Randy Brown v. Bill Holman and Claytex Properties, Inc. ( 2010 )

NO. 07-10-00013-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

JUNE 29, 2010

RANDY BROWN, APPELLANT

v.

BILL HOLMAN AND CLAYTEX PROPERTIES, INC., APPELLEE

 FROM THE 97TH DISTRICT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY;

NO. 2008-0000187C-CV; HONORABLE ROGER E. TOWERY, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

ORDER ON MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Appellee ClayTex Properties, Inc. has filed a motion asking us to consolidate the present appeal with a case filed June 1, 2010, in the 97th District Court of Clay County.  ClayTex presents no authority supporting the relief requested. A notice of appeal perfecting an appeal to this court of the June 1 case has not been filed.  Indeed, ClayTex offers nothing demonstrating the June 1 case has produced a final, appealable judgment or an interlocutory order made appealable by statute.  Moreover, Clay County is located in the Second Court of Appeals District and no order from the Supreme Court of Texas transferring the June 1 case to this court is presented.[1]  Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.201(c) (Vernon 2004).

In a civil case, appeal is perfected by timely filing a notice of appeal.  Cadzow v. Wells Fargo Banks, N.A., No. 07-09-0330-CV 2009 Tex. App. Lexis 9237, at *1 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Nov. 30, 2009) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(a)).  We have limited appellate jurisdiction “over final judgments and such interlocutory orders as the legislature deems appealable.” Ruiz v. Ruiz, 946 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no writ) (per curiam). Our appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to cases appealed from trial courts within our district.  Brooks v. State, No. 07-07-0505-CR, 2008 Tex. App. Lexis 629, at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Jan. 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).  “Only the Supreme Court is authorized to transfer appellate cases.”  Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005).

Because no perfected appeal of a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order from the June 1 case is before us and because the June 1 case was filed in a trial court outside our appellate district and no transfer order is of record, we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of ClayTex’s motion.  Accordingly, we dismiss the motion.

            It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

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[1]  The present appeal was transferred to this court by docket equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas.