends that even if
the State adequately proved theft of the drill, it failed to prove the prior convictions
necessary for a state-jail felony theft conviction. He also complains that the trial
court failed to give a requested instruction on the lesser-included offense of
misdemeanor theft.
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I. Sufficiency of the evidence
A. Theft
As part of his first issue, Goodie argues that the State presented legally
insufficient evidence to prove that he was the man who stole the drill. He asserts
that his testimony and that of his mother outweigh the testimony of eyewitness
Guel.
The State argues that it presented legally sufficient evidence to allow the
jury to conclude that Goodie stole a drill from Home Depot. The State contends
that both Guel’s testimony and the surveillance video, standing alone, were
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Goodie committed
theft.
When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);
Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The standard is
the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d
701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh
any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this is the function of
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the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999).
A person commits theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent
to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a).
Appropriation of property is unlawful if “it is without the owner’s effective
consent.” Id. § 31.03(b)(1). Considering the evidence presented at trial, we must
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Goodie unlawfully appropriated a drill with intent to deprive Home
Depot. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.
The testimony of a single eyewitness may constitute legally sufficient
evidence to support a conviction. See Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75,
77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)). At trial, Guel provided eyewitness testimony that
Goodie entered the store without a drill in his cart and went to the tool area where
he selected a drill and placed security tape on it. In addition, cashier Molina also
testified that Goodie did not have a drill when he entered the store. Although the
video does not explicitly show Goodie placing security tape on the drill, it does
clearly show him entering the store without a drill and later appearing on video
with a drill in his cart. Furthermore, Goodie told a cashier that he had decided not
to return the drill and left the store without paying for the drill.
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Goodie’s argument ultimately boils down to a plea for us to reweigh the
credibility of the witnesses and testimony presented at trial. However, the jury is
the exclusive judge of the believability of witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. We conclude that Guel’s
testimony, which was corroborated by Molina and portions of the video, provided
sufficient evidence for the jury rationally to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that Goodie took the drill without Home Depot’s effective consent and left the
store with the intention of depriving Home Depot of the drill. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (b)(1); Davis, 177 S.W.3d at 359; see also Lindgren v.
State, No. 01–12–00083–CR, 2013 WL 978257, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Mar. 12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(upholding theft conviction in the absence of video evidence when loss prevention
officer of HEB store provided eyewitness testimony).
B. Prior theft convictions
Goodie next contends that the State did not adequately prove the prior theft
convictions set out in the indictment (cause numbers 9834910 and 828781).
Specifically, he argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove
that he had been convicted in cause number 9834910.
The State has the burden of proof to establish that the defendant is the same
person convicted of theft in the two prior judgments as alleged in the indictment.
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Rios v. State, 557 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Some methods of
proving prior convictions approved by Texas courts include: (1) testimony of a
witness who personally knows the defendant and the fact of his prior conviction
and identifies him; (2) stipulation or judicial admission of the defendant that he has
been so convicted; (3) introduction of certified copies of the judgment, sentence,
and record of the Texas Department of Corrections or a county jail including
fingerprints of the accused supported by expert testimony identifying them with
known prints of the defendant; or (4) comparison by the fact finder of a record of
conviction which contains photographs and a detailed physical description of the
named person, with the appearance of the defendant, present in court. Daniel v.
State, 585 S.W.2d 688, 690–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), overruled on other
grounds by Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); accord
Smith v. State, 998 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref’d);
Fontenot v. State, 704 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no
pet.). While these methods are preferred, they are not exclusive. Littles, 726
S.W.2d at 32.
The State may prove a prior conviction by documentary proof that contains
“sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the
defendant’s identity as the person convicted.” Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919,
921–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Regardless of the type of evidentiary puzzle
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pieces the State offers to establish the existence of a prior conviction and its link to
a specific defendant, the trier of fact determines if these puzzle pieces fit together
sufficiently to complete the puzzle.” Id. at 923. The fact that the name of the
defendant on judgments of prior convictions is different from the name of the
defendant on trial is irrelevant if other evidence establishes the person on trial is
the same person previously convicted. Rios, 557 S.W.2d at 92; see also Garza v.
State, 548 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Although State’s Exhibit 12 shows that a person named Gerald Wade
Williams pleaded guilty to and was convicted of theft in cause number 9834910,
the State presented other evidence from which the jury could conclude that Goodie
was actually the person convicted in cause number 9834910. For example, State’s
Exhibit 13—copies of the complaint and judgment in cause number 798058 (a
previous conviction for third-offense theft)—showed that Rickie Renarld Goodie
had his name changed from Gerald Wade Williams. The complaint contained in
State’s Exhibit 13 named Gerald Wade Williams as the defendant. However, the
ultimate judgment in that cause named the defendant as Rickie Renarld Goodie.
