Joyce Hopes-Fontenot v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Company ( 2013 )

Opinion issued August 15, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00286-CV
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JOYCE HOPES-FONTENOT, Appellant
V.
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 234th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2011-68916
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Joyce Hopes-Fontenot sued appellee Farmers New World Life
Insurance Company for failing to pay her a disability benefit of $50,000 under a
life insurance policy she purchased for her daughter. Farmers filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the insurance policy did not provide for a $50,000
payment in the event that the purchaser of the policy becomes disabled and that the
claims are barred by limitations. The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment without specifying the ground on which the motion was granted.
Because Hopes-Fontenot does not challenge all of the grounds on which the trial
court may have granted summary judgment, we affirm.
Background
In 1992, Hopes-Fontenot purchased a life insurance policy for her daughter
from Farmers. She received a copy of the policy, which contained a provision
called the “Payor Waiver of Deduction Rider,” waiving premium payments for a
set time if the policy payor died or became disabled. In 2001, Hopes-Fontenot was
adjudged disabled by the Social Security Administration, and she made a disability
claim to Farmers. Based on statements made by her insurance agent, Hopes-
Fontenot alleged that she believed that she was entitled to a lump-sum payment in
the benefit amount of $50,000 for becoming disabled. After receiving the
information about her disability, Farmers waived the monthly payments due for her
policy and credited her $86.36 in administration fees, rather than paying the lump-
sum to which she believed she was entitled.
Hopes-Fontenot then sued Farmers for rejecting her claim, alleging breach
of common-law duties and contract, bad faith, fraud, negligence, and
misrepresentation. Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment on three
grounds: (1) the policy contract plainly and unambiguously does not provide for a
$50,000 payment for the payor becoming disabled, only a waiver of premium
benefits; (2) even if someone misrepresented to Hopes-Fontenot that her policy
contained the $50,000 payment term, any reliance on those alleged
misrepresentations would not be justified because she is charged with knowledge
of her insurance policy; and (3) her causes of action are barred by limitations. The
trial court granted Farmers’s motion without stating the grounds on which it based
its decision. Hopes-Fontenot then timely filed this appeal.
Analysis
Litigants appearing on their own behalf must comply with all applicable
laws and rules of procedures, and they are held to the same standards as are
licensed attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85
(Tex. 1978); Kanow v. Brownshadel, 691 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). A pro se litigant is required to properly present her case
on appeal, and we may not make allowances or apply different standards for
litigants appearing without the advice of counsel. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg.
Servicing, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
The Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellate briefs to contain clear and
concise arguments with appropriate citations to the record and supporting
authorities. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Nevertheless, we construe briefs liberally and
substantial compliance with the rules is sufficient. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9.
In Hopes-Fontenot’s two-page appellate brief, she asserted that Farmers and
her agent, Barsales Insurance Agency, represented to her that she purchased
coverage providing for a $50,000 payor disability payment. She also contends that
Farmers is “at fault for not including the payor disability information in the
contract.” Finally, she reasserts the claims from her petition for breach of duty and
breach of contract. Her appellate brief does not address the argument made in the
summary-judgment motion that her extra-contractual claims are barred because she
is charged with the knowledge of her insurance policy, which does not contain a
term providing for the lump-sum payment she seeks. Nor does her brief address
the argument that her suit is barred by limitations. Her brief also lacks a general
point of error attacking the summary judgment as a whole.
When there are multiple grounds for summary judgment and the order does
not specify the ground on which the summary judgment was rendered, the
appellant must negate all grounds on appeal. Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders,
Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (relying
on State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex. 1993)). A party
appealing a motion for summary judgment must either assert (1) separate points of
error attacking each of the independent grounds alleged in the motion, or (2) a
general point of error attacking the summary judgment as a whole. Zapata v. ACF
Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
“If summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a
ground not challenged, the judgment must be affirmed.” Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898
(relying on Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 23 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ
denied)).
Here, the summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or
improperly, on the unchallenged ground of limitations. Because this ground was
not challenged, we must affirm.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Sharp and Massengale.