Emanuel Walcott v. Texas Southern University ( 2013 )

Opinion issued February 14, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-12-00355-CV
———————————
EMANUEL WALCOTT, Appellant
V.
TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 129th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-36758
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Emanuel Walcott sued his former employer Texas Southern University
pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.051, 21.055, 21.254 (Vernon 2006). Walcott alleged that the
university discriminated against him based on his national origin when it failed to
promote him and when it terminated him. Walcott also alleged that the university
retaliated against him for reporting the discriminatory practices.
The trial court granted Texas Southern University’s motion for summary
judgment on Walcott’s discrimination claim and granted the university’s plea to
the jurisdiction with regard to his retaliation claim. In two issues, appellant
challenges the trial court’s judgment, asserting that (1) the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment on his national origin discrimination claims and (2)
the trial court erred by granting the plea to the jurisdiction on appellant’s retaliation
claim.
We affirm.
Background
Emanuel Walcott was born in Panama and immigrated to the United States
in 1983. Texas Southern University (TSU) hired Walcott to be Manager of
Custodial Services on December 1, 2008. Walcott had been invited to apply for
the position by TSU employee, Diane Nicholson-Jones, who had known Walcott
for 10 years. Nicholson-Jones helped Walcott fill out the paperwork for the
position. After interviewing five other candidates, Nicholson-Jones hired Walcott.
As stated in the job posting, Walcott’s duties included managing and coordinating
the day-to-day custodial operations of maintaining the interior of the campus
2
buildings. The duties also included supervising, organizing, and coordinating the
work and activities of assigned staff in accordance with TSU’s standards and the
customer’s needs.
Nicholson-Jones was Walcott’s supervisor. On January 23, 2009, Darrell
Bunch began working at TSU as Executive Director of Buildings and Grounds. In
that position, Bunch served as Nicholson-Jones’s supervisor.
On March 12, 2009, Bunch posted the position of Assistant Director of
Customer Service. The position included the duties of managing the day-to-day
scheduling of custodial staff and conducting quality control. Walcott did not apply
for this position, but later claimed that he had indicated to Bunch that he was
interested in applying. Walcott alleges that Bunch told him that speaking Spanish
was a requirement for the position. Walcott claims he told Bunch that he was from
Panama and that he spoke Spanish. Walcott alleges that Bunch then told him that
he “didn’t look Spanish enough” for the position of Assistant Director of Customer
Service. Throughout the case and on appeal, Walcott has described himself as
being “very dark skinned.” Walcott asserts that, after hearing Bunch’s comment,
he believed that it would be futile to apply for the position. Bunch later denied
telling Walcott that he “didn’t look Spanish enough.”
Bunch hired Griselda Galan for the position of Assistant Director of
Customer Service. Galan is a Hispanic woman who was from Brownsville, Texas.
3
Bunch had previously worked with Galan at another university. Galan became
Walcott’s supervisor.
Walcott alleged that he reported Bunch’s comment that he did not look
Hispanic enough to Nicholson-Jones. After he reported the comment, Walcott
contends that Nicholson-Jones and Galan began treating him differently. He
asserts that Nicholson-Jones started referring to him as the “Hispanic Bulldog” and
that Galan started calling him the “Black Columbian.” Walcott claims that, after
he traveled to Mexico, Galan commented that he must be using drugs and asked if
he was a felon. Nicholson-Jones and Galan deny that they ever made such
comments.
Nicholson-Jones ultimately recommended to Bunch that Walcott be
terminated. Nicholson-Jones would later explain that she had been receiving
complaints from university customers that areas for which Walcott was
responsible, such as restrooms, classrooms, and carpets, were not being cleaned
and that Walcott was not in the buildings where he should be managing staff.
Bunch also later stated that he had received complaints about Walcott from staff,
who reported that Walcott was not completing his tasks, was not supervising
custodial staff, and did not know how to operate cleaning equipment. Bunch
accepted Nicholson-Jones’s recommendation to fire Walcott, and Walcott’s
employment with TSU was terminated on May 29, 2009. At that time, Walcott’s
4
six-month probationary period had not yet expired. TSU hired an African-
American man to fill Walcott’s position.
On July 20, 2009, Walcott filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission. Walcott received right-to-sue letters from
the EEOC and from the Texas Workforce Commission. Walcott filed suit against
TSU under Chapter 21 of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA),
alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation. 1 Walcott asserted that TSU
had discriminated against him based on his national origin when it failed to
promote him to the position of Assistant Director of Customer Service and when it
terminated his employment. With respect to the retaliation claim, Walcott alleged
that he was terminated because he reported Bunch’s discriminatory remarks and
his concomitant denial of a promotion to Nicholson-Jones.
