David Oyewole Falade v. State ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00300-CR
DAVID OYEWOLE FALADE APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant David Oyewole Falade appeals his convictions for aggravated
robbery with a deadly weapon while engaging in organized criminal activity and
for burglary of a habitation while engaged in organized criminal activity. In three
issues, Falade contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
introduce certain photographs, by excluding a self-serving hearsay statement,
and by denying his challenge to a veniremember for cause. We will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Terrance Nielsen came home in the early morning, Monday, February 2,
2009, and went to bed while the rest of the family left for work and school.
Although he initially heard a banging noise at the back of the house, he thought
nothing of it, believing the neighbor was doing yard work. He then heard the
stairs creak and opened his eyes to see Falade coming into his bedroom holding
a pistol. Falade raised the pistol, pointed it at Nielsen, and fired a shot to
Nielsen’s right. Falade then pointed the pistol toward Nielsen’s head, demanding
Nielsen’s money. Nielsen said he did not have his wallet.
Falade then forced Nielsen through the house, eventually forcing Nielsen
into a closet while Falade continued to pilfer. At one point, Nielsen freed himself,
called 9-1-1, and returned to the closet without Falade knowing he had done so.
Falade then again forced Nielsen through the house in an attempt to find
valuable possessions, eventually forcing him to get under a bed in another
bedroom. Shortly after, Nielsen heard Falade yell. He then heard other voices
yell ―freeze‖ and ―drop the gun.‖
Officer Bryant Parks and Officer Don Allred arrived shortly after the 9-1-1
call. Parks took position in the front of the house. Allred went to cover the back
of the house. As Allred approached the back door, Falade opened the door and
stepped out, pointing his pistol at Allred. Allred yelled for Falade to drop his gun.
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After a short standoff, Falade threw his pistol down. Allred ordered Falade to lie
on the patio. After hearing Allred issue commands to Falade to get down, Parks
went to the backyard, where Allred had already apprehended Falade. Falade
was in the prone position at Allred’s gunpoint.
At trial, defense counsel, after the State’s hearsay objection and outside
the presence of the jury, questioned Parks about whether Falade had said
anything to Allred. Parks said that Falade had said, ―They made me do it.‖ The
trial court sustained the State’s objection. Also at trial, the State introduced a
number of photographs, some of which included Falade and other alleged gang
members flashing gang signs. Other photographs contained only Falade holding
a gun, wearing brass knuckles, and wearing a bandana as a mask. Defense
counsel objected to the photographs of Falade holding a gun, wearing brass
knuckles, and wearing the bandana. The trial court overruled Falade’s objection
and allowed the State to introduce the photographs. A jury returned a verdict of
guilty and assessed punishment at thirty-two years’ confinement on each case, to
run concurrently. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Photographs
In his first issue, Falade argues that the trial court erred by allowing the
State to introduce photographs that display him holding a gun, wearing brass
knuckles, and wearing a bandana as a mask. Specifically, Falade argues that
these photographs ―impermissibly alluded to the commission of extraneous
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offenses and impermissibly introduced character evidence against‖ him. See
Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). The State argues that Falade failed to object at trial under
rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence and has waived this issue for our
review. The State also argues that the photographs were relevant to establish its
case-in-chief. Although Falade’s objection at trial was largely based on rule 403
of the Texas Rules of Evidence, he also objected to the introduction of these
photographs because, according to Falade, the photographs ―[went] to [Falade’s]
specific prior bad act[s].‖ We conclude that Falade has preserved this alleged
error for our review.
We review the trial court’s determination to admit evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. See Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). The trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its determination
lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Montgomery v. State,
810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
Evidence of extraneous offenses is not admissible as character evidence.
See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence may be admissible, however, if the
evidence has relevance other than to show character conformity. Moses, 105
S.W.3d at 626. Examples within the rules of evidence include ―proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident . . . .‖ Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Even relevant evidence offered for a
permissible purpose under rule 404(b) may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid.
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403; Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626. In determining whether the danger of unfair
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of an extraneous
offense, we consider (1) how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence
serves to make a fact of consequence more or less probable; (2) the potential of
the evidence to impress the jury in an irrational but indelible way; (3) the time
needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the force of the proponent’s need for the
evidence. See Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(discussing factors trial court is to consider when determining whether the
probative value of extraneous offense evidence outweighs a claim of prejudice).
Cf. Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing
factors to determine whether photographs are more prejudicial than probative).
Falade argues that the State introduced the objected-to photographs solely
to show his propensity to commit crimes or bad acts. Thus, Falade contends, the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
and inflammatory nature. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. But to carry its burden of
proving Falade’s participation in a criminal street gang, the State was required to
show that Falade and his companions ―continuously or regularly associate in the
commission of criminal activities.‖ Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.01(d). Thus,
some evidence of extraneous offenses would be relevant and, indeed, essential
to meet the State’s burden of proof. See Hernandez v. State, 52 S.W.3d 268,
278 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (reasoning that the admissibility of
extraneous activity is necessary to prove that defendant was a member of a
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criminal street gang); see also Roy v. State, 997 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (stating that when a defendant is charged with
engaging in organized criminal activity under section 71.02 of the penal code, the
State is entitled to introduce evidence that the defendant was a gang member
and regularly engaged in criminal activities such as the illegal sale and
distribution of drugs).
