Demers, Joseph Michael v. State ( 2013 )

Fli Ii Opinion issued January 29. 2(113.
In The
iInairt rrf Appiati
1Fiftl! Dhtrirt uf xai at IJa11a
. 05-1 1-01704-CR
JOSEPH M ICIIAEL DEMERS, Appellant
THE 1
ST
V TE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 060883
OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Fillmore, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Fillmore
Ajury found appellant Joseph Michael Demers guilty of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI)
and assessed punishment often years’ imprisonment. In two points of error on appeal, Demers asserts
the evidence of two prior misdemeanor DWI convictions used for enhancement of the offense to a
felony was insufficient. We conclude there was sufficient evidence of the prior DWI convictions, and
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Demers was indicted for the offense of DWI, which was alleged to have occurred on May 21,
2011. The indictment also alleged that prior to commission of the May 21, 2011 offense, Demers was
convicted of offenses relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated on April 29, 1988,
in cause number X7 I $72 in the County Court at Law of( ira on County, Texas. and on Ma” 27, I 993,
in cause number 92-2-1640 in the County Court at Law No, 2 of Urayson County, Texas.
m’, lound Demc. is 4111 lt\ ol the \ I i’ 2 I 20 11 of tensc, ot 1) \\ I I he i ur’, ilsu found th it L 101
to the commission of the May 21, 2011 DWI, Demers was convicted of OWl on April 29, 1988, in
cause number $7—I 872. and Was convicted ofl)Wl on May 27. 1993, in cause number 92—2—1 640. The
jury assessed punishment often years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PEN\L CODE ANN. 49M9(b)(2) (West
§
Supp. 2012) (An offense under Section 49.04, “Driving While [ntoxicatcd,’ is a third degree lèlony if
it is shown on the trial of the otlense that the person has previously been convicted two times of’ any
other offense relating to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.); TEX, PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.34
West 2011) (The range of punishment tbr a third degree felony is imprisonment for a term of’not more
than ten years or less than two years. In addition to imprisonment, a fine not to exceed $10,000 may
be assessed.).
On appeal, Demers concedes he was legally intoxicated when operating his motor vehicle on
May 2 1, 2011. 1-lowever, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the two prior misdemeanor
OWl convictions upon which the State relied as enhancements in order to convict Demers for felony
D Wi.
Standard of Review
We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set out in Jackron v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (1979). Aclaiiies i’. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crirn. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1763 (2012). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860. This standard recognizes
“the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
—2—
and to draw reasonable inferences trom haste liets to ultimate hiets.” ,Iackso,,. 443 U.S. at 3 1 9 see
uI ldaIn( S \\ d it Sot) I h. ur s t1i I ic I mdci is nti tic (Ito judac thc ci cdtbi I itv of thc
uitnesses, and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties.
hambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. (‘rim, App. 1991). We defer to the jury’s
determinations of credibility, and may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Brooks
v. 5tute, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. (‘rim. App. 2010 (plurality op.); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556,
5o2 (Tex. Crim .App. 2000) (in conducting legal sufficiency analysis, appellate court “may not re—weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment br that of the jury”).
April 29, l98 Misdemeanor DWI Conviction
In his first point of error, Demers asserts the evidence was insufficient to establish the prior
April 29, 1988 misdemeanor DWI conviction because the judgment in cause number 87-1872 failed
to tind Demers guilty. When, as here, a prior DWI conviction is alleged as an element ot’the offense
of’ felony DWI, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior
conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. 1qou’e,v v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919.
921 (‘T’ex. Crim. App. 2007); see also TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01 (West Supp. 2011) (“A
judgment is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing
the conviction or acquittal of the defendant.”); Williamson v. State, 46 S.W.3d 463, 466—67 (Tex.
