Donald E. Spencer v. GC Services Limited Partnership and Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin, P.C. ( 2013 )

Opinion issued May 7, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-12-00159-CV
———————————
DONALD E. SPENCER, Appellant
V.
GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND ROSS, BANKS, MAY,
CRON & CAVIN, P.C., Appellees
On Appeal from the 270th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-83448
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Donald Spencer sued Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin, P.C. (“Ross
Banks”) and GC Services Limited Partnership (“GC Services”) after the United
States Department of Education (“the Department”) denied Spencer’s hardship
application concerning repayment of his federal student loans and issued a writ of
garnishment directed to Ross Banks, his former employer. Spencer asserted causes
of action for negligence, gross negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
retaliation, discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Ross Banks and a cause of action for fraud against GC Services. Both Ross Banks
and GC Services moved for summary judgment, and the trial court rendered
summary judgment in favor of both defendants. In two issues, Spencer contends
that the trial court erred (1) in granting Ross Banks’s no-evidence motion for
summary judgment because Ross Banks filed its motion before an adequate time
for discovery had passed and (2) in granting GC Services’ motion for summary
judgment because he presented evidence raising material fact issues on his fraud
claim.
We affirm.
Background
Spencer worked as a legal assistant at Ross Banks from March 2002 until
July 2009. Spencer had approximately $21,000 in outstanding federal student loan
debt, but the Department had granted him a financial hardship deferment for 2004
through 2006. On January 10, 2008, the Department issued a wage garnishment
order to Ross Banks, directing it to withhold 15% of Spencer’s disposable income
2
and pay that amount to the Department to satisfy Spencer’s student loan debt.
Spencer requested a hearing on this decision, arguing that he qualified for the
hardship deferment, but the Department hearing officer upheld the original
determination.
Spencer then sued both Ross Banks and GC Services, a company that
contracts with the Department to assist in the collection of student-loan debt, on
December 28, 2010.1 Spencer alleged that Ross Banks, “knowing that Spencer
disputed the garnishment and had qualified for hardship on two previous attempts
to garnish, continued to take disciplinary action in the form of garnishing wrong
amounts beginning in February 2008 through July 2009.” Spencer also alleged
that GC Services “intentionally failed to put Spencer’s proof of income before the
hearing officer of [the Department] and therefore received the Wage Garnishment
Order that was given and wrongly implemented by Ross Banks” and “continued to
fraudulently sabotage Spencer’s appeal process in not directing proof of income
and expenses to the appeal officer as required in a hardship application.”
Spencer asserted causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, fraud,
retaliation, discrimination, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. With respect to his fraud claim, Spencer alleged that “[t]he
1
Spencer later amended his petition to add the Department as a defendant, but there
is no indication in the record that citation was ever issued and served upon the
Department.
3
misrepresentations that Spencer relied upon involve believing that a hardship
would not involve the employer and therein the employer would not be burdened
with implementing a garnishment.” Spencer also alleged, with respect to his
negligent misrepresentation claim, that “GC [Services] represented to Spencer that
it would assist in Spencer’s hardship application on the garnishment issue.”
Ross Banks answered on May 16, 2011. Ross Banks subsequently moved
for no-evidence summary judgment on August 30, 2011. In its summary judgment
motion, Ross Banks stated, “A Court may grant a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment if the Movants can show that adequate time for discovery had passed and
the Non-Movant has no evidence to support one or more essential elements of its
claim or defense. An adequate time for discovery has passed.” (Internal citations
omitted.) Ross Banks specifically identified each element of each of Spencer’s
asserted causes of action and stated that Spencer could not provide any evidence to
support any of these elements.
Less than a month later, on September 21, 2011, Ross Banks moved for
protection from discovery, arguing that Spencer’s discovery requests were
harassing, overbroad, and not reasonably tailored to “include only relevant
matters.” Ross Banks requested that the trial court order Spencer to redraft his
discovery requests such that “only issues pertinent to this lawsuit are included in
the discovery requests.”
4
On September 29, 2011, Spencer filed a verified motion for continuance.