TSU filed a no-evidence and a traditional motion for summary judgment on
Walcott’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Walcott filed a response. As
summary judgment evidence, both sides relied primarily on the deposition
testimony of Walcott, Nicholson-Jones, Bunch, and Galan. Following a hearing,
the trial court granted TSU’s no-evidence and traditional motions for summary
1
Courts refer to Chapter 21 of the Labor Code as the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act. Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 503 n.1 (Tex. 2012)
(citing Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 798 n.1 (Tex. 2010)). Although
the Commission on Human Rights has been replaced with the Texas Workforce
Commission civil rights division, we refer to Chapter 21 of the Labor Code as the
TCHRA. See id.
5
judgment with respect to Walcott’s discrimination claims without identifying the
specific bases for granting the motions. The trial court denied the motions with
respect to Walcott’s retaliation claim.
TSU then filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that Walcott failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation claim. TSU
argued that the retaliation claim fell outside the scope of what Walcott had alleged
in the charge filed with the EEOC. The trial court granted TSU’s plea to the
jurisdiction, dismissing Walcott’s retaliation claim.
This appeal followed. Walcott presents two issues on appeal.
Summary Judgment on Discrimination Claim
In his first issue, Walcott contends that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment on his discrimination claims.
A. Summary Judgment Standards
TSU raised both traditional and no-evidence grounds in its motion for
summary judgment, and the trial court did not specify on which grounds it based
its judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i). In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009) (citing City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the
nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the
6
nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. See Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286
S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). When, as here, the trial court does not specify the
grounds for its grant of summary judgment, we must affirm the summary judgment
if any of the theories presented to the court and preserved for appeal are
meritorious. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216
(Tex. 2003).
After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof
may move for a no-evidence summary judgment on the basis that there is no
evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(i); see Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008).
Summary judgment must be granted unless the non-movant produces competent
summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the
challenged elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426. A
non-moving party is “not required to marshal its proof; its response need only point
out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a (Notes & Comments 1997).
A no-evidence summary judgment motion is essentially a motion for a
pretrial directed verdict. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581–82
(Tex. 2006). Accordingly, we apply the same legal-sufficiency standard of review
that we apply when reviewing a directed verdict. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
7
S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). Applying that standard, a no-evidence point will be
sustained when (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the
court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence
offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no
more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite
of a vital fact. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003);
see City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. Less than a scintilla of evidence exists
when the evidence is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or
suspicion” of a fact, and the legal effect is that there is no evidence. Kindred v.
Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983). In other words, we review a no-
evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-
minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. See Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426
(citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822).
To prevail on a traditional Rule 166a(c) summary judgment motion, a
movant must prove that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Little
v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004). A defendant
moving for summary judgment must either (1) disprove at least one element of the
plaintiff’s cause of action or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential
element of an affirmative defense to rebut the plaintiff’s cause. Cathey v. Booth,
8
900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). The movant must conclusively establish its
right to judgment as a matter of law. See MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60
(Tex. 1986). A matter is conclusively established if reasonable people could not
differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See City of Keller, 168
S.W.3d at 816.
If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See Centeq
Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). The evidence raises a
genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their
conclusions in light of all of the summary judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).
B. Legal Principles Governing Employment Discrimination Claims
Chapter 21 of TCHRA provides that an employer commits an unlawful
employment practice if it discharges an employee or “discriminates in any other
manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of “race, color, disability,
religion, sex, national origin, or age . . . .” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051(1)
(Vernon 2006). One of the purposes of the TCHRA is to “provide for the
execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 21.001(1) (Vernon 2006). For this reason, when analyzing a claim
9
brought under the TCHRA, we look not only to state cases but also to analogous
federal statutes and the cases interpreting those statutes. See Mission Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012).
In employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff may present his case by
direct or circumstantial evidence, or both. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309
F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002); see Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d
at 634. If the plaintiff produces direct evidence that discriminatory animus played
a role in the decision at issue, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, who
must prove that it would have taken the same action regardless of discriminatory
animus. Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 896 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 252–53, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1792 (1989)). If the plaintiff produces only
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the burden-shifting analysis set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824
(1973) guides our inquiry.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and later decisions, the United States
Supreme Court established an allocation of the burden of production and an order
for the presentation of proof in such cases. 411 U.S. at 802–05, 93 S. Ct. at 1824–
25; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct.
2097, 2106 (2000). Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff is
entitled to a presumption of discrimination if he meets the minimal initial burden
10
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Mission Consol. Independent
School Dist., 372 S.W.3d at 634 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981)). “The precise elements of this
showing will vary depending on the allegations.” Quantum Chem. Corp. v.
Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex. 2001). Nevertheless, “the plaintiff’s burden at
this stage of the case ‘is not onerous.’” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 372
S.W.3d at 634 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253,101 S. Ct. at 1094). The
McDonnell Douglas presumption is “merely an evidence-producing mechanism
that can aid the plaintiff in his ultimate task of proving illegal discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d
1287, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Establishment of the prima facie case creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at
253, 101 S. Ct. at 1094. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824; Quantum, 47 S.W.3d at
477. “The offer of a legitimate reason eliminates the presumption of
discrimination created by the plaintiff’s prima facie showing.” Quantum, 47
S.W.3d at 477. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
employer’s reason was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
11
at 807, 93 S. Ct. at 1826–27. Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back
and forth under this framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier-of-fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106; Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093.
C. Failure to Promote
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to
promote, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he
applied for and was qualified for the position he sought; (3) he was not promoted
to the position sought, i.e., he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) his
employer promoted an employee to the position sought by the plaintiff who was
not a member of the protected class. See Villarreal v. Del Mar College, No. 13–
07–00119–CV, 2009 WL 781750, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, pet.
denied) (mem. op.); Browning v. Sw. Research Inst., 288 Fed. App’x. 170, 175 (5th
Cir. 2008) (citing Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella, S.A., 266 F.3d 343, 354–55
(5th Cir. 2001)).
Walcott claimed that TSU unlawfully discriminated against him based on his
national origin in violation of the TCHRA by failing to promote him to the position
of Assistant Director of Customer Service, the position for which Griselda Galan
was hired. Among the grounds raised by TSU in its traditional motion for
12
summary judgment was its assertion that Walcott could not, as a matter of law,
establish his prima facia case of discrimination based on a failure to promote
because the evidence showed that he was not qualified for the position.
In support of this ground, TSU offered a copy of its Manual of
Administrative Policies and Procedures. The manual defined the circumstances
under which a currently employed TSU employee was qualified to be hired for
another position with the university. As pointed out by TSU, the manual provides,
“A current staff member must have at least six months employment in their current
position to qualify to move laterally or promotionally.”
The summary judgment evidence further showed that TSU posted the
Assistant Director of Customer Service position approximately four months after
Walcott was hired. Galan was hired the following month. In other words, Walcott
had not been in his position for six months when the Assistant Director of
Customer Service position was posted and filled. Walcott was still in his six-
month probationary period at the time. Walcott offered no summary judgment
evidence to show that TSU was inconsistent or discriminatory in applying the
internal hiring policy. 2
2
In his opening brief, Walcott asserts that TSU admitted in its motion for summary
judgment that the fact that Walcott was still in his six-month probationary period did not
preclude his promotion. Walcott misinterprets TSU’s statement. TSU stated—citing
deposition testimony of Nicholson-Jones—that it did not prevent probationary employees
from applying for other positions. Nicholson-Jones explained that a probationary
13
We conclude that TSU met its summary judgment burden by conclusively
disproving the element of Walcott’s failure to promote claim, which requires a
showing that he was qualified for the position. Walcott did not meet his summary
judgment burden as non-movant to raise a genuine issue of material fact on that
element.
We recognize that Walcott also contends the McDonnel Douglas framework
does not apply because he produced direct evidence that TSU discriminated against
him based on his national origin when it failed to promote him to the position of
Assistant Director of Customer Service. Direct evidence is evidence that, if
believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or
presumption. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir.
2002).
In his summary judgment response and on appeal, Walcott contends that
Bunch told him that he did not “look Hispanic enough” for the Assistant Director
of Customer Service position. Walcott cites his own deposition testimony to
employee’s application would be reviewed along with the other applicants. However,
such review would show that the probationary employee was not qualified for an internal
position under the university’s policy unless he had been employed for six months in his
current position. In other words, the evidence does not indicate that TSU considered a
probationary employee to be qualified simple because it did not prevent him from
applying for internal position. He would still need to demonstrate that he met the
position’s qualifications, including those imposed by the university.
14
support this contention. He asserts that such evidence is direct evidence of
discrimination.
We note, however, that if the employee does produce direct evidence that
discriminatory animus played a role in the decision at issue, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer, who must prove that it would have taken the
same action regardless of discriminatory animus. See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252–53, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1792 (1989); Sandstad, 309 F.3d
at 896. Even if we assume arguendo that the cited evidence was direct evidence of
discriminatory animus, TSU offered evidence showing that it would have taken the
same action regardless of discriminatory animus. Specifically, it offered
conclusive evidence showing that it would not have promoted Walcott because he
was not eligible for a promotion under written university policy. TSU was entitled
to summary judgment under this theory as well. We hold that the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment on Walcott’s failure-to-promote claim.
E. Termination of Employment
Walcott claims that TSU unlawfully terminated his employment based on
his national origin, that is, because he is Panamanian. Under the circumstances
alleged, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Walcott must show that
(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified to do his job, (3) he
was fired, and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class. See
15
Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Assuming without
deciding that Walcott established a prima facia case of national origin
discrimination, the burden shifted to TSU to proffer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for firing Walcott. See Tex. Dept. of Cmty Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S.248, 255