Bret Wayne Hooper v. Generations Community Federal Credit Union ( 2013 )


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  •                               Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-12-00080-CV
    Bret Wayne HOOPER,
    Appellant
    v.
    Generations Community Federal Credit
    GENERATIONS COMMUNITY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
    Appellee
    From the County Court at Law No. 7, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 352061
    Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Karen Angelini, Justice
    Sitting:          Karen Angelini, Justice
    Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: June 12, 2013
    REVERSED AND RENDERED
    Bret Wayne Hooper appeals from a $20,600.36 judgment against him in a suit to recover
    the balance due on a credit card account. Because the evidence was legally insufficient to support
    the judgment, we reverse and render a take-nothing judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    Hooper was sued by Generations Community Federal Credit Union, formerly known as
    the San Antonio City Employees Federal Credit Union. The Credit Union alleged Hooper had
    defaulted on a credit card agreement and, as a result, owed the Credit Union $20,600.36 plus
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    interest. Hooper answered the suit, pleading various defenses and a counterclaim under the Texas
    Debt Collection Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment against Hooper
    and in favor of the Credit Union in the amount of $20,600.36. The trial court also rendered
    judgment that Hooper take nothing on his counter-claim. Hooper appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    In Texas, collection of the amount due under a credit card agreement is treated as a claim
    for a breach of contract. In re Tran, 
    351 B.R. 440
    , 445 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d, 
    369 B.R. 312
    (S.D. Tex. 2007); see Tully v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 
    173 S.W.3d 212
    , 215-20 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). To recover for breach of contract, a plaintiff must show (1) the
    existence of a valid contract, (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance, (3) the
    defendant breached the terms of the contract, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of
    the defendant’s breach. Transworld Leasing Corp. v. Wells Fargo Auto Fin., LLC, No. 04-12-
    00036-CV, 
    2012 WL 4578591
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied); McLaughlin,
    Inc. v. Northstar Drilling Tech., Inc., 
    138 S.W.3d 24
    , 27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no
    pet.). Thus, in this case, the Credit Union had the burden to prove each element of a breach of
    contract claim at trial. See Preston State Bank v. Jordan, 
    692 S.W.2d 740
    , 744 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth 1985, no writ) (affirming a take-nothing judgment in a suit to recover a credit card debt
    when the bank failed to present evidence of the contract between the bank and the credit card
    holder).
    Parties form a binding contract when the following elements are present: (1) an offer; (2)
    an acceptance in strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4)
    each party’s consent to the terms; and (5) the execution and delivery of the contract with the
    intent that it be mutual and binding. Williams v. Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Citibank,
    
    264 S.W.3d 231
    , 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). To be enforceable, a
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    contract must be sufficiently certain to enable a court to determine the rights and responsibilities
    of the parties. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc. v. Bank of El Paso, 
    847 S.W.2d 218
    , 221 (Tex. 1992).
    The material terms of a contract must be agreed upon before a court can enforce the contract. 
    Id. A breach
    of contract occurs when a party to the contract fails or refuses to do something he has
    promised to do. West v. Triple B Services, LLP, 
    264 S.W.3d 440
    , 446 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
    In his second issue, Hooper argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
    support each of the elements of the Credit Union’s breach of contract claim. In response, the
    Credit Union argues there was sufficient evidence of a credit card agreement. Notably, the Credit
    Union focuses on the first element of its breach of contract claim—the existence of a valid
    contract. The Credit Union does not explain how the evidence was sufficient to prove each of the
    remaining elements of its breach of contract claim.
    We review challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial under the
    same standard used in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial. Rosas v. Comm’n
    for Lawyers Discipline, 
    335 S.W.3d 311
    , 316 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.). When
    reviewing a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” challenge, we determine “whether the evidence at
    trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of
    Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 827 (Tex. 2005); 
    Rosas, 335 S.W.3d at 316
    . If the appellant is
    challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding on which he did not have
    the burden of proof at trial, the appellant must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence exists to
    support the adverse finding. 
    Rosas, 335 S.W.3d at 316
    . We sustain a legal sufficiency or “no
    evidence” challenge when: (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital
    fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only
    evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more
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    than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.
    
