Young, Linda v. Golfing Green Homeowners Association, Inc. ( 2012 )


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  •   l)ISMISS;   Opinion issue4i   December 21. 2012.
    In The
    Etitirt tif pra1
    WiitI! Jitrirt uf axa at                    1tai
    No. 05- 12-00651-CV
    LINDA YOUNG, Appellant
    V.
    GOLFING GREEN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. INC. Appell
    ee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law
    Kaufman County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 76706-CC
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Moseley, Fillmore. and Myers
    Opinion By Justice Fillmore
    Subject to a few mostly statutory exceptions not applicable here, appella
    te courts have
    jurisdiction only over appeals taken from final judgments that dispos
    e of all pending parties and
    claims in the record. See Lehniann   ‘.   Hcir-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001). In this
    appeal. Linda Young challenges an order granting an interlocutory surnma
    ryjudgment. to the Golfing
    Green Homeowners Association, Inc. on its claims against Young. The
    order indicates the trial court
    found Young to be in violation of certain provisions of the neighborhood
    s declaration of covenants
    and rules of conduct and, as requested by Golfing Green, granted perman
    ent injunctive relief
    requiring, among other things, that Young make certain permanent
    changes to her premises. The
    interlocutory order, however, does not provide a date by which Young
    must comply, specifically
    states it does not dispose of Young’s counterclaims against Golfing
    Green, and “jdjecree{sI” that
    Golfing Green “shall ha\ e all                    rits of execuLion and other processes necessary to enforce this
    judement when came becomes final.”
    At ,ur direction. the parties filed briefs           idressing our jurisdiction over the order. Young
    contends in her brief that we have jurisdiction because the summary judgment dispos
    ed of all of
    Golfing Green’s claims, including a claiiri for permanent injunctive relief. Golfing Green counte
    rs
    we do not have juri.sdictioii because Young’s counterclaims remain pending. We agree with
    Golfing
    Greeii Alihouh it grants permanent injunctive relict, the interlocutory summary
    .
    judgment order
    [ails to expressly dispose of oungs couiiterclaiins and makes enforcement of the injunc
    tive relief
    granted dependent on the disposition of oung’s counterclaims. A summary judgm
    ent that fails to
    dispose of all claims, even if it grants a permanent injunction, is interlocutory and unappe
    alable.
    See City a! Beaumont v. Gui/Ion’, 751 S.W.2d 491,492 (Tex. 1988) (per euriam); Aloe Vera
    ojAm.,
    Inc. c. CIC Cosmetics               Iii!’!   Corp., 5 
    17 S.W.2d 433
    . 435 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1974, no writ).
    In concluding we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we distinguish the facts before us from
    the facts in Qwest Communications Corp. c.AT& TCorp.. 
    24 S.W.3d 334
    (Tex. 2000) (per
    euriam).
    In Qwest, the trial court entered an order restricting Qwest’s activities in the United
    States for a
    period of three years. The court of appeals dismissed Qwest’ s interlocutory appeal of the
    order,
    concluding the order did not meet the “traditional requirements”                of a temporary injunction because
    it did not preserve the status quo. require a bond, set a trial date, or require the clerk to issue
    a writ
    of injunction and because the order’s duration was not limited until final judgment or further
    order
    of   the court. 
    Id. at 335.
    Reversing the court of appeals’ judgment, the supreme court concluded that
    “Iblecause the trial court’s order place[dI restrictions on Qwest and Iwasi made effective
    immediately       so    that it operaterdi during the pendency of the suit, it function[edl as      a   temporary
    injunction.”     1(1.   at   337.
    1 lere, ‘oung did not tile a notice ol accelerated appeal and does not argue the injunc
    tive
    rel id ranted. though relerred u) as ‘permanent’ by the trial court, is temporary
    and coiilers
    unsdict ion upon us pursuant to st.c lion 5 I ( ) I 4( a )(4   Additionally, the complained—of order
    lollowed a hearing on a motion for summary judgment and         Was   not based on any pleadmgs seeking
    temporary injunctive relief. In fact, Golfing Green never sought temporary injunctive relief.
    Finally,
    the summary judgment order does not contain a date by which Young must compl
    y with the
    pennandlit injunction or provide an enlorcemeni mechanism br non—compliance until
    following
    disposition of Young’s counterclaims.
    Accordingly. we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction .
    (’L’ Tux. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
    5
    ROBERT M. FILLMORE
    JUSTICE
    120651 F.P05
    —3—
    Q!niirt uf Appia1a
    fiftI! JiIrirt Lii ixa at DaI1L!
    JUDGMENT
    LINDA YOUNG, Appellant                             Appeal from the County Court at Law of
    Kauhnan County. Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 76706
    No, 05 1 2M065 I CV          V.                    CC),
    Opinion delivered Lw Justice Fillmore.
    (IOLFIN(i GREEN HOMEOWNERS                         Justices Moseley and Myers participating.
    ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we I)ISMISS the appeal. We ORDE
    R
    that appellee Golfing Green Homeowners Association, Inc. recover its costs of this appeal
    from
    appellant Linda Young.
    Judgment entered December 21, 2012.
    I
    ROBERT M. FILLMORE
    JUSTICE
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-12-00651-CV

Filed Date: 12/21/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015