Eric Xavier Mendoza v. State ( 2013 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-12-00146-CR
Eric Xavier MENDOZA,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009-CR-5141
Honorable Philip A. Kazen Jr., Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 12, 2013
AFFIRMED
Appellant Eric Xavier Mendoza appeals his conviction for capital murder. Mendoza pled
not guilty. However, the jury convicted him of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 1 On appeal, Mendoza argues: (1) the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress a pretrial identification; (2) the trial court erred in
admitting extraneous evidence that Mendoza was a member of the Mexican Mafia; and (3) the
1
Because the State did not seek the death penalty, Mendoza was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, as is
mandatory upon conviction of a capital felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b)(2) (West 2011).
04-12-00146-CR
trial court erred in admitting extraneous evidence that Mendoza was an “ex-con” and “locked
up” pending trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On February 21, 2009, two groups of people fought in a bar, resulting in the deaths of
two men, Christopher Baxter and Jason Garay.
According to trial testimony, one group was celebrating Ashley Escobedo’s birthday, 2
who was a bartender at the bar, while the other group was celebrating Wendy Galindo’s birthday,
Mendoza’s girlfriend at the time. The bar was crowded that night. The manager of the bar,
Evangeline de los Santos, testified she saw minors continuously entering the bar, and decided to
close the bar early, around midnight. As she began to lead people out, she heard a fight begin on
the patio.
Crystal Flores was one of the guests at the bar celebrating Ashley’s birthday. She was
married to Joe Pierce, Ashley’s cousin. Other guests at the party included Christopher and Jason
(the victims), and Crystal’s sister Tiffany. Crystal testified she and Jason went outside, and the
rest of Ashley’s group followed shortly thereafter. As they tried to exit through an outside gate,
a group of men followed them. One of these men, Mario Ramirez, pushed Crystal out of the way
to get to Jason. Ramirez grabbed Jason and threw him onto a picnic table. Crystal jumped on
Ramirez’s back and tried to choke him. Crystal testified she saw Jason running away, and
shortly thereafter, heard gunshots. As she turned toward the direction of the gunshots, Crystal
testified Mendoza put a gun to her face and pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired. A few
minutes later, she saw her friends Jason and Christopher lying dead on the ground. Crystal
2
According to trial testimony, some of the members in Ashley’s group, including the victims in this case Jason and
Christopher, were associated with the “Latin Kings,” a San Antonio gang.
-2-
04-12-00146-CR
testified Mendoza was the only person she saw with a gun that night. She later picked his picture
out of a photo lineup. 3
Joe Pierce, Crystal’s husband, testified he was friends with both Jason and Christopher.
Before Ashley’s group moved outside, Joe was on the patio by himself, drinking and looking
into the bar. Joe testified a man inside the bar kept pointing at him, so Joe went inside to
confront him. The man, Daniel Aguilar, told Joe he thought he was looking at his wife. Joe
denied the accusation and went back outside. Shortly thereafter, Joe and the rest of Ashley’s
group decided to leave the bar, but Mendoza and the other people in his group blocked the exit.
At that point, Joe testified his aunt, Anna Escobedo, Ashley’s mother, intervened. She told
Ramirez and his friends to go back inside, but they refused. Joe testified Ramirez grabbed Jason
and threw him down. Meanwhile, two other men rushed at Joe. One of the men hit Joe with a
beer bottle. Minutes later, Joe heard two gunshots, but did not see who fired them.
Tiffany Flores, Crystal’s sister, identified Mendoza as the man who attempted to shoot
Crystal in the face. In her testimony, Tiffany explained how the fight started. She mentioned
that at one point in the night, Jason was escorting her to the restroom when they overheard a
table of strangers, later identified as Mendoza’s group, making rude comments and making fun
of Jason’s long and curly hair. Tiffany said she and Jason walked around the bar to avoid them.
However, later that night, when they tried to leave the bar, the same group of men blocked the
exit. The men ran toward Tiffany’s group and a fight ensued. Tiffany heard two gunshots, but
did not see who was shooting. At trial, Tiffany stated that although she was not positive,
Mendoza “appeared to look like” the individual who attempted to shoot Crystal.