    Id. Evidence does
    not exceed a scintilla if it is so weak as to do no more than create a mere
    surmise or suspicion that the fact exists. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev.
    and Research Corp., 
    299 S.W.3d 106
    , 115 (Tex. 2009).
    At trial, the evidence was as follows. The Credit Union presented two documents that are
    relevant to our discussion. The first document, titled “Credit Line Account and Personal Loan
    Application,” indicates that Hooper applied for a credit card, specifically a “Mastercard Platinum
    [************]7844 9.0%.” This document appears to have been signed by Hooper as an
    “applicant” on March 22, 2007. This document states: “You agree and understand that if
    approved, [y]ou are contractually liable according to the applicable terms of the Credit Line
    Account Agreement and Disclosure. You will receive a copy of that Agreement no later than the
    time of [y]our first credit advance and you promise to pay all amounts charged to [y]our
    [a]ccount according to its terms.” (emphasis added). Significantly, the “Agreement” referenced
    in the document was never offered into evidence.
    The second relevant document, titled “Addendum to Platinum Mastercard Agreement,”
    appears to have been signed by Hooper as the “Borrower/Cardholder” on March 21, 2007. This
    document states that Hooper was approved for an “Introductory Annual Percentage Rate of
    3.90%” on balances transferred from other financial institutions or credit card issuers.
    The Credit Union also presented the testimony of two witnesses. First, the Credit Union
    called Hooper to testify. In his testimony, Hooper acknowledged that his signature appeared on
    both of the above-referenced documents. Hooper also confirmed that he had received a credit
    card from the San Antonio City Employees Federal Credit Union and that he made use of that
    credit card. Furthermore, Hooper stated that he had received statements from “Card Services”
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    04-12-00080-CV
    but he did not recall if they were for a San Antonio City Employees Federal Credit Union
    account. Hooper also stated he had made payments to “Card Services.”
    Second, the Credit Union called one of its employees, Lorie Garcia, to testify. Garcia
    testified that customers were given a copy of the Credit Line Account Agreement and Disclosure
    when they applied for credit. Garcia further stated that the Credit Line Account Agreement and
    Disclosure stated that credit cards were subject to a variable interest rate. Garcia stated that the
    current interest rate on Hooper’s account was 18% because of the account’s delinquent status.
    According to Garcia, the prior interest rate on Hooper’s account was 9%. Finally, Garcia testified
    that the principal balance on Hooper’s account was $20,600.36 and that the interest balance on
    Hooper’s account was $4,080.30. No further evidence was presented.
    Although there was some evidence that Hooper obtained a credit card from the Credit
    Union and that he used the credit card, there was no evidence establishing Hooper’s specific
    obligations under the terms of an agreement. For example, there was no evidence regarding
    Hooper’s obligation to repay the balance and interest on the account, including when his
    payments were due, where his payments were to be made, and what would transpire if he failed
    to make a payment in accordance with the terms of an agreement. Nor was there evidence
    indicating Hooper failed to comply with a particular term of an agreement, or otherwise failed to
    perform his obligations under an agreement. We conclude the record discloses the complete
    absence of evidence of the third element of the Credit Union’s breach of contract claim, i.e., that
    Hooper breached the terms of an agreement with the Credit Union. In the absence of evidence
    that Hooper failed or refused to do something he promised to do under an agreement, the Credit
    Union failed to prove its breach of contract claim. See Pioneer Land & Cattle Co. v. Collier, No.
    07-12-00320-CV, 
    2013 WL 2150814
    , at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet. h.) (concluding
    the trial court did not err in granting a no-evidence summary judgment on the plaintiff’s breach
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    04-12-00080-CV
    of contract claim when there was no evidence of the first, third, or fourth elements of the claim).
    We, therefore, hold the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.
    Hooper’s second issue is sustained.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Hooper’s second issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address his first
    issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (directing appellate courts to issue opinions that are as brief as
    practicable but also address every issue raised and necessary to the final disposition of the
    appeal). We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and render judgment that Generations
    Community Federal Credit Union take nothing by its suit.
    Karen Angelini, Justice
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