Daniel Maurice Smallwood v. State ( 2013 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-11-00749-CR
Daniel Maurice SMALLWOOD,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas
Trial Court No. B10-711
Honorable M. Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 28, 2013
AFFIRMED
We withdraw our opinion and judgment of June 12, 2013, and issue this opinion and
judgment in its place.
This appeal arises from Appellant Daniel Maurice Smallwood’s guilty plea and conviction
for the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, hydrocodone, in an amount of four
grams or more but less than 200 grams. Smallwood contends (1) the arresting officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, (2) the officer detained Smallwood for a “fishing
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expedition” and longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop, and (3) the
search and pat-down of Smallwood for weapons was illegal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The State contends, inter alia, that we should decline to address the merits of Smallwood’s
claim because the record did not clearly identify what the fruits of the alleged unlawful search and
seizure are or whether the alleged fruits have “somehow been used” by the State. For purposes of
this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, the issue was properly preserved.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Smallwood was traveling on Interstate Highway 10, in Kerr County, Texas, when he was
stopped by Investigator Mike Chapman for failure to signal lane change. Chapman asked
Smallwood to exit his vehicle. As Chapman approached Smallwood’s vehicle, he commented that
the tint on the vehicle’s windows was very dark. Smallwood was subsequently directed to make
his way to the back of his vehicle where Chapman obtained Smallwood’s driver’s license and
proof of insurance. After requesting Kerr County Sheriff’s Dispatch run a check of Smallwood’s
license, a criminal history, and warrants check, Chapman asked Smallwood for permission to
search his vehicle. Smallwood agreed; but prior to performing the search, Chapman conducted a
weapons pat-down search of Smallwood. Chapman testified that he “[f]elt two large objects below
[Appellant’s] waistband that [he] recognized to be contraband.” Chapman placed Smallwood
under arrest and called for additional officers to make the scene. Approximately ten to twelve
minutes elapsed from the time Investigator Chapman stopped Smallwood to the time Chapman
conducted the pat-down search.
Smallwood was charged by indictment with the offense of possession of a controlled
substance, hydrocodone, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. Smallwood
filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his detention. Smallwood and Chapman
testified at the hearing, and the trial court denied Smallwood’s motion. Smallwood then entered a
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plea of guilty and was sentenced by the trial court to three years’ confinement, probated and
suspended for a period of three years. Smallwood now appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion
to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review.” Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Valtierra v.
State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). An appellate court gives “[a]lmost total
deference . . . to the trial court’s implied findings, especially those based on an evaluation of
witness credibility and demeanor.” Id. (citing Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447). When the trial court
does not make findings of fact, “we ‘must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact to support its ruling as long
as those findings are supported by the record.’” Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Harrison v. State, 205 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
A warrantless detention does not violate Fourth Amendment protections when justified by
reasonable suspicion. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). To
detain an individual, an officer must have “specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational
inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has
been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Id. This objective standard “disregards the
actual subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an
objectively justifiable basis for the detention.” Id. “It also looks to the totality of the
circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine
to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.”
Id. (citation omitted).
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REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP SMALLWOOD’S VEHICLE
In his first issue, Smallwood contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because Chapman did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Smallwood’s vehicle.
Smallwood contends the video recording does not begin until after Investigator Chapman
is pulling over to the side of the road; and thus, the video recording does not show Smallwood
changing lanes without signaling. Chapman testified that “the camera is automatic and activated
by turning the headlight flashers on.” The camera, therefore, would not record the failure to signal
lane change.
If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person has committed a traffic violation,
the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944–45 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992); State v. McCall, 929 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.).
Reasonable suspicion is based on a review of the totality of the circumstances. Garcia v. State, 43
S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “This standard is an objective one.” Id. The officer’s
subjective intent is irrelevant; instead, there need only be “an objective basis for the stop.” Id. The
State need not show the “traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer
reasonably believed a violation was in progress.” Fernandez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex
App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“An operator shall use the signal . . . to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start
from a parked position.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104 (West 2011). Investigator Chapman
testified he reasonably believed Smallwood changed lanes without signaling and the trial court
found that the “Defendant changed lanes without using his traffic signal.” Although Chapman’s
testimony may have appeared to waiver regarding whether he actually told Smallwood why he
was stopped, the trial court could have reasonably believed Chapman stopped Smallwood for the
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stated offense. See Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“[The] credibility
decision [of a witness at a suppression hearing] is one for the trial court.”). Because the trial court
observed first-hand the witness’s demeanor and appearance, we afford almost total deference to
the trial court’s determination of historical facts. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855–56 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
Based on the record, the trial court could have reasonably determined Investigator
Chapman legally initiated the traffic stop based on Smallwood’s failure to signal a lane change.
Accordingly, we overrule this issue.