3
Shortly before trial, Crystal told the prosecutors she “didn’t want” to make an identification of the man who
pointed a gun at her face. Crystal stated she picked Mendoza from the photo lineup because: (1) she had seen an
eight-by-ten picture of Mendoza in Detective Jesse Salame’s folder shortly before he showed her the six-photo
array; and (2) Mendoza was the only individual in the photo array whom she recognized from the bar that night.
However, at trial, Crystal reiterated Mendoza was the man who pointed a gun at her and pulled the trigger.
-3-
04-12-00146-CR
Felipe Maldonado was one of the individuals in Mendoza’s group the night of the
shootings. Maldonado testified he was Mendoza’s friend and a member of the Mexican Mafia.
Maldonado was in federal custody at the time he testified at trial, having pled guilty to
conspiracy for “collecting the dime,” which he explained was a percentage the Mexican Mafia
charged drug dealers for protection. Maldonado testified about the ranks of the Mexican Mafia
members, identifying himself as a lieutenant in charge of a quadrant in San Antonio. He testified
Mendoza was also a member of the Mexican Mafia and had the rank of sergeant. Maldonado
testified no one in the Mexican Mafia was allowed to cooperate with law enforcement officers.
If they did, the penalty was a “green light” to kill the cooperating person. Maldonado stated he
was now an ex-member of the Mexican Mafia because he violated the non-cooperating rule by
testifying at Mendoza’s trial.
Maldonado testified Mendoza was living with him at the time of the shootings. On the
night in question, they went to the bar because it was Mendoza’s girlfriend’s birthday. There
was a standing order at the time that Mexican Mafia members must go armed to clubs and bars,
but Maldonado testified he was not armed that night. He testified Ramirez was not a Mexican
Mafia member, but a common friend of the group. Maldonado testified Aguilar was the man
who thought Joe was staring at his girlfriend. Maldonado told jurors that on the night of the
shootings he saw another member of his group, a man known as “Animal,” in a confrontation
with a young man with “curly hair.” When Maldonado saw Mendoza walking out to the patio,
he followed him because he knew Mendoza had a short temper. Maldonado testified that once
outside, he saw Ramirez arguing with an older woman. He tried to intervene, but the woman
stopped him. Maldonado then began fighting with one of the young men. At one point,
Maldonado saw a man in a hoodie who appeared to be reaching for a gun. Maldonado testified
he then dropped to the ground and heard two gunshots. When he looked up, he saw Mendoza
-4-
04-12-00146-CR
shooting at two men who were running away. Maldonado testified he also saw Mendoza shoot
at a girl; he saw her fall. He said after the shooting his group went back to Mendoza’s
girlfriend’s house. Maldonado testified Aguilar offered to dispose of the revolver used in the
shootings.
Detective Jesse Salame, lead detective in the case, testified that when he interviewed
Maldonado, Maldonado was reluctant to talk to him because he was a member of the Mexican
Mafia. However, Maldonado told Detective Salame that Mendoza shot the men at the bar that
night. Detective Salame also testified he showed Crystal a photo spread that included a picture
of Mendoza. He testified that when her eyes focused on Mendoza’s photo, she was visibly
shaken and tearful; she then pointed to Mendoza’s photo.
Finally, the State’s gang expert, Deputy Anthony Rodriguez, testified that both Mendoza
and Maldonado were known members of the Texas Mexican Mafia, and that Mafia members had
a rule not to cooperate with law enforcement officials.
Before trial, Mendoza filed a motion to suppress Crystal’s pretrial identification. A
pretrial hearing was held, where the court heard live testimony from only Detective Salame, to
whom Crystal had made the pretrial identification. The court also received and reviewed a
written statement from Crystal. At the hearing, Detective Salame testified that after he had
identified suspects in the bar murders, and Maldonado told him Mendoza was the shooter, he
showed a photo spread to Crystal that included Mendoza’s picture. He testified he did not show
her any other photos of Mendoza before showing her the photo lineup, nor did he give her any
hints as to which person in the lineup was the suspect. After viewing the photo spread, Crystal
pointed to Mendoza and told Detective Salame he was the one who pointed a gun at her face and
shot at her, and that he was the man who shot Jason and Christopher.
-5-
04-12-00146-CR
While cross-examining Detective Salame at the hearing, Mendoza’s attorney asked him
whether he had shown Crystal another picture of Mendoza before the photo spread. Detective
Salame denied the allegation. The trial court denied the motion to suppress Crystal’s pretrial
identification.
The jury found Mendoza guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Mendoza timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mendoza argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
pretrial identification; (2) the trial court erred in admitting extraneous evidence that Mendoza
was a member of the Mexican Mafia; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting extraneous
evidence that Mendoza was an “ex-con” and “locked up” pending trial.
Motion to Suppress
Mendoza argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the pretrial
identification made by Crystal Flores. 4 We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Aviles v. State, 385
S.W.3d. 110, 113 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). A trial court’s determination of
historical facts will be given almost total deference, while the trial court’s application of the law
will be reviewed de novo. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);
Aviles, 385 S.W.3d at 113. When the trial court does not issue findings of fact and none are
4
In his brief, Mendoza contends “the trial court erred in denying [his] motion to suppress the identification.”
However, Mendoza then cites law regarding the admissibility of an in-court identification. Mendoza’s motion to
suppress dealt only with Crystal Flores’s pretrial identification. Then, at trial, Mendoza’s counsel objected to
Crystal’s in-court identification “on the basis of [the] motion.” Therefore, we will only consider Mendoza’s
argument as it relates to the pretrial identification.
-6-
04-12-00146-CR
requested, as in this case, we imply findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, supports those findings. See Valtierra, 310
S.W.3d. at 449. “[T]he trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given to their testimony.” St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld if there is any
valid theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not base its decision on that
theory. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Application
A pretrial hearing was held on Mendoza’s motion to suppress. In that hearing, the trial
court heard live testimony from only one witness, Detective Jesse Salame, to whom Crystal had
made the pretrial identification. The trial court also admitted into evidence a written statement
from Crystal.
Mendoza argues evidence of Crystal’s pretrial identification should not have been
admitted because it was made after she saw an eight-by-ten picture of Mendoza in Detective
Salame’s folder immediately before she picked out Mendoza’s photograph in the six-photo
array. 5 However, Crystal gave such testimony at trial, and therefore, the trial court did not hear
this testimony when it ruled on the motion to suppress. This court must review the trial court’s
ruling on the motion to suppress in light of what was before that court at the time the ruling was
made. See Rodgers v. State, 525, 528–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, Crystal’s
statements made during trial have no bearing on this court’s review of the trial court’s ruling on
the motion to suppress.
5
At trial, Crystal denied Detective Salame showed her the eight-by-ten picture of Mendoza. She stated she saw the
picture when Detective Salame opened his folder, prior to showing her the six-photo array.
-7-
04-12-00146-CR
Furthermore, during the pretrial hearing, Detective Salame specifically stated he did not
show Crystal any other photos of Mendoza before showing her the photo lineup, nor did he give
her any hints as to which person in the lineup was the suspect. Instead, Detective Salame
testified that when Crystal came to Mendoza’s photo in the six-photo lineup:
[I]t was as if she started to relive the moment in her -- right in front of me she
began to tremble, she shook, she got very nervous as she started to shake. And
she pointed him out and said, That’s him. That’s the one. He’s the one that had
the gun. He’s the one that pointed the gun at me.
While cross-examining Detective Salame at the hearing, Mendoza’s trial counsel alleged
Detective Salame had shown Crystal a picture of Mendoza before he showed her the six-photo
array. Detective Salame denied the allegation.
The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). Therefore, we hold it was within the trial judge’s discretion to believe Detective
Salame’s testimony, and impliedly find that no improperly suggestive event occurred before
Crystal identified Mendoza in the photo lineup. Accordingly, we overrule Mendoza’s issue.
Admission of Extraneous Offense Evidence
Mendoza next argues the trial court erred in allowing into evidence extraneous evidence
regarding his affiliation with the Mexican Mafia. The trial court included a limiting instruction
in the charge, instructing the jury that “any testimony before you in this case regarding the
defendant having any alleged gang affiliation was allowed for a contextual purpose and has no
bearing upon assessing the defendant’s guilt, if any.”
Mendoza also contends the trial court erred in allowing testimony that Mendoza was an
“ex-con” and was “locked up” pending trial. Mendoza specifically points to statements made by
Maldonado, one of the State’s witnesses, referring to Mendoza and himself as “ex-cons” during
-8-
04-12-00146-CR
his testimony, and stating Mendoza had been “locked up.” In the jury charge, the trial court
reminded the jurors they had been instructed during trial to disregard testimony from the witness
stand about “ex-cons” and about Mendoza being “locked up.”
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. Hines
v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615, 624 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Tienda v. State,
358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). We also review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse
of discretion standard. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A trial
court abuses its discretion only when its decision is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Hines, 383 S.W.3d at 625 (citing Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638). “[I]f the trial court’s evidentiary
ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, it will not be disturbed” regardless
of the reason for the trial court’s ruling. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009).
Extraneous Evidence Regarding the Mexican Mafia and Mendoza’s Affiliation
Mendoza complains the trial court should not have admitted evidence that he was a
member of the Mexican Mafia. Although evidence of an extraneous offense is normally
inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, evidence of an extraneous
offense is admissible as same transaction contextual evidence to show the context in which a
criminal act occurred. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “This
evidence is considered ‘res gestae,’ under the reasoning that events do not occur in a vacuum,
and the jury has a right to hear what occurred immediately prior to and subsequent to the
commission of that act so that it may realistically evaluate the evidence.” Id. This type of
evidence results when an extraneous matter is so intertwined with the State’s proof of the
-9-
04-12-00146-CR
charged offense that avoiding reference to it would make the State’s case incomplete or difficult
to understand. Smith v. State, 316 S.W.3d 688, 699 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d).
“Such evidence imparts to the trier of fact information essential to understanding the context and
circumstances of events which, although legally separate offenses, are blended or interwoven.”
Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Preservation of Error
During oral argument, Mendoza’s appellate counsel stated every witness at trial testified
regarding Mendoza’s affiliation with the Mexican Mafia, and his trial counsel objected every
time this testimony was admitted. A review of the record does not support this assertion.
Mendoza argues he made a running objection prior to opening statements to preserve
error as to all witness testimony regarding his gang affiliation. Mendoza’s trial counsel stated
“please let the record note my objection to any evidence of gang membership now or at any time
throughout the trial.” The trial court responded “okay.” We hold this statement by the trial court
does not constitute an adverse ruling. See Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (holding an adverse ruling “must be conclusory; that is, it must be clear from the
record the trial judge in fact overruled the defendant’s objection or otherwise error is waived.”).
Mendoza next objected to the admission of gang affiliation evidence during the testimony
of certain witnesses, primarily Felipe Maldonado and Anthony Rodriguez, the State’s gang
expert. Prior to the testimony of each of these witnesses, the trial court granted Mendoza a
running objection as to their testimony about Mendoza’s affiliation with the Mexican Mafia.
However, Mendoza did not make a proper Rule 404(b) objection to the testimony of
another witness, Detective Salame, who testified Maldonado was a member of the Mexican
Mafia and was reluctant about “disclosing the identity of a fellow member,” that is, Mendoza.
Although Mendoza objected to this testimony, he stated the testimony was speculative.
- 10 -
04-12-00146-CR
Therefore, we hold Mendoza’s objection does not comport with his complaint on appeal. See
Bennett v. State, 235 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting to preserve complaint,
party must convey substance of complaint to trial judge); see Phelps v. State, 999 S.W.2d 512,
519 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding appellant’s objection on speculation did not
preserve error for his Rule 404(b) challenge on appeal); see Dreyer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 751,
755 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (noting defendant waived review of error
when objection at trial was on different basis than his complaint on appeal); see also TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a) (noting to preserve error on appeal, record must show appellant made timely and
specific objection that stated grounds for ruling).
Error
Assuming arguendo Mendoza preserved error on the admission of evidence of his
affiliation with the Mexican Mafia, we now address whether the trial court erred in allowing into
evidence testimony that Mendoza was a member of the Mexican Mafia.
