Aaron Dale Campbell v. State ( 2012 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-11-00094-CR
    NO. 02-11-00095-CR
    AARON DALE CAMPBELL                                                 APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                       STATE
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    FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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    Appellant Aaron Dale Campbell waived his right to a jury trial and entered
    open pleas of guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and chemical transport
    with intent to manufacture a controlled substance. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
    § 46.04(a) (West 2011); see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
    § 481.124(a)(1) (West 2010).       Campbell also pleaded true to enhancement
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    paragraphs contained in one of the indictments.        Campbell now appeals his
    convictions of five years’ and fifteen years’ confinement. We will affirm.
    Campbell’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
    withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel
    avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief
    and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a
    professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable
    grounds for relief. 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    (1967). We gave Campbell the
    opportunity to file a pro se brief, and he did not file one. The State also did not
    file a brief.
    As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
    record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
    frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
    Mays v. State, 
    904 S.W.2d 920
    , 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
    then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 82–83, 
    109 S. Ct. 346
    , 351 (1988). Because Campbell entered an open plea
    of guilty, our independent review for potential error is limited to potential
    jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of Campbell’s plea, error that is not
    independent of and supports the judgment of guilt, and error occurring after entry
    of the guilty plea. See Monreal v. State, 
    99 S.W.3d 615
    , 620 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2003); Young v. State, 
    8 S.W.3d 656
    , 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
    2
    We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
    counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
    the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 684
    , 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to
    withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BILL MEIER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: June 21, 2012
    3