App—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“Even if all the procedural requirements of article 42.0 I have not been
met, as long as a judgment adjudicates the guilt of the defendant and assesses his punishment, it may
be used under section 49.09(d) to elevate misdemeanor DWI to a felony offense.”). The April 29, 1988
judgment in cause number 87-1872 specifically provides the defendant pleaded guilty to the DWI
charge and “the Court. . . so finds that defendant is guilty as confessed by him of the offense of driving
while intoxicated. . .
—3—
Considering the totality of the record in this case in die light most favorable to the verdict, as
we are required to do. a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Demers was
adjudged guilty in cause number 87-1872, the April 29, 1988 misdemeanor DWI conviction, as alleged
to enhance the May 2011 DWI offense to a felony. We overrule Demers’s first point of error.
May 27.. 1993 MIsdemeanor DWI Conviction
In his second point oferror Demers asserts the evidence was insufficient to establish the prior
May 27. 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction because the State failed to sufficiently connect the May
27, 1993 judgment to Demers. Texas law does not require that the existence of a prior conviction or
linking of the defendant to the prior conviction be proven in any specific manner. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d
at 921—22. In making its proof, the State may use “[a]ny type ofevidence, documentary or testimonial.”
Id. The existence of a prior conviction and linking of the defendant to the prior conviction may be
established by certified copies of the prior judgment and sentence and records of the State containing
fingerprints of the individual previously convicted, supported by expert testimony identifying those
fingerprints as identical to known fingerprints ofthe defendant. See Vessels v. State, 432 S.W.2d 108,
117 (Tex. Crim. App.l968) (op. on reh’g); see also Gnffln v. State, 181 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2005, pet ref’d) (‘Typically, the State will present fingerprints included
in the pen packet, have a fingerprinting expert take fresh fingerprints from the defendant, and then
conclude from comparison that the defendant on trial is the same person convicted of the previous
offense.”). Other methods of proving prior convictions include the testimony of a witness who
personally knows the defendant and the facts ofhis prior conviction and identifies him, or a stipulation
orjudicial admission ofthe defendant SeeBeck v. State 719 S.W.2d 205,209 (rex. Crim. App. 1986).
The evidence offered could also include photographs ofthe convicted individual for comparison with
the defendant by the fect finder, or identification information such as name, gender, height, eye color,
-4-
hair color, and date of birth. Sec Williams v State, 94 S.W2d 886, 895 (Tex. App— Waco 1 997, no
pet.). The approved methods ftr prool of identity set forth ii various Texas appellate court opinions
are not exclusive and may olen include the use ola combination of methods. Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 2 10.
The State may use circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant is the same person named in the prior
convictIons. 1111111(111 Y. State, 749 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tcx. Crim. App. 1 9S$) (op. on rch’g). The fact
finder looks at the totality of the admitted evidence to determine whether there was a previous
conviction and whether the delCndant was the person convicted. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923. As the
Court of (‘riminal Appeals stated in fluinan:
[Ojrdinarily the proof that is adduced to establish that the defendant on trial is one and
the same person that is named in an alleged prior criminal conviction or convictions
closely resembles pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The pieces standing alone usually have
little meaning. However, when the pieces arc fitted together, they usually form the
picture of the person who committed the alleged prior conviction or convictions.
Human, 749 S.W.2d at 835-36.
Here, the judgment of conviction was admitted into evidence and showed that on May 27, 1993,
in cause number 92-21640, a person by the name of Joseph Michael Demers was convicted in Grayson
County, Texas, of a misdemeanor DWI oflCnse and sentenced to twenty days in the county jail and
assessed a fine of $600. However, even if the name on the judgment is the same as that of the accused
at trial, the State must present independent evidence that the accused is the same person previously
convicted. See Gri/jin v. State, 866 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no pet.).
No witness at trial testified that the fingerprint on the judgment in the 1993 misdemeanor DW1
conviction matched Demers’s fingerprint. The “I.D. officer” for the Grayson County Sheriff’s
Department, Kim Hobbs, indicated she was not testifying the fingerprint appearing on the 1993
judgment was Demers’s fingerprint, and that someone else, such as Terry Dunn of the Grayson County
District Attorney’s Office, would have to identify the fingerprint. Neither Dunn nor any other witness
—D—
was called to testit Concerning the fingerprint Ofl the judgment in the 1993 misdemeanor DWI
conviction. Accordinulv. we look to the totality of the evidence to determine whether there arc other
liicts that link Demers to the I 993 misdemeanor DWI conviction, There are two such evidentiary hnks.
The first evidentiary link connecting Demers to the 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction is his
name. Generally, a name alone is insufhcicnt to connect a defendant to a prior udrment. Sec Beck.
719 S.W.2d at 210. Here, we are not confronted with a name commonly encountered, a partial name,
or initials. See Benton i’. State, 336 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.— -Texarkana 2011, pet. rei’d). the
1993 misdemeanor DWI judgment contains Demers’s full name, Joseph Michael Demers, as did the
1988 misdenieanorDWl judgment contained in State’s Exhibit No.2. Each ofthese misdemeanor DWI
judgments, as well as the felony DWI conviction that is the subject of this appeal, resulted from
offenses committed in Grayson County, Texas. While name alone is not the sole evidence connecting
Demers to the 1993 misdemeanor conviction, it is unlikely that a person other than Demers, by the same
full name of Joseph Michael Demers, was convicted of the 1993 misdemeanor DWI offense in Grayson
County, Texas.
The Second evidentiary link connecting Demers to the 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction is
the testimony of Officer Hobbs. On direct examination of Officer Hobbs, the State elicited the
following testimony:
Q: Mrs. Hobbs, what are your duties as identification officer?
A: I am basically responsible for all jail records.
Q: And in this case were you requested to look at somejail records on behalf of the
I)istrict Attorney’s office’?
A: Yes, I was.
Q: What person or defendant was it regarding?
A: Mr. Demers.
Q: Were you able to identify any jail records?
A: Yes, sir, I was.
—6—
Q: What jail records arc those?
A: His jail file.
Q: Does it contain information relating to arrests from 1992?
A: Yes, sir, it does.
Q: Did it show the date on or about that arrest?
A: I have an arrest for X—29 ot ..
Q: Does it say what the offense was for I sicj he was arrested for?
A: DWL
Q: 1 lave you been able to make an identification from those jail records tir the
1992 arrest to the individual seated here in the courtroom?
A: Yes, I have
Q: How did you do that’?
A: I have a photo, a bookin photo of that arrest.
Q: in comparing the photo with your knowledge of Mr. Derners, is that one in the
SI1flC person?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Mrs. Hobbs, so the jury understands if an individual comes in the jail and they
say they lied about their name but perhaps they have been arrested before, would
you have a way to determine who that person is?
A: Yes, we would. Once their fingerprints are taken, they are submitted to Austin
DPS. We get a hit confirmation back on those tmgerpririts.
Q: Part of our job when an individual comes in, they give the jail certain
information; correct’?
A: That’s correct..
Q: Their name?
A: Yes.
Q: Date of birth?
A: Yes.
Q: Social security numbers?
A: Absolutely.
Q: Other identifiers’?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What do you do with that information?
A: We input that into our system. Just as the subject gave the officer that did the
arrest and then it’s submitted along with the prints to the Austin DPS.
Q: In your judgment, the jail records that you have, do they support identifying
infonnation from arrests from 1992 on Joseph Demers.
A: Yes, they do.
***
Q: I am showing you what is marked as state’s exhibit number three which is a
certified copy of a judgment and a sentence. Is this the same Joseph Michael
Demers that is seated here in the courtroom?
—7—
A: Yes, sir, I believe that it is.
*4*
Q: And, Mrs. Hobbs, so the july understands, again we talked a little bit about
identification. But it’s your job, is it not, to merge records?
A: That’s correct.
Q: In the jail. So if someone comes in, in this case Mr. Demers had been arrested
within the last year, you would have merged those records with those 1992 jail
records; correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: That is basically how you know this is one in the same individual?
A: Correct’
Demers did not object to Officer Hobbs’s testimony linking him to the 1993 misdemeanor DWI
conviction. Furthermore, Demers did not object to admission ofState’s Exhibit No.3, which contained
a certified copy ofajudgment of conviction dated May 27, 1993 in cause number 92-2-1640 showing
that a person by the name of Joseph Michael Demers was convicted in Grayson County, Texas of the
offense of misdemeanor DWI, sentenced to twenty days in the countyjail, and assessed a fine of $600.
We note that there is a third link connecting Demers to the 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction.
However, the link is not evidentiary; it is a link provided in the closing argument of defense counsel
during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. While Demers moved for a directed verdict of acquittal
at the conclusion of the State’s case on the basis of legal and tictual insufficiency of the evidence,
Demers made no specific motion or objection during trial concerning any alleged inadequacy of the
evidence linking him to the 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction. In flict, neither the State nor Demers
argued any identity issue concerning the prior DWJ convictions to thejury. When counsel for Demers
mentioned the prior 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction during his closing argument to the jury, he
stated:
The testimony olOfficer Hobbs is significantly mote probative than the one sentence of police officer testimony. purporting to link a
defendant to a prior conviction, that the court found lacking in Prihoda it &ate 352 5.W.3d 796 810 (rex. App.—San Antonio 201 It pet. retd).
-8-
ihe tWo convictions are misdemeanor conviclions. lhe two COnvictiOns happened in
1 9X8 and 1993. Years have passed. Apparently he learned his lesson tbr a while at least
&puidine oil ho\\ \OU bud tod i But ihu ii not proot uid the lUdgL h is told ‘,ou in
the instructions. they are not proof ol his gui It br what he is charged with today. We
didn’t trY to bide them, We didn t try to make ridiculous observations. We simply
raised the points and then brought them into evidence. 1 told you up front that we
weren’t going to try to hide anything from you in this case.
In his jury aruliment. detense counsel bocused the jury on the trial court’s instruction that evidence of
the 1993 misdemeanor DWI conviction could not be considered in determining whether Demers was
intoxicated while driving a motor vehicle on the date of the charged ofti.nse. However, the jury
argument also conceded that Demers was convicted of the 1993 misdemeanor DWI offense, a matter
defense counsel indicated he never intended to hide from the jury.
2
Considering the totality of the record in this case in the light most favorable to the verdict, as
we are required to do, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Demers was the
same person who was convicted in cause number 92-2-1640, the May 27, 1993 misdemeanor DWI
conviction, as alleged to enhance the May 2011 DWI offense to a felony. We overrule Derners’s second
point of error.
Conclusion
There was sufficient evidence on this record for a rational jury to have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Demers had been convicted of the 1988 misdemeanor DWI offense in cause
number 87-1872 and the 1 993 misdemeanor DWI offense in cause number 92-2-1640 that were used
to enhance the current offense to a felony.
7
See Benion. 336 S.W3ci at 360 (statements of defense counsel dtinng elosmg arguments wcrejudictal admissions linking defendant to
pnor convictions). C’/. SoOth v. 5tiift’, 469 S.W.2d 920 (Tea.C rim. App. 1973) (explanation by defense counsel in closing argument that two prior
convictions occurred long ago did not constitute evidence and did not sufficiently connect appellant with “the prior convictions so as to render
unnecessary any further proof on the part of the State”).
—9—
Accordingly. we affinn the trial court’s judgment.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. K. App. P.47
ii 1704F.UO5
-10-
Luirt tf 41rI1
Wift1i Jitrirt uf tt Ja11a
JUDGMENT
JOSEPTI Mid IALI. l)EMERS, Appellant Appeal li-oni the 1 5th Judicial District Court
ol Gravson (‘ountv. Texas. (Tr.Ct.No.
No, U5i lMl704CR V 060S83L
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Moseley and Myers participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion o{ this date, the judgment ol the trial court is AFFIRNIED.
Judgment entered January 29, 2013.
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE