Michelle E. Matlock v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                                   NO. 07-09-0318-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL D
    APRIL 28, 2010
    ______________________________
    MICHELLE E. MATLOCK,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _______________________________
    FROM THE 121st DISTRICT COURT OF TERRY COUNTY;
    NO. 5826; HON. KELLY G. MOORE, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Memorandum Opinion
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
    Michelle E. Matlock (appellant) appeals her conviction for possessing a
    controlled substance.     Via a single issue, she contends that her due process rights
    were violated when the police destroyed evidence favorable to her case in bad faith.
    We affirm.
    Background
    Appellant was stopped for speeding. Subsequently, active arrest warrants were
    discovered, and appellant was placed under arrest. Consent to search the vehicle was
    granted. The arresting officer searched appellant’s purse found in the floorboard behind
    the driver’s seat and found baggies containing methamphetamine. A passenger in the
    car was also searched, and she too was found to possess drugs. A pipe that could be
    used for ingesting drugs also was found in the front passenger area of the vehicle.
    However, the officer determined that the pipe would not provide any additional evidence
    and then destroyed it on the side of the road.         Appellant was charged with and
    convicted of possession of methamphetamine. She now appeals that conviction.
    Issue – Due Process
    Appellant contends in her sole issue that her due process rights were violated by
    the officer destroying evidence. She contends that the evidence was favorable to her
    case and it prevented her from presenting her defense. We disagree.
    First, Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governs preservation
    of error, and states, in part: “(a) In General.--As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint
    for appellate review, the record must show that: (1) the complaint was made to the trial
    court by a timely request, objection, or motion that: (A) stated the grounds for the ruling
    that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make
    the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from
    the context.”      TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. This rule encompasses the concept of "party
    responsibility."    Pena v. State, 
    285 S.W.3d 459
    , 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).         The
    complaining party bears the responsibility of clearly conveying to the trial judge the
    2
    particular complaint, including the precise and proper application of the law as well as
    the underlying rationale. 
    Id. at 463-64.
    “Error preservation does not involve a hyper-
    technical or formalistic use of words or phrases; instead, ‘[s]traight forward
    communication in plain English’ is sufficient.’”                  
    Id. at 464.
       “To avoid forfeiting a
    complaint on appeal, the party must ‘let the trial judge know what he wants, why he
    thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at
    a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.’” 
    Id. This gives
    the trial judge and the opposing party an opportunity to correct the error. 
    Id. Whether a
    party's particular complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on appeal
    comports with the complaint made at trial.                  
    Id. In making
    this determination, we
    consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties' shared
    understanding at that time. 
    Id. Here, the
    record shows that appellant did not preserve her due process claim for
    appellate review. Although appellant filed a motion for new trial, she failed to raise this
    claim at that time. Indeed, appellant stressed the fact that evidence was destroyed to
    the jury but as a means to cast doubt on appellant’s guilt. Appellant was obligated to
    put the trial judge on notice of the specific legal theory that she intended to advocate,
    and because she did not, she failed to preserve her complaint that her due process
    rights had been violated.1 Therefore, we overrule her sole issue.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Brian Quinn
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.
    1
    Appellant agrees with this conclusion but raised the issue for possible habeas use later.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-09-00318-CR

Filed Date: 4/28/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015