Lorenzo Timmons v. State ( 2013 )


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  • Opinion issued April 23, 2013
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-12-00754-CR
    ———————————
    LORENZO TIMMONS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 208th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 458204
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On February 1, 1987, appellant, Lorenzo Timmons, pleaded nolo contendere
    to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The trial court deferred
    adjudication and placed appellant on community supervision for ten years. On
    April 10, 1997, the trial court signed an order stating that appellant had
    “unsatisfactorily” completed his term of community supervision, namely, that he
    had completed his 10-year term but had not paid the costs as ordered. 1 On August
    6, 2012, appellant filed a notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    To the degree appellant seeks to appeal from the trial court’s order placing
    him on deferred adjudication community supervision, even if the order is
    appealable,2 appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. The record reflects
    that appellant’s sentence was suspended on April 1, 1987. Therefore, a notice of
    appeal was due on or before May 1, 1987. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a). Appellant
    did not file his notice of appeal until 25 years later, on August 6, 2012.
    In addition, to the degree appellant challenges the trial court’s April 1, 1997
    order on the completion of his community supervision, appellant’s notice of appeal
    filed 15 years later, on August 6, 2012, was untimely filed. See 
    id. Because appellant’s
    notice of appeal was untimely filed, we have no basis
    for jurisdiction over the appeal. See Olivo v. State, 
    918 S.W.2d 519
    , 522 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1996); Slaton v. State, 
    981 S.W.2d 208
    , 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
    1
    The trial court did not fill out the portion of the boilerplate form concerning
    adjudication or dismissal of the case.
    2
    Prior to November 3, 1987, appellate review of an order deferring adjudication
    was precluded. See Olowosuko v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 940
    , 943 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1992); Kite v. State, 
    788 S.W.2d 403
    , 404–05 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    1990 no pet.) (stating that “[p]rior to November 3, 1987, appellate courts had no
    jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a defendant who received deferred
    adjudication.”).
    2
    Appellant complains that he successfully completed deferred adjudication in
    this case and that this offense is being improperly used to enhance punishment in
    another case. Appellant complains that the statutory provision permitting such
    enhancement did not exist at the time adjudication was deferred. See Scott v. State,
    
    55 S.W.3d 593
    , 594–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This issue is not properly raised
    in a direct appeal from this case. See e.g., Martinez v. State, No. 05-00-00517-CR,
    
    2002 WL 257697
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 25, 2002, no pet.) (not designated
    for publication) (considering whether statute in effect at time of defendant’s prior
    placement on deferred adjudication applied to preclude use of such deferred
    adjudication to enhance his punishment in subsequent offense).
    On February 25, 2013, we notified appellant of our intent to dismiss the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction unless he showed grounds for continuing the appeal.
    Appellant did not respond.
    We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We dismiss any pending
    motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    3