Ryan Roosevelt Sanders A/K/A Brian Roosevelt Sanders v. State ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00270-CR
RYAN ROOSEVELT SANDERS APPELLANT
A/K/A BRIAN ROOSEVELT
SANDERS
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
Appellant Ryan Roosevelt Sanders received deferred adjudication
community supervision after he pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. The
State subsequently filed a petition to proceed to adjudication. At the hearing, the
State waived three allegations, and Appellant pleaded true to the remaining nine
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
allegations concerning his commission of five new offenses; use of marijuana;
and failure to complete community service, an educational program, and a
substance abuse assessment. After hearing testimony from Appellant and
argument from counsel, the trial court found the State’s nine remaining
allegations true, adjudicated Appellant guilty of burglary, and sentenced
Appellant to eight years’ confinement. Appellant contends in two points on
appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by finding three of the State’s
allegations true and erred by ordering payment of court-appointed attorney’s
fees. We reform the judgment to remove the order that Appellant pay attorney’s
fees and affirm the judgment as modified.
II. Applicable Law
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State, 202
S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Miles v. State, 343 S.W.3d 908, 912
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth, no pet.); Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). When there is sufficient evidence to support
a finding that the defendant violated a condition of his community supervision,
the trial court does not abuse its discretion by revoking the supervision. See
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Wade v.
State, 83 S.W.3d 835, 839–40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to
support revocation. Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Fort
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Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). A defendant’s plea of ―true‖ to even one allegation in the
State’s motion to revoke is sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to
adjudicate Appellant’s guilt. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1979); see Ramos v. State, No. 02-08-00363-CR, 2009 WL 1035120,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 16, 2009, pet. struck) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Once sufficient evidence is presented of a violation
of a community-supervision condition, the trial court has broad discretion in
choosing whether to continue, modify, or revoke the community supervision.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, '' 5, 22, 23 (West Supp. 2011); Flournoy
v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Hays v. State,
933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Where deferred
community supervision is revoked, the trial court may generally impose any
punishment authorized by statute within the statutory range. See Von
Schounmacher v. State, 5 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
III. Discussion
Appellant contends in two points that the trial court abused its discretion by
finding three of the State’s allegations true because there was no evidence to
support them and that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay attorney’s fees
because there is no evidence to support the fees or his ability to pay the fees.
A. Violations of Community Supervision
Appellant acknowledges that he pleaded true to committing five new
offenses (each involved burglary of a vehicle) and using marijuana. Appellant
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also acknowledges that the trial court had ―complete authority based on [the]
evidence and Appellant’s pleas of true to the other paragraphs to proceed to
adjudication and punishment.‖ Appellant argues, however, that despite his pleas
of true, there is no evidence supporting the State’s other three allegations of
failure to complete community service, an educational program, and a substance
abuse assessment. Thus, according to Appellant, the case should be remanded
for a new hearing because ―it is impossible to determine what impact these
erroneous findings may have had on the trial Court’s decision[s] to proceed to
adjudicate guilt‖ and to sentence him to eight years’ confinement.
We cannot agree with Appellant’s contention because, even if there were
no evidence offered to support the allegations concerning Appellant’s failure to
complete community service, an educational program, and a substance abuse
assessment,2 Appellant’s plea of true to those three allegations, standing alone,
is sufficient, and it was not necessary for the State to prove additional violations.
See Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926; Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128. And perhaps more
importantly, Appellant pleaded true to six other allegations, five concerning new
offenses and one concerning the use of marijuana. Appellant unequivocally
admitted to his participation in the offenses and his use of marijuana while
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We note, however, that although Appellant did not unequivocally admit
during his testimony that he failed to complete community service, an educational
program, and a substance abuse assessment, he did testify during both direct
and cross-examination that he believed he did not have to complete those tasks
because his probation officer had told him not to worry about them while he
attended school.
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testifying, and it is clear from the record that the trial court placed emphasis on
Appellant’s commission of new offenses when assessing his sentence. Finally,
because the trial court acted within its discretion by revoking Appellant’s
community supervision, the trial court had discretion to impose any punishment
authorized by statute within the statutory range. See Von Schounmacher, 5
S.W.3d at 223. Appellant faced a possible sentence of twenty years’
imprisonment but was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.33(a) (West 2011). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by revoking Appellant’s community supervision and sentencing him to
eight years’ imprisonment. We overrule Appellant’s first point.
B. Attorney’s Fees
Appellant argues in his second point that the trial court erred by ordering
payment of court-appointed attorney’s fees because there is no evidence of the
amount of fees or his ability to pay the fees. The State concedes in its brief that
the judgment should be reformed to remove the order that Appellant pay
attorney’s fees. See Mayer v. State, 274 S.W.3d 898, 901–02 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2008), aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (―Without evidence
to demonstrate appellant’s financial resources to offset the costs of the legal
services, the trial court erred in ordering reimbursement of appointed attorney
fees.‖); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2011)
(authorizing trial court to order repayment of court-appointed attorney’s fees if it
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―determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in
part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided‖).
We have reviewed the record and agree that there is no evidence of either
the amount of the court-ordered attorney’s fees or Appellant’s ability to pay them.
We therefore sustain Appellant’s second point and order that the trial court’s
judgment be modified to remove the order concerning Appellant’s payment of
attorney’s fees. See Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (holding appellate court not required to remand based on insufficient
evidence of ability to pay attorney’s fees).
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s first point and having sustained his second
point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 29, 2011
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