The State contends Mendoza’s affiliation to the Mexican Mafia provided a context for the
crime—that is, the evidence showed how a small personal encounter turned into a group attack.
We disagree. Altercations and fights in bars happen routinely, not only when members of gangs
are involved. In fact, when the prosecutor was explaining to the trial court why the testimony
from the State’s gang expert, Anthony Rodriguez, was necessary to explain the shooting, the trial
judge stated “I mean, it could have, just as arguably, been two macho groups butting heads, as
opposed to a gang unit.” The State’s argument would have more merit if it was trying to prove
the shootings occurred because the victims were members of the Latin Kings and Mendoza was a
part of the Mexican Mafia—that is, that the fight ensued due to some form of “gang rivalry.”
But the State, in its opening statement, stated: “This was not one gang versus another. This was
not a sanctioned, ordered hit. This was a bar fight turned deadly.” Therefore, we hold the trial
- 11 -
04-12-00146-CR
court abused its discretion in admitting the extraneous evidence about Mendoza’s affiliation with
the Mexican Mafia, as it did not provide context for the crime.
Next, the State argues the evidence was necessary to demonstrate why witnesses like
Crystal Flores were reluctant to testify. Although it is true that extraneous evidence may be
admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident” or other relevant matters, see TEX. R. EVID. 404(b), we hold this
particular evidence was not necessary in this case. Witnesses may be reluctant or even afraid to
testify for many reasons, including but not exclusively when the suspect is a member of a gang.
The State cites Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) for the proposition that
inconsistent statements by witnesses provide a reason to admit evidence that a defendant is a
member of a violent gang. In Ortiz, the court held the evidence that appellant was a member of a
violent gang tended to rebut impeachment of the State’s witnesses because it explained
inconsistencies in their statements were “motivated by their fear.” Id. at 94. However, this was
only one of several reasons the court listed on how the extraneous evidence was relevant to show
appellant’s guilt of the crime. See id. Moreover, Mendoza’s gang affiliation was not offered by
the State exclusively to rebut any impeachment of Flores’s testimony. Accordingly, we hold that
in the context of this case, the fear of a witness to testify, by itself, did not warrant the admission
of Mendoza’s affiliation with the Mexican Mafia.
Finally, the State argues Mendoza’s gang affiliation helped explain Mendoza’s motive for
the murders. The State argues the evidence shows Mendoza acted to support his fellow gang
members, and the standing order that all gang members carry a gun at a bar explained why
Mendoza was carrying a gun that night. 6 Again, the State in its own opening statement
6
The State argues the defense repeatedly emphasized that one of the victims, Jason, was carrying a gun in a holster,
and in raising the issue of self-defense, Mendoza opened the door for the State to bring in evidence about the
- 12 -
04-12-00146-CR
mentioned this altercation was not “one gang versus another.” Therefore, the fact that Mendoza
was a member of the Mexican Mafia does not explain why he shot the two victims in this case.
It is not uncommon for people to get involved in fights to help other friends, not just because
they are members of a gang. Furthermore, gang members are not the only individuals who carry
guns in bars.
Therefore, we hold the State did not meet its burden of proving the extraneous evidence
of Mendoza being a member of the Mexican Mafia was so intertwined with the shooting that the
evidence was essential for the jury to understand the context and circumstances surrounding the
incident. See Camacho, 864 S.W.2d at 532. We hold the absence of this contextual evidence
would not “make the State’s case incomplete or difficult to understand.” See Smith, 316 S.W.3d
at 699. Therefore, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence.
Harm Analysis
Although the trial court erred in admitting the extraneous offense evidence, we hold such
error was harmless and does not entitle Mendoza to a reversal. The error complained of by
Mendoza is nonconstitutional error, and is therefore governed by Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which states that nonconstitutional error must be disregarded unless this
court finds it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). The
improper admission of evidence is not reversible, i.e. does not affect a defendant’s substantial
rights, “if the same or similar evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the
trial.” Lacaze v. State, 346 S.W.3d 113, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d)
(quoting Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
Mexican Mafia. The State cites Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) for the proposition that
“evidence of membership in a violent gang may [] be introduced to rebut a theory of self-defense.” However, in
Vasquez, evidence that the appellant was a member of the Mexican Mafia was admitted because it provided a
context for the crime—that the shooting in that case occurred during a robbery to “collect the dime,” a percentage
the Mafia charged drug dealers for protection. Id. at 239–40. We previously rejected the argument that the evidence
in this case could be admitted to explain context.