Spencer pointed out that the discovery period was scheduled to end on January 6,
2012, and Ross Banks had moved for no-evidence summary judgment on August
30, 2011, less than four months after it had answered. He stated that he “needs
time to conduct discovery” and that Ross Banks would not be prejudiced by a
continuance. He further stated, “With no discovery produced from the Defendant,
Plaintiff has requested discovery from the Defendant and Plaintiff needs additional
time to secure it.” Spencer requested that the trial court allow the discovery period
to continue and that it postpone a hearing on Ross Banks’s summary judgment
motion until the completion of discovery.
The next day, on September 30, 2011, the trial court granted Ross Banks’s
motion for no-evidence summary judgment. The trial court subsequently granted
Ross Banks’s motion for protection on October 11, 2011.
Spencer moved for a new trial and argued that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because the discovery period was still open when
Ross Banks filed its summary judgment motion, and Spencer had not yet served
his first set of discovery requests upon Ross Banks. He argued that Ross Banks
made no showing that the trial court should shorten the discovery period, nor did it
“show anything involving discovery time and adequacy.” The trial court denied
this motion.
5
On December 15, 2011, GC Services moved for both traditional and no-
evidence summary judgment. GC Services’ summary judgment evidence included
excerpts from Spencer’s deposition, the Department’s 2008 wage garnishment
order, the August 12, 2008 garnishment hearing decision, and an affidavit from
Denise Bolton, GC Services’ Area Manager of Garnishment.
With respect to Spencer’s fraud claim, GC Services noted that this claim
“involves an allegation that GC Services promised [Spencer that] GC Services
would do something in the future.” Specifically, Spencer claimed in his deposition
that GC Services “made him believe” that it was going to “handle” his 2008
hardship application, and then GC Services “didn’t submit documents to the
Department of Education.” Thus, because this claim involved a promise to do a
future act, to be entitled to relief, Spencer had to prove that at the time GC Services
allegedly made this representation, it had no intention of “handling” Spencer’s
hardship application in the future. In support, GC Services argued,
Plaintiff admits GC Services never told Plaintiff [that] GC Services
knew at the time it allegedly represented it would handle his hardship
application that it was not going to process Plaintiff’s application. In
addition to not having any witness who will testify in support of
Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff also admitted there are no documents
Plaintiff claims support his subjective belief that GC Services had no
intention of performing the promises Plaintiff claims GC Services
promised.
GC Services also moved for no-evidence summary judgment, arguing that Spencer
could produce no evidence in support of any element of fraud.
6
In his deposition, Spencer acknowledged that he had no written evidence
from GC Services that he “sent [it] something that [it] did not send to the
Department of Education” and that he has not spoken to anyone at GC Services
who has told him that “anything other than everything [he] submitted to [it] was
submitted to the Department of Education, that is[,] that [it] withheld any
documentation.” GC Services included, as summary judgment evidence, the
following deposition excerpt:
[GC Services’ counsel]: Do you have any evidence in the form of
anything in writing or any person who
would testify that even if GC, as you claim,
negligently failed to turn things over to the
Department of Education that it went
beyond that, that when somebody told you
they were going to turn things over to the
Department of Education they knew at the
time they weren’t going to do it? That is
they committed a fraud?
[Spencer]: Not in so many words, no.
When later asked, “Do you have a document that you say shows that when
somebody told you they were going to turn over your documents they had no
intention of doing so?” Spencer responded, “No.” Spencer also acknowledged that
when he sent documents to GC Services to be passed along to the Department
hearing officer, he was also “sending [the relevant documents] to the Department
of Education directly.”
7
Denise Bolton averred that GC Services works with the Department on
student-loan accounts that the Department has determined are subject to
garnishment. When an account is subject to garnishment, GC Services notifies the
borrower that he must either enter repayment or apply for a hardship exception.