LENGTH OF DETAINMENT
Smallwood next contends the length of the traffic stop was unreasonable and unnecessary
based of the stated purposes for the stop: (1) window tint too dark and (2) failure to signal a lane
change.
The length of a detention may render a traffic stop unreasonable, but there is no absolute
and unbending timeline which identifies when the stop became unreasonable. United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1985). Instead, “common sense and ordinary human experience
must govern over rigid criteria.” Id. at 685. The reasonableness of a detention depends on whether
the officer “diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Kothe v. State,
152 S.W.3d 54, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686). “[T]he trial and
appellate courts may consider legitimate law enforcement purposes served by any delay in the
officer’s investigation.” Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no
pet.) (citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685). “Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires a balance
between the public interest served and the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary detentions
and intrusions.” Id. (citing Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63).
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Investigator Chapman testified that after both vehicles were on the side of the road, he
asked Smallwood to exit his vehicle. Because the tint on the vehicle’s windows was so dark,
Chapman confirmed with Smallwood that there were no other individuals in the vehicle. Without
any additional questioning by Chapman, Smallwood offered that he was traveling to Kerrville to
purchase a “Dually pickup.” During the hearing, Chapman described Smallwood speaking so fast
that Chapman could not even ask a question.
Smallwood told Chapman that he had only been arrested for possession of drug
paraphernalia. Yet, his criminal history check revealed Smallwood had a previous felony arrest
for possession of marijuana. Based on Smallwood’s evasive behavior and excessive nervousness,
Investigator Chapman requested and received permission from Smallwood to search the vehicle.
Because he did not have another officer present, and Smallwood’s behavior and previous arrest,
Chapman conducted a pat-down search of Smallwood prior to searching the vehicle. During the
pat-down, Chapman “felt two large objects below his waistband” that he “recognized to be
contraband.” Smallwood was handcuffed and Chapman called for backup. Ten to twelve minutes
elapsed between the initial stop and the pat-down. There is no evidence the stop lasted any longer
than was necessary for Investigator Chapman to run checks on Smallwood’s license, as well as
warrant and criminal background checks. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64.
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that
Smallwood’s detention was not unreasonably delayed. See id. at 58, 66 (upholding other three to
twelve minute detentions pending results of routine computer driver’s license check). We,
therefore, overrule Smallwood’s second issue.
OFFICER’S PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF SMALLWOOD
Finally, Smallwood asserts that Chapman’s contention that Smallwood appeared nervous
was insufficient to warrant the officer’s pat-down search of Smallwood.
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Even in the absence of probable cause, an officer is permitted to conduct a limited search
of a suspect’s outer clothing to locate weapons based on reasonable beliefs that the suspect is
armed and dangerous to the officer or others in the area. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323,
329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Thomas v. State, 297 S.W.3d 458, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). “To support a protective frisk or detention, there must be facts that, when
reviewed under an objective standard, would cause a reasonably cautious person to believe that
the action taken was reasonable or that the person frisked was presently armed and dangerous.”
State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 287–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Sheppard,
Nos. 12-06-00259-CR, 12-06-00260-CR, 2007 WL 1241511, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007),
rev’d on other grounds, 271 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing O’Hara v. State, 27
S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “A pat-down search is substantially less intrusive than
a standard search requiring probable cause.” O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 550–51.
The pat-down search took place on the side of the highway and Investigator Chapman
provided several examples of Smallwood’s extreme nervousness and evading stance that raised
his level of suspicion. See Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 836, 840 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2007, pet. ref’d) (allowing an officer conducting traffic violation stop to “determine whether the
driver has any outstanding warrants, conduct a pat down search of the driver for weapons, and
request the driver’s consent to search his vehicle” (citations omitted)); Stoker v. State, 170 S.W.3d
807, 813 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.) (holding a pat-down search was reasonable due to
“Appellant’s nervousness, previous criminal history, and [the officer’s] belief that something
illegal might be on Appellant’s person”). Chapman testified Smallwood “exited the vehicle, did
not close the door in the lane of traffic, and would not turn around and speak directly to me, but
just started talking about the purpose of his trip before he was ever asked.” Additionally, Chapman
knew Smallwood had previously been arrested for felony possession of marijuana and he was the
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only officer at the scene. Smallwood provided consent to search his vehicle, and at some point
during that search, Chapman would inevitably have to turn his back on Smallwood.
Viewed objectively, we conclude that the facts as they existed at the time of the incident
would warrant a reasonably cautious person to believe Investigator Chapman’s protective search
was appropriate. See Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 387–88. We overrule Smallwood’s last issue.
CONCLUSION
Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the testimony
justified the initial stop of Smallwood’s vehicle. The evidence elicited during his preliminary
investigation further justified Investigator Chapman’s suspicion of criminal activity and his reason
for conducting a pat-down search. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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