- 13 -
04-12-00146-CR
ref’d)); see Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (noting where other
evidence at trial is admitted without objection and proves same fact that inadmissible evidence
sought to prove, this renders inadmissible evidence harmless).
As noted earlier, Mendoza did not make a proper Rule 404(b) objection to the testimony
of Detective Salame, who testified Maldonado was a member of the Mexican Mafia and was
reluctant about “disclosing the identity of a fellow member”—Mendoza. Although Mendoza
objected to this testimony, he stated the testimony should not be admitted because it was
speculative. Therefore, Mendoza’s objection did not comport with his complaint on appeal. See
Phelps, 999 S.W.2d at 519. Furthermore, Detective Salame’s testimony proved the same facts as
the testimony Mendoza now complains of, rendering any error in admitting the extraneous
evidence harmless. See Anderson, 717 S.W.2d at 628.
Moreover, error in admitting evidence of Mendoza’s affiliation with the Mexican Mafia
was harmless in light of the evidence presented in this case. A harm analysis should assess
whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected—that is, whether the error had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Rich v. State, 160
S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In the case of erroneous admission of evidence, as in
this case, we can “consider everything in the record, including any testimony or physical
evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict,
the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other
evidence in the case, the jury instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing
arguments, voir dire, and whether the State emphasized the error.” Id. at 577–78.
In this case, the State emphasized in its opening statement this case was not “one gang
versus another.” Therefore, the State’s theory did not benefit from the introduction of gang
affiliation. Moreover, the jury heard testimony from Maldonado, who was Mendoza’s roommate
- 14 -
04-12-00146-CR
and friend. Maldonado testified he saw Mendoza shoot at a girl and at two men who were
running away. Furthermore, Crystal Flores testified Mendoza was the man who shot at her and
the only man who was seen with a gun that night. Also, there was no emphasis in the State’s
closing argument regarding gang affiliation. Therefore, we hold that in light of the evidence
presented at trial, the trial court’s improper admission of evidence of Mendoza’s affiliation with
the Mexican Mafia did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See id. at
577. Accordingly, we overrule Mendoza’s issue.
Extraneous evidence that Mendoza was an “ex-con” and “locked up”
Finally, Mendoza contends the trial court erred in admitting testimony that Mendoza was
an “ex-con” and “locked up” pending trial. Mendoza specifically points to statements made by
Maldonado, referring to Mendoza and himself as “ex-cons,” and stating that Mendoza had been
“locked up.”
In both instances, Mendoza’s counsel objected to Maldonado’s statements and requested
a mistrial. Both times, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard such statements and denied
Mendoza’s request for mistrial. Furthermore, the trial court reminded the jury in the charge that
it had been instructed throughout the trial to disregard testimony from the witness stand about
“ex-cons” and about Mendoza being “locked up.” 7
We hold that any error in admitting Maldonado’s testimony that Mendoza was “locked
up” was harmless, because the same evidence came before the jury, at different points during his
testimony, without an objection. See Anderson, 717 S.W.2d at 628. Furthermore, the trial court
issued a limiting instruction for the jury to disregard such statements. It is presumed that jurors
7
Mendoza argued that Maldonado’s testimony stating he was “locked up” implied Mendoza was in jail awaiting
trial rather than free on bond, minimizing his presumption of innocence. Because Mendoza did not make this
argument to the trial court, he has waived this argument on appeal. See Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 21 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
- 15 -
04-12-00146-CR
followed such an instruction. See Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009); see also Barney v. State, 698 S.W.2d 114, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (holding trial
court’s instruction for jury to disregard blurted testimony that appellant was ex-con cured any
potential harm); Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that when
trial court issues clear, determinative, and unambiguous instruction limiting jury’s consideration
of evidence, appellant must rebut presumption jury followed instruction).
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendoza’s
motion for a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Do Not Publish
- 16 -