GC Services tells the borrower to submit “his completed application and financial
statement documents directly to” the Department, but if the borrower sends this
documentation to GC Services instead, “GC Services forwards the borrower’s
financial documents to the Department of Education when the borrower notifies
GC specifically that the borrower requests a rehearing or appeals the Department
of Education’s hearing officer’s decision.” In those instances, GC Services
forwards the information to the assigned hearing officer “with a note instructing
the hearing officer to add the documents to the borrower’s file.” Bolton stated,
“There is no indication in GC Services’ account notes or file, as it relates to
Plaintiff’s defaulted student loan obligations, that shows GC Services failed to
forward any documents Plaintiff submitted to GC Services in order to appeal the
hearing officer’s decision on Plaintiff’s request for hardship status.” She further
averred that GC Services did not make any representations to Spencer that it was
working for him and that it did not make “any misrepresentations regarding GC
Services’ intent not to forward Plaintiff’s hardship documents” to the Department.
8
In response to GC Services’ summary judgment motion, Spencer attached
his own affidavit. He averred that GC Services notified him on July 13, 2006, that
it would be handling his hardship application. At a hearing on December 17, 2007,
his hardship application was denied, and although he had sent in “income
documentation” with his application, “[i]ncome documentation was missing from
evidence considered at the hearing.” After he requested a rehearing of this
decision, he sent “5 letters to GC outlining hardship” and “none of [those] letters
and proof of income were considered in the [hearing officer’s] decision” to uphold
the original determination. Spencer also argued in his response that “GC’s fraud
was relied upon by Spencer in that Spencer sent 5 letters to GC in 2008. These
letters were crying out that Spencer was in hardship. Spencer knowing he is in
hardship relied upon the false misrepresentation by GC by continuing to send
letters to GC and [the Department].”
Prior to the summary judgment hearing, Spencer non-suited all of his causes
of action against GC Services except the fraud claim. The trial court held a
hearing on GC Services’ motion and took the motion under advisement before
ultimately granting the motion.2 The summary judgment order did not specify the
grounds on which the court granted the motion. This appeal followed.
2
In his brief, Spencer argues that, at this hearing, the trial court stated, “There are
material fact issues that preclude summary judgment.” The record reflects that at
the hearing, GC Services’ counsel stated at one point, “Who knows exactly what it
9
Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion.
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848
(Tex. 2009). When a party moves for both traditional and no-evidence summary
judgment, we first review the trial court’s ruling under the no-evidence standard of
review. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If the trial
court properly granted the no-evidence motion, we do not consider the arguments
raised regarding the traditional summary judgment motion. Id.
After an adequate time for discovery, a party may move for no-evidence
summary judgment on the ground that no evidence exists of one or more essential
elements of a claim on which the adverse party bears the burden of proof at trial.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil
Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no
pet.). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence raising a
genuine issue of material fact on the elements specified in the motion. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(i); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006).
The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant presents more than a
scintilla of evidence raising a fact issue on the challenged elements. Flameout
Design & Fabrication, 994 S.W.2d at 834; see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
is [the hearing officer] considered,” and the trial court responded, “[Well], when
you start talking about [‘]who knows,[’] then you’re talking about fact issues.”
10
v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (“An appellate court
reviewing a summary judgment must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded
jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the evidence presented.”).
To determine if the nonmovant raises a fact issue, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable
jurors could do so, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors
could not. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve
any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d
211, 215 (Tex. 2001) (citing Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911
(Tex. 1997)).
To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant must
establish that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Little v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004). When, as here, the trial
court’s summary judgment order does not state the basis for the court’s decision,
we must uphold the judgment if any of the theories advanced in the motion are
meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216
(Tex. 2003).
11
Adequate Time for Discovery
In his first issue, Spencer contends that the trial court erred in rendering
summary judgment in favor of Ross Banks because Ross Banks filed its no-
evidence summary judgment motion before the expiration of the discovery period.
We construe Spencer’s argument as complaining that the trial court erroneously
denied his verified motion for continuance and, thus, erroneously proceeded to rule
upon Ross Banks’s no-evidence summary judgment motion.
Rule 166a(i) provides that a party may move for no-evidence summary
judgment “[a]fter adequate time for discovery.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Specialty
Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). When a party contends that it has not had an adequate
opportunity for discovery before a summary judgment hearing, he must file either
an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a verified motion for
continuance. Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996).