Furthermore, the State used cause number 9834910 as one of the prior thefts used
to elevate the theft conviction in Exhibit 13 to a state-jail felony. The judgment
shows that Goodie pleaded true to the allegation that he had previously been
convicted of theft in cause number 9834910.
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Moreover, the State introduced Exhibit 11, a pen packet containing
photographs of Goodie as well as his fingerprints and a copy of the judgment in
cause number 828781. The indictment and judgment named the defendant as
Rickie Renarld Goodie. Once again, the State alleged the conviction in cause
number 9834910 as a jurisdictional prior conviction to make the theft a state-jail
felony. Goodie again pleaded true to the alleged conviction in 9834910 as part of
his guilty plea in 828781. In addition, Marcey Farley, fingerprint examiner for the
Brazoria County Sherriff’s Department successfully matched the prints contained
in Exhibit 11 with the known prints she took from Goodie on the day she testified.
In sum, the jury had before it evidence that Gerald Wade Williams was a
name formerly used by Goodie, evidence that he twice pleaded true to allegations
that he had been convicted of theft in cause number 9834910, and testimony that
the fingerprints contained in Exhibit 11 matched Goodie’s known prints. Although
the State did not link Goodie to the 1998 theft directly by one of the conventional
methods, we conclude that the State presented the jury with evidence from which it
could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Goodie was the person
convicted of theft in cause number 9834910. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923. We
overrule Goodie’s first issue.
II. Lesser-included offense
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Goodie next argues that the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury
the option of finding him guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor
theft, if it did not find that he had been previously convicted of two theft offenses.
An instruction on a lesser-included offense is required only if (1) the lesser-
included offense is included within the proof necessary to establish the offense
charged, and (2) some evidence exists in the record that, if the defendant is guilty,
he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377,
382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). An instruction on a lesser-included offense is not
required solely because “the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the
greater offense, but rather, there must be some evidence directly germane to the
lesser-included offense for the finder of fact to consider before an instruction on a
lesser-included offense is warranted.” Hampton v. State, 109 S.W.3d 437, 441
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We consider all evidence presented at trial in determining
whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense would have been warranted.
Goad v. State, 354 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Misdemeanor theft is a lesser-included offense of state-jail felony theft
because proof of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor theft is included
within the proof necessary to establish the state-jail felony offense. Franklin v.
State, 219 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Thus,
we focus our analysis on the second prong of the test for lesser-included offenses.
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In Guess v. State, No. 12–08–00448–CR, 2010 WL 681345 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Feb. 26, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.), the appellant argued that the State
failed to adequately prove a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated. 2010
WL 681345, at *4. The indictment alleged that Guess had been convicted of
driving while intoxicated in Tarrant County. Id. at *1. The State introduced a
copy of the Tarrant County conviction and records from a Gregg County criminal
case. Id. at *5. Guess’s name was the only identifying information on the copy of
the Tarrant County conviction. Id. However, the records from Gregg County
revealed that Guess pleaded true to the Tarrant County conviction as an
enhancement in the Gregg County indictment. Id. The court concluded that
Guess’s plea of true sufficiently linked him to the Tarrant County conviction. Id.
Therefore, it held that Guess was not entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included
offense of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated because Guess admitted to the
Tarrant County conviction by pleading true and the record contained no affirmative
evidence that would have allowed the jury to conclude otherwise. Id.
Similarly here, Goodie argues that an instruction on misdemeanor theft
would have been proper because the State failed to prove he had been convicted in
cause number 9834910. However, the record contains no affirmative evidence that
Goodie was not the person convicted in cause number 9834910. Although State’s
Exhibit 12 named the defendant as Gerald Wade Williams, the jury had before it
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evidence that Goodie had twice pleaded true to the allegation that he committed the
1998 theft identified in State’s Exhibit 12. Because appellant twice admitted that
he was convicted of the 1998 theft, and Goodie did not present any evidence
suggesting otherwise, the record did not contain evidence that would have allowed
the jury to conclude that Goodie was guilty only of misdemeanor theft. See Guess,
2010 WL 681345, at *5; Carter v. State, No. 14–08–00662–CR, 2009 WL
2998534, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 11, 2009, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (holding that an instruction on a lesser-included
offense was not necessary because appellant provided no evidence or authority to
show that proof of his prior convictions was insufficient). We overrule Goodie’s
second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Massengale.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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