The photographs in question, along with other photographs displaying
Falade with other alleged gang members flashing gang signs, were both relevant
and highly probative that Falade and his companions engaged in violent crimes
as members of a gang.2 This series of photographs allowed the State to provide
compelling evidence that made Falade’s alleged involvement as a member of a
criminal street gang more probable than if the photographs had not been
introduced. The photographs are not of a nature that they have the potential to
impress the jury in an irrational but indelible way. And given that the State bore
the burden to prove Falade’s involvement in a street gang, the force of the
photographs was necessary to establish this requirement. See Chaddock v.
State, 203 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that
evidence of a prior assault committed by defendant was relevant to show he
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Falade testified in his own defense. During questioning, Falade admitted
that he was a gang member and also testified to the contents of many of the
pictures that the State admitted into evidence. Falade’s testimony regarding a
number of these pictures was that he was in a gang at the time the photos were
taken and that the photos depicted his membership in that gang.
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engaged in criminal activity and was not offered solely to prove character
conformity). We conclude and hold that the trial court’s determination to admit
into evidence the objected-to photographs does not lie outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. Thus, we
overrule Falade’s first issue.
B. Self-serving Statement
In his second issue, Falade contends that the trial court erred by not
allowing him to elicit testimony from Parks that as he was being handcuffed,
Falade said to Allred, ―They made me do it.‖ Falade’s contention is that his
statement was a res gestae statement which should have been admitted as
evidence that he committed the robbery under duress. The State argues that the
statement is a classic self-serving hearsay statement and that the trial court
correctly excluded its admission.
The determination of admissibility of evidence is within the trial court’s
sound discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion. See Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994);
Gaitan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet.
ref’d).
Hearsay is defined by the rules of evidence as ―a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.‖ Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). ―Matter
asserted‖ includes ―any matter explicitly asserted, and any matter implied by a
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statement, if the probative value of the statement as offered flows from
declarant’s belief as to the matter.‖ Tex. R. Evid. 801(c).
It is the rule in Texas that self-serving declarations are not admissible in
evidence as proof of the facts asserted. See Hafdahl v. State, 805 S.W.2d 396,
402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 948 (1991); Crane v. State,
786 S.W.2d 338, 353–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d
146, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); Chambers
v. State, 905 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); State v.
Morales, 844 S.W.2d 885, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). There are,
however, limited exceptions to this general rule that permit introduction of such
proof. The exception at issue in this case is whether Falade’s self-serving
declaration was part of the res gestae of the offense or arrest. See Allridge, 762
S.W.2d at 152; Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 576–77 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974).
One of the factors for determining a res gestae statement in Texas is
―spontaneity.‖ See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 152; Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d
793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). This principle was explained long ago as
follows:
For a statement to be a part of the res gestae, the declaration must
deal substantially with, and must grow out of, the main fact so as to
be spontaneous and not, in any event, a narration of a past event or
occurrence. Above everything else, there must exist that
spontaneity which takes the statement out of the realm of narration
or premeditation.
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See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 152 (quoting Trammell v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 224,
167 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942)). In Singletary, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals elaborated on this standard, noting: ―These principles embrace
such factors as time elapsed, and, more importantly, spontaneity, or whether the
statement was instinctive.‖ 509 S.W.2d at 577; see also Fisk v. State, 432
S.W.2d 912, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). And it is well established that the
statements must be generated by an excited feeling that extended without break
or let-down from the moment of the event they illustrate. Hamilton v. State, 138
Tex. Crim. 205, 209, 135 S.W.2d 476, 478 (1940).
After carefully examining the record before us, we hold that there is
nothing in this record to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the complained-of statement. During Falade’s bill of exception, Parks
testified that it was during ―handcuffing procedures‖ that Falade made the alleged
statement. Parks said that while he was unsure of the exact timing of Falade’s
statement, he ―assumed‖ it was made more than two minutes after Falade had
been apprehended. Parks also stated that the statement was made at a time
when the tension of the arrest had ―cease[d].‖ Under this record, we cannot say
whether the ―spontaneity‖ of Falade’s statements existed to take such statements
―out of the realm of narration or premeditation.‖ See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 152.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
Falade’s self-serving statements. We overrule Falade’s second issue.
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C. Vacillating Veniremember
In his third issue, Falade contends that the trial court erred by denying his
challenge for cause to veniremember 37. Pointing out that veniremember 37 at
one time said that she could not consider the full statutory range of punishment
but later stated that she could consider the evidence before determining what
punishment within the statutory range was appropriate, Falade asks this court to
hold that veniremember 37 ―gave the answers that she thought the person
questioning her wanted to hear, and that she did so with an incomplete
appreciation for the issue she was being questioned about.‖ The State retorts
that veniremember 37 was a classic vacillating veniremember and that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Falade’s challenge for cause.
In the case of a vacillating veniremember, we defer to the decision of the
trial court, which was in a position to actually see and hear the veniremember in
the context of the voir dire. Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 232–33 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 927 (2003). Such a ruling will not be
disturbed unless there is no adequate basis in the record to support the ruling.
Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 944 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
997 (1992). Elements such as demeanor and tone of voice, among other things,
are important factors in conveying the precise message intended by the
veniremember. Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Here, veniremember 37 initially indicated that she could not consider the
low range of punishment, but she later stated that she was going to wait and hear
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the evidence before deciding what punishment would be appropriate within the
statutory range. In light of veniremember 37’s apparently contradictory
statements, we defer to the trial judge, who was best positioned to evaluate her
demeanor and voir dire as a whole. See Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654,
669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Therefore, we overrule Falade’s third issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all three of Falade’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 1, 2011
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