Filing a verified motion for continuance preserves the party’s objection to the
summary judgment. See Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete & Constr., Inc., 37 S.W.3d
517, 521 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied). An order granting a motion for
summary judgment impliedly denies the opposing party’s motion for continuance.
See West v. SMG, 318 S.W.3d 430, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no
pet.); Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Tex. App.—Waco
12
1999, no pet.) (“[W]e conclude that the trial court’s granting of Bank One’s
summary judgment creates an inference that the court implicitly overruled
Williams’s motion for continuance.”). We review questions of whether the trial
court erroneously denied a motion for continuance and of whether the trial court’s
rendition of summary judgment was improper because an adequate time of
discovery had not yet passed for an abuse of discretion. See Carter v. MacFadyen,
93 S.W.3d 307, 310–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
Rule 166a(i) does not require that discovery be completed before a party
may move for no-evidence summary judgment; instead, the trial court may grant
such a motion after “adequate time” for discovery has passed. See Madison v.
Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
denied); In re Mohawk Rubber Co., 982 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1998, orig. proceeding). When determining whether adequate time for discovery
has elapsed, we consider: (1) the nature of the cause of action; (2) the nature of the
evidence necessary to controvert the no-evidence motion; (3) the length of time the
case has been active in the trial court; (4) the amount of time the no-evidence
motion has been on file; (5) whether the movant has requested stricter time
deadlines for discovery; (6) the amount of discovery that has already taken place;
and (7) whether the discovery deadlines that are in place are specific or vague.
Madison, 241 S.W.3d at 155; Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Dickson Constr.,
13
Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 5 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1999, pet. denied)); see also Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d
150, 161 (Tex. 2004) (considering following nonexclusive factors when deciding
whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance seeking
additional time to conduct discovery: length of time case has been on file,
materiality and purpose of discovery sought, and whether party seeking
continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain discovery sought). When a party
moves for no-evidence summary judgment before the end of the specified
discovery period, “our principal task is to determine if [the] record provides
support for the trial court’s consideration of a no-evidence summary judgment
motion” before the end of the designated discovery period. McInnis v. Mallia, 261
S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
In contending on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment, Spencer states only that Ross Banks filed its no-evidence summary
judgment motion “long before the discovery period was complete” and that
“[t]here had not been adequate time for discovery.” Spencer does not address any
of the factors that courts consider when determining whether adequate time for
discovery has passed. 3 Spencer does not argue that his case is complex, nor does
3
Spencer did not address these factors in his motion for continuance either.
Instead, he stated that “[s]ome discovery has been completed,” that he “needs time
14
he state what discovery was needed in order to controvert Ross Banks’s no-
evidence summary judgment motion. He does not state what discovery had
already been conducted, nor does he identify the additional discovery yet to be
completed and why he could not obtain that discovery before submission of the
summary judgment motion. He does not argue or explain why the time that he did
have to conduct discovery was inadequate. We therefore conclude that Spencer
has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in implicitly
denying his motion for continuance and ruling on the merits of Ross Banks’s no-
evidence summary judgment motion. See Madison, 241 S.W.3d at 155
(considering fact that appellant “made no effort to specify the additional evidence
she needed to respond to the motion, or the reason she could not obtain it during
the discovery period” when determining appellant had adequate time for
discovery); Robertson v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“[A]ppellant has made no effort to discuss any of the
relevant factors. She does not state how much time she had for discovery, what
discovery was completed, what further discovery was needed or otherwise argue
why the time was not adequate. We will not make appellant’s arguments for
her.”); see also Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Camberg, 247 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex.
to conduct discovery,” and that Ross Banks “will not be prejudiced by the
continuance.”
15
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (“[T]he appellant bears the burden
to establish error in the trial court’s judgment.”).
We overrule Spencer’s first issue.4
Fraud
In his second issue, Spencer contends that he presented evidence raising a
material fact issue with respect to his fraud claim against GC Services, and,
therefore, the trial court erroneously rendered summary judgment in favor of GC
Services. GC Services argues, in response, that we must affirm the summary
judgment because Spencer failed to attack all independent grounds presented in its
summary judgment motion. We agree with GC Services.
