Jason Medina v. State ( 2013 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-12-00071-CR
Jason MEDINA,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009CR1905
Honorable Lori I. Valenzuela, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 12, 2013
AFFIRMED
Jason Medina was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced
to twenty years imprisonment. Medina asserts three issues on appeal, contending: (1) the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the omission of an Article 38.23 instruction
from the jury charge resulted in egregious harm; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel. We overrule Medina’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-12-00071-CR
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first issue, Medina contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the officer who stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle. The State responds that reasonable suspicion supported the stop.
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review.” Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); accord Martinez v.
State, 275 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). “We give ‘almost total
deference’ to the trial court’s findings of historical facts that are supported by the record and to
mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.”
Martinez, 275 S.W.3d at 34; see Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,
89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “When the trial court does not enter findings of fact, we ‘must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling’ and ‘assume the trial court
made implicit findings of fact to support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the
record.’” Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; accord Martinez, 275 S.W.3d at 34.
“A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts
that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude
that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.”
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “This standard is an
objective one that disregards the actual subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks,
instead, to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention.” Id. “It also looks
to the totality of the circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent enough in
isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an
investigative detention is justified.” Id.
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Officer Daniel Moynihan testified that he was responding to a call for loud music at
approximately 12:30 a.m. when he heard a gunshot north of the location to which he was
responding. Officer Moynihan stated that three seconds after he heard the gunshot, he observed
a car “screeching up to the stop sign” in his location. Based on his concern that the car was
somehow involved in the gunshot, Officer Moynihan exited his vehicle and illuminated the other
car with his flashlight. As Officer Moynihan approached the car, he saw a shotgun laying across
the passenger’s lap. After further investigation, Officer Moynihan determined that the
passenger, Medina, was a convicted felon and arrested him for possession of a firearm by a
felon. On cross-examination, Officer Moynihan testified that he stopped the vehicle based on
“the totality of the circumstances,” stating, “I heard the gunshot, the vehicle came from the
direction of the gunshot, and then came to a screeching halt at the stop sign.” Officer Moynihan
also stated that he did not see any other vehicles on the roadway when he stopped the car.
In Faulker v. State, 727 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d),
the Houston court considered a similar issue. In that case, an officer was responding to a
disturbance call from an apartment complex around 3:00 a.m., when he heard four gunshots
coming from the north, behind the apartments. Id. at 795-96. As the officer was leaving the
apartment complex to proceed to a school located just north of the apartment complex, “he
observed a brown pick-up truck make a ‘pretty quick’ u-turn in the roadway.” Id. at 795. The
officer did not see anyone else in the area. Id. at 796. The Houston court held that the facts were
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to justify the officer’s stop of the truck. Id.; see also
Carraway v. State, No. B14-92-00758-CR, 1993 WL 263400, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] July 15, 1993, no pet.) (holding facts justified temporary detention when officer heard
numerous shots coming from an apartment complex around 11:30 p.m. and, moments later,
observed appellant’s car leaving that complex at a high rate of speed).
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In this case, Officer Moynihan heard the gunshots and observed the car in which Medina
was a passenger appear from the area in which the gunshots were fired within seconds. The car
then came to a screeching halt at the stop sign, and Officer Moynihan did not see any other
vehicles on the roadway. Given the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Officer Moynihan
had reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Medina’s first issue is overruled.
JURY CHARGE
In his second issue, Medina asserts that the trial court erroneously failed to include an
Article 38.23 instruction in the jury charge because the testimony at trial raised a fact issue with
regard to whether Officer Moynihan had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which
Medina was a passenger. The instruction would have informed the jury to disregard Medina’s
statement that he shot the gun which was made after the stop if the jury believed, or had a
reasonable doubt, that the stop was illegal. Medina acknowledges that no objection was made
with regard to the omission of the Article 38.23 instruction and that the record must show
egregious harm in order for Medina to prevail on this issue.
