Jeremy Crespin v. State ( 2013 )


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  • AFFIRM; and Opinion issued February 27 2013.
    In The
    court of ppeat
    fifth itrict of exa at OatLa
    No. 05-12-01352-CR
    No, 05-12-0131-CR______
    JEREMY JASON CRESPIN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-16205-W, F08-16204-W
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Lang-Miers, Murphy, and Fillmore
    Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
    Jeremy Jason Crespin appeals following the revocation of his community supervision and
    adjudication of his guilt in these cases.   In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is
    insufficient to support the revocation of his community supervision and adjudication of his guilt.
    We affirm. The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the
    parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion
    pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is
    well settled.
    FACTS
    Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child
    younger   than lourteen years oi age and indecency with a child under sevemeen years ol age. See
    TEx. PINAI, CoDE ANN, § 21.11(a). 22.021(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). The trial
    court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on five years’ community supervision
    in
    each case. The court assessed a $3,000 fine in the aggravated sexual assault case and a $2,500
    fine in the indecency case. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt. alleging in an amended
    motion that appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision by: (1) failing to
    register as a sex offender; (2) committing a theft of a motor vehicle offense: (3) failing to report:
    (4) failing to give twenty-four hours’ notice of any change in home address; (5) traveling outside
    of Dallas County without permission; and (6) failing to pay costs and fines. Appellant pleaded
    not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motions.
    During the adjudication hearing, at the State’s request, the trial court took judicial notice
    of the entire contents of the court’s file, specifically noting the following: (1) the order
    suspending adjudication of guilt and placing appellant on community supervision on June 15,
    2010; (2) the terms and conditions of community supervision signed by appellant on June 15,
    2010; (3) the sex offender admonitions signed by appellant on June 15, 2010; (4) page 6 of
    a
    certified copy of the transcript from that proceeding where the judge specifically denied
    appellant’s request to suspend him having to register as a sex offender while he was appealing
    the specific point of registration; and (5) that the mandate in that appeal was affirmed and
    received by the trial court on July 2, 2011.
    Regarding the registration allegation, Garland police detective Brian Younger testified
    appellant came to his office to register on September 14, 2010. Appellant was initially told to
    -2-
    register annually due to a discrepancy in the initial paperwork sent to the police department. On
    May 10, 2011, Younger explained to appellant in person that due to the nature of his offenses, he
    was required to register his address every   ninety    days. At that   time,   appellant signed a document
    acknowledging he understood the ninetyday registration requirement. Younger testified he             gave
    appellant a card that stated his next registration date was August 9, 2011. Appellant did not
    show up   on   that date. Instead, he left a telephone message and asked to reschedule the time to
    register. Younger rescheduled the registration appointment time for August 16, 201 1. Appellant
    did not show up on August 16, 2011. Appellant did call Younger on August 16th and asked tor
    more time because he “had a warrant out for his arrest.” Younger gave appellant another week
    and a half to get in touch with Younger, but he never heard from appellant again.
    Appellant testified that he was given instructions on the sex offender registration
    requirements when he was placed on community supervision, and he understood the requirement
    to register his address every ninety days when he spoke with Younger on May 10. 2011.
    Appellant said he was “in and out of jail” and could not make the appointments, but he always
    tried to call to reschedule.
    The trial court also heard testimony from several witnesses concerning the theft
    allegation. The trial court found all of the allegations true and adjudicated appellant guilty in
    each case. The court sentenced appellant to fifty years’ imprisonment in the aggravated sexual
    assault of a child case and twenty years’ imprisonment in the indecency with a child case.
    APPLICABLE LAW
    Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining
    whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels      v.   State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2006).       An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a
    -3-
    preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that        WOUld
    create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. id, at 76364.
    A knding ot a single violation ol community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See
    Sanchez v, State, 603 S.W2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. IPanel Op.j 1980). Thus, to prevail on
    appeal, appellant must successfully challenge all of the findings that support the revocation
    order, See Jones v. State, 
    571 S.W.2d 191
    , l9394 (Tex. Crirn. App. IPanel Op.J 1978).
    DISCUSSION
    Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community
    supervision and adjudicating his guilt because the evidence is insufficient to show he violated
    any of the conditions alleged in the amended motion to adjudicate. Appellant asserts there is no
    evidence he took a motor vehicle without the proper owner’s consent, changed his home address
    or traveled outside of Dallas County without permission, or intentionally failed to pay costs and
    fines. Appellant further argues that because he was never criminally charged with the offense of
    failure to register as a sex offender and the State “merely created the allegation,” the evidence is
    insufficient. The State responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence
    is sufficient to show appellant violated at least one condition of his community supervision.
    Younger’s testimony shows appellant did not comply with the sex offender registration
    requirements.   Younger specifically testified that after he gave appellant additional time to
    comply with the registration requirements on August 16. 2011, Younger never heard from
    appellant again. Appellant admitted he knew about and understood the registration requirements,
    but he was “in and out of jail” and always called to reschedule. It was the trial judge’s role, as
    the fact-finder, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 
    101 S.W.3d 89
    , 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial judge was free to accept or reject any and all of the
    -4-
    evidence presented by either side See Dewherrv v. State. 
    4 S.W.3d 735
    , 740 (Tex, Crim. App.
    1999).
    We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial   COWl’S   tinding that appellant
    failed to register as a sex offender, Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
    appellant’s community supervision and adjudicating appellant’s guilt in each case. See Rickets,
    2t)2 S.W.3d at 763; 
    Sanchez. 603 S.W.2d at 871
    . We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him.
    because proof of one violation is sufficient to SupPOrt revocation, we do not address appellant’s
    remaining complaints.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    2CL€2
    LANG-MIERS
    JUST19E
    Do Not Publish
    Tux. R. App. P.47
    121 352F.U05
    -5-
    _______
    Qtourt of Ztppeat
    jfiftl, itrict of exa at atta
    JUDGMENT
    JEREMY JASON CRESNN, Appellant                   Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District
    Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr,Ct.No,
    No. 05-12-0 1352-CR                              F08- I 6205-W).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                     Justices Murphy and Fillmore participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered February 27, 2013.
    /
    ELJZA1ETH LANG-MIER
    JUST’E            /
    Qlourt of tppeat
    Jfitt Oitrict of exa at Oafta
    JUDGMENT
    JEREMY JASON CRESPIN, Appellant                   Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District
    Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.CtNo.
    No. 05-12-01381-CR       V.                       F08-16204-W).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellec                      Justices Murphy and Fillmore participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIR11ED.
    Judgment entered February 27, 2013.
    /
    Jrn, )w
    ZIZ4BETH LANI-MIE S
    JUSyiCE          /