As we noted above, when the trial court does not state the basis for its
decision in the summary judgment order, we must uphold the judgment if any of
the theories advanced in the summary judgment motion are meritorious. See
Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 216. Thus, on appeal, the appellant must negate all grounds
that support the judgment. See Leffler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 290
S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) (citing Star-Telegram, Inc. v.
4
Spencer also contends, in his first issue, that Ross Banks violated Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 191.2 when it filed a discovery motion that did not include a
certificate of conference. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.2 (“All discovery
motions . . . must contain a certificate by the party filing the motion . . . that a
reasonable effort has been made to resolve the dispute without the necessity of
court intervention and the effort failed.”). Spencer does not cite any authority for
the proposition that failure to comply with Rule 191.2 provides a basis for
reversing the rendition of summary judgment.
16
Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995)). If the appellant does not negate each
ground on which the judgment may have been rendered, we must uphold the
summary judgment. See id. (citing Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.
1989)). “When a ground upon which summary judgment may have been rendered,
whether properly or improperly, is not challenged, the judgment must be
affirmed.” Id. (citing Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 23 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1992, writ denied)); Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“Generally speaking, an appellant
must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of
ruling or judgment. If an appellant does not, then we must affirm the ruling or
judgment.”).
One of the grounds on which GC Services moved for both traditional and
no-evidence summary judgment was that Spencer could produce no evidence that
at the time GC Services allegedly told Spencer that it would “handle” his hardship
application, it did not intend to follow through and perform that promise.
The elements of common-law fraud are:
(1) that a material representation was made; (2) the representation was
false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a
positive assertion; (4) the speaker made the representation with the
intent that the other party should act upon it; (5) the party acted in
reliance on the representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered
injury.
17
Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337
(Tex. 2011). When, as here, the representation at issue “involves a promise to do
an act in the future,” the plaintiff also has to prove that, at the time the defendant
made the promise, the defendant “had no intention of performing the act.” T.O.
Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. 1992); see also
Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 48 (Tex. 1998) (“A promise of future performance constitutes an actionable
misrepresentation if the promise was made with no intention of performing at the
time it was made.”); Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Schleider, 124 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“A future promise to
act . . . constitutes fraud only when made with the intent to deceive and with no
intention of performing the act.”).
Here, the alleged misrepresentation by GC Services that Spencer relies upon
for his fraud cause of action is GC Services’ statement to Spencer that it would
“handle” his 2008 hardship application. This statement is a promise to perform a
future act; thus, to survive summary judgment, Spencer had to raise a genuine issue
of material fact on the question of whether, at the time it made that representation,
GC Services lacked the intent to perform that promise in the future. Spencer,
however, never presented any evidence to the trial court concerning this element of
his cause of action, nor did he make any argument for why the evidence that he did
18
present constituted evidence of intent not to perform. Thus, because Spencer did
not raise a fact issue on this essential element of his fraud claim in response to GC
Services’ traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motion, the trial court
could have properly granted summary judgment on this basis alone. See Formosa
Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 48 (stating promise of future performance constitutes
actionable misrepresentation when made with no intention to perform); Beal Bank,
124 S.W.3d at 647 (stating same); see also Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc., 111
S.W.3d 719, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“If the
respondent does not produce more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine
issue of material fact on the challenged element or elements, the trial court ‘must’
grant the motion.”).
Furthermore, Spencer does not challenge this basis for granting summary
judgment on appeal. He argues that Denise Bolton’s affidavit was “full of
misstatements,” but he does not argue that any of the summary-judgment evidence
before the trial court raised a fact issue on the question of whether GC Services
lacked the intent to perform when it made the alleged misrepresentation to him.
Thus, because Spencer has not attacked all independent grounds for granting
summary judgment on appeal, we must uphold the trial court’s summary judgment
ruling. See Leffler, 290 S.W.3d at 386; Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681 (“[I]f an
independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or judgment, but the
19
appellant assigns no error to that independent ground, then (1) we must accept the
validity of that unchallenged independent ground, and thus (2) any error in the
grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged independent
ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or judgment.”).
We overrule Spencer’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Huddle.
20