Shaw, George W. v. State ( 2012 )

AFFIRM; Opinion issued December 4, 2012
In The
(tnitrt iif Appiats
FiftI! itrirt uf !Jrxas at 1alla
No. 05-11-01154-CR
GEORGE WARD SHAW, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MAO8-60886-C
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Francis, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice Morris
A jury found George Ward Shaw guilty of driving while intoxicated. In his sole issue on
appeal, he complains that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known
to the parties, and therefore we limit our recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion
pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well
settled.
At the motion to suppress hearing preceding appellant’s trial, both sides agreed to let the trial
court decide the suppression issue based solely on the video recording of appellant’s driving before
he was stopped and later arrested. In the video, appellant can twice be seen weaving between the
fir left lane and the center lane of the one way street on which he was driving. On the second
occasion, the ear appellant is driving moves so far into the center lane that it approaches a car
traveling in the fir right lane before it veers back to the far left lane, overcorrecting and then
returning to the center of the left lane. Then, once the police officer recording the pursuit activates
his patrol cars lights, the car swerves into the center lane one more time before returning to the left
lane. At this point, appellant signals that he is moving to the right and eventually pulls over on the
right hand side of the road.
Appellant complains in his sole issue that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to
suppress the evidence following his stop because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop him. He particularly bases his contention on the testimony of the arresting officer given not
during the motion to suppress but during his trial. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Stale v. Garcia-
Can/u. 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We review de novo the trial court’s
application of the law. Stale v. Ross. 32 S.W.3d 853. 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When. as here.
the trial court does not make findings of fact, we infer the necessary factual findings that support the
trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, support the
implied fact findings. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241.
A law enforcement officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the
officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, 158
S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists if an officer has specific,
articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the
officer to conclude reasonably that a particular person actually is. has been, or soon will be engaged
in criminal activity. Castro v. State. 227 S.W.3d 737. 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In making a
reasonable suspicion determination, we disregard the subjective intent of the officer making the stop
and consider solely, under the totality ol the circumstances, whether there was an objective basis br
the stop. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 49293.
Here, the officer was able to observe appellant having obvious difficulty staying in a single
lane of traffic and doing so while there was at least one other vehicle on the road with him. Such
driving was undeniably unsafi. regardless of whether the arresting officer made such a notation in
his report. Based on these facts, the officer could have reasonably concluded that appellant was
violating transportation code section 545.060 by unsafely failing to drive within a single lane or that
appellant was driving while intoxicated. See TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.060 (West 2011).
Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to suppress.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JOSEPiThORRIS
)JTICE
Do Not Publish
TEx. R. App. P. 47
11 l154F.U05
______________)
natrt tif Apprahi
iftI! Dhtrirt uf Lcxai at Ja11w3
JUDGMENT
GEORGE WARD SI-lAW, Appellant Appeal from the County Criminal Court No.
3 of Dallas County, Texas, (Tr.Ct.No.
No. 05-1 1-01 154-CR V. MA08-60886-C).
Opinion delivered by Justice Morris.
TI IF STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee Justices Francis and Murphy participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered December 4, 2012.
JOSEP.I B. M(RR1S
SflCF