Juan Juarez Candelas v. State ( 2013 )

Opinion issued July 2, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-13-00007-CR
———————————
JUAN JUAREZ CANDELAS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 149th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 31697
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Juan Juarez Candelas appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.072 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. 1 In a single issue, Candelas contends that the trial court erred
in denying his requested relief because his trial counsel was ineffective over fifteen
years ago based on his alleged failure to advise Candelas of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
In 1996, Candelas, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to a charge of
possession of a controlled substance, namely, cocaine weighing less than one
gram. He received a two-year suspended sentence, was placed on community
supervision for three years, and ordered to pay a $300 fine.
Several months after his guilty plea, Candelas submitted his application to
“Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.” The United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service denied an adjustment of Candelas’s residency status
based on his 1996 conviction. 2 One year later, the INS began removal proceedings
1
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072, § 8 (West 2005) (providing for
appeal in felony or misdemeanor case in which applicant seeks relief from order or
judgment of conviction ordering community supervision).
2
A guilty plea and term of deferred adjudication community supervision constitutes
a conviction for federal immigration law purposes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)
(defining “conviction” to include “if adjudication of guilt has been withheld,
where . . . the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere” and “the judge
has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to
be imposed”); State v. Guerrero, No. PD-1258-12, 2013 WL 2419595, at *6 (Tex.
Crim. App. June 5, 2013) (citing Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1005–06 (5th
Cir.1999)) (stating that appellee’s guilty plea and completed term of deferred-
2
against him based on that conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(B) (“Any alien who
. . . has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . .
relating to a controlled substance . . . is deportable.”). In January 2003, Candelas
was ordered removed from the United States to Mexico; the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed the order of removal.3
After Padilla, Candelas filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He
contended that his guilty plea was involuntary, asserting that Padilla applied
retroactively and that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not
specifically advise Candelas on the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
According to Candelas, the general admonitions about adverse immigration
consequences in the plea documents were insufficient. Candelas further asserted
that if he had been advised that his guilty plea would result in automatic removal
and denial of citizenship, he would not have entered the plea and would have gone
to trial.
Candelas attached the affidavit of Leo Torres, his trial counsel, in support of
his petition. In his affidavit, Torres stated that it was not his practice in 1996 to
consult with non-citizen clients in state court criminal matters on the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea because the consequences were not as harsh then,
adjudication community supervision was conviction for federal immigration
purposes law purposes).
3
According to Candelas’s counsel, the order of removal has not been executed.
3
and he did not independently recall discussing immigration matters with Candelas.
Torres further stated that he explained to Candelas the admonitions that the trial
judge would give before he entered his plea. According to Torres, an independent
warning about immigration consequences was unnecessary because Candelas’s
plea documents listed the consequences, and he assumed the conviction would not
have a negative consequence because Candelas was not going to serve jail time.
Candelas initialed and signed the “Defendant’s Affidavit of Admonitions, Waiver,
Judicial Confession, Statements, Plea, Probation and Appeal-Felony Less Than
Capital,” which stated that a guilty plea “may result in deportation, the exclusion
from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law[.]”
Torres stated in his affidavit that, based on his review of that document, he
discussed its contents with Candelas on the day judgment was entered.
At the November 2012 habeas hearing, Candelas’s counsel and the State
presented argument. Candelas was present but did not testify. The trial court signed
its order denying Candelas habeas relief and made findings of fact, including:
2) [Candelas] was warned in writing prior to accepting his plea of
guilty that it “may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission
to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law.”
3) [Candelas] was warned orally by the Judge prior to accepting his
plea of guilty that it “might be used against you or could be used
against you by the immigration and naturalization service,” which
“could try to deport you, deny petition for naturalization, or exclude
you from the lawful entry into this country.”
4
***
5) At the time of [Candelas’s] plea, federal law allowed, but did not
mandate removal of aliens convicted of possession of cocaine. . . .
Therefore, under Padilla, trial counsel in the instant case was only
required to give [Candelas] a general warning that his conviction
might result in deportation.
6) . . . Padilla should not be applied retroactively.
7) [Candelas] has been ordered removed to Mexico by a Federal Court
as a result of his conviction in the above cause.
8) Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to properly warn
[Candelas] regarding deportation.
9) [Candelas] is not a United States citizen; he is a citizen of Mexico;
and he has not been “admitted or paroled” into this country. He has
neither alleged nor shown an independent basis for being in this
country. He has also failed to show that even without this conviction
he could stay or be admitted into the country. As such he has failed to
show prejudice.