Article 38.23(a) states that:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any
provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution
or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the
accused on the trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury
shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence
was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event,
the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005). “The trial judge has an absolute sua
sponte duty to prepare a jury charge that accurately sets out the law applicable to the specific
offense charged.” Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Article
38.23 is ‘the law applicable’ to any case in which a specific, disputed issue of fact is raised”
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04-12-00071-CR
regarding whether a “statement was illegally obtained.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159,
181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
The only person who testified at trial regarding the circumstances of the stop other than
Officer Moynihan, whose testimony was consistent with his testimony during the suppression
hearing, was the driver of the vehicle, Manual Ruiz. Ruiz testified he was returning from a store
with Medina when he decided to fire a gun he was thinking about purchasing from Medina’s
girlfriend to determine if the gun worked. Ruiz described the car he was driving as a small
compact car. Ruiz stated that he exited the car, went into the woods, and shot the gun twice.
Ruiz then picked up the shell casings, returned to the car, and placed the gun in the hatchback of
the car. While driving back to Medina’s apartment, Ruiz stopped at a corner, where a police
officer was waiting with a spotlight. Ruiz testified that he was traveling approximately fifteen to
twenty miles an hour when he stopped at the stop sign, and his tires did not screech. Ruiz stated
that he arrived at the stop sign about four minutes after he fired the gun.
“A defendant must establish three foundation requirements to trigger an Article 38.23
instruction: (1) the evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact; (2) the evidence on that
fact must be affirmatively contested; and (3) the contested factual issue must be material to the
lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the statement claimed to be involuntary.”
Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 177. In his brief, Medina asserts these three requirements were met
because Ruiz’s testimony raised material fact issues with regard to whether Officer Moynihan
had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Specifically, Medina points to disputed testimony
regarding the number of shots that were fired from the gun, whether the vehicle arrived at the
location of the stop within three seconds after the firing of the shots, and whether the vehicle had
been traveling at a rate of speed that would cause it to “screech” to a stop. The State responds
that whether the car “screeched” to a stop was not a material fact in determining whether Officer
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04-12-00071-CR
Moynihan had reasonable suspicion to stop the car. We do not reach the issue of whether the
Article 38.23 instruction was required under the facts of the instant case because even if we
assume the instruction was required, the record does not establish that its omission resulted in
egregious harm.
Egregious harm is established if the record shows that the appellant has suffered such
harm that he has not had a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984). “[T]he actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury
charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative
evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of
the trial as a whole.” Id.
In this case, Medina would be entitled to a reversal only if he was deprived of a fair and
impartial trial by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that it could not consider Medina’s
statement that he shot the gun if it believed, or had a reasonable doubt, as to whether Officer
Moynihan had sufficient facts to justify his initial stop of the vehicle. Under the evidence
presented, however, the jury would have decided not to consider Medina’s statement only if the
jury believed Ruiz’s testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the stop. If the jury
believed Ruiz’s testimony, however, the jury would have acquitted Medina since Ruiz also
testified that the gun was in Ruiz’s possession and that he fired the shots. The absence of the
Article 38.23 instruction did not affect the jury’s consideration of the credibility of the witnesses.
Nothing in the record supports the contention that the jury might have chosen to believe Officer
Moynihan’s testimony regarding the statements Medina made at the scene of the investigation
but disbelieved his testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the initial stop.
Accordingly, Medina was not deprived of a fair and impartial trial by the omission of an Article
38.23 instruction, and his second issue is overruled.
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04-12-00071-CR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In his final issue, Medina contends trial counsel was ineffective because he filed
inappropriate pre-trial motions and numerous motions for continuance. Medina also contends
that trial counsel failed to effectively communicate with him. Medina asserts that trial counsel’s
actions “dramatically increased” his time in jail by delaying the commencement of trial.
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel’s representation fell below the standard of
prevailing professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Cox v. State, 389 S.W.3d 817, 819
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Cox, 389 S.W.3d at 819. “‘If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice … that course should be followed.’” Id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
In this case, Medina’s argument is focused on the delays occasioned by trial counsel’s
actions rather than the result or outcome of the trial. Even assuming the delays unnecessarily
lengthened Medina’s pre-trial incarceration, the record does not establish that Medina’s defense
was prejudiced by the delays. Moreover, Medina does not show how the result or outcome of his
trial would have been different if the trial had proceeded sooner than it did. Accordingly,
because Medina failed to establish a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have
been different absent his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, we overrule Medina’s final issue.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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