10) [Candelas] has failed to sufficiently show that he would not have
accepted the plea, if he had known of the potential immigration
consequences. He has failed to show prejudice on this basis also.
This appeal followed. After Candelas filed his notice of appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that Padilla did not apply retroactively to convictions
final before that decision. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107
(2013); see also Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (adopting Chaidez reasoning as matter of state law).
5
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief for an abuse of
discretion. Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Ex
parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex parte Necessary,
333 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). In
conducting our review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We
review questions of law de novo. Ex parte Necessary, 333 S.W.3d at 787. Candelas
had the burden to prove his claims for habeas relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);
State v. Webb, 244 S.W.3d 543, 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
B. Under controlling law, no basis exists to establish that the trial court
abused its discretion
Candelas contends that his trial counsel’s representation was constitutionally
deficient because he did not specifically advise Candelas that he would be
ineligible to adjust his residency status and would be deported for accepting a
suspended sentence with community supervision. Acknowledging that Padilla
does not apply retroactively, Candelas urges us to make “an independent
6
determination that defendants like Candelas deserve the same protections as Mr.
Padilla” and conclude that his plea was involuntary.
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a
criminal defendant’s attorney to provide advice about the risk of deportation
arising from a guilty plea. 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. The Court held that
“longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on
families living lawfully in this country” demanded that counsel “inform [his] client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” Id. at 1486. When the deportation
consequence is “truly clear,” counsel’s duty is to warn a defendant that he would
be deported. Id. at 1483. When the consequences are “not succinct and
straightforward,” counsel “need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”
Id.
Nearly three years later, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of Padilla’s
retroactive application and had to decide whether Padilla announced a “new rule”
because “[o]nly when [the Supreme Court] appl[ies] a settled ruled may a person
avail herself of the decision on collateral review.” Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107. The
Court rejected the argument that Padilla applied the settled law of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 1108–09 (referencing well known standard in
7
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)). The Court held
that Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and, thus,
did not apply retroactively to cases already final. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1113; see
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989) (“Unless they fall
within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the
new rules are announced.”).
Shortly after Chaidez, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted Chaidez’s
reasoning: “We adhere to the retroactivity analysis in Chaidez and its holding that
Padilla does not apply retroactively.” Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d at 679.
The Court recognized that it “could accord retroactive effect to Padilla as a matter
of state habeas law” but “decline[d] to do so.” Id. The Court held that the
applicant, whose conviction was final before Padilla, could not rely on it to argue
that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
As an intermediate court of appeals, we are bound to follow De Los Reyes.
See Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet.
ref’d) (citing Purchase v. State, 84 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d)); see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a). And, this Court has held
that, because Padilla announced a “new rule,” it does not apply retroactively. See
Ibarra v. State, No. 01-12-00292-CR, 2013 WL 1163967, at *2 (Tex. App.—
8
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, no pet. h.) (concluding that appellant who was
convicted twelve years before Padilla could not rely on it on collateral review and
affirming denial of habeas relief). Because Candelas’s conviction became final
before Padilla was decided, he may not avail himself of the decision on collateral
review. Id.
Under applicable pre-Padilla law, “while the Sixth Amendment assures an
accused of effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, [it] does not
extend to ‘collateral’ aspects of the prosecution.” Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d
530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Immigration consequences of a guilty plea were
considered a collateral matter and did not support an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888–89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999) (“That a guilty plea may result in deportation is generally considered a
collateral consequence.”); see Ex parte Luna, No. 14-11-01063-CR, 2013 WL
1197777, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2013, no pet.)
(“Immigration consequences of a guilty plea are considered collateral; therefore,
[applicant’s] plea would not be rendered involuntary under the United States or
Texas Constitutions even if his attorney was deficient in informing him of the
consequences.”).
Candelas was convicted in 1996, nearly fifteen years before Padilla was
decided. Because Padilla announced a “new rule,” it is not retroactive and
9
Candelas may not rely on the decision to argue that his counsel was ineffective.
Before Padilla, immigration consequences of a guilty plea were considered a
collateral matter that did not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Candelas does not argue that his counsel was ineffective on any basis other than a
failure to advise Candelas properly on the immigration consequences of his plea.
He presents no basis for an independent determination that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and overrule Candelas’s issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Candelas’s single issue on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Harvey Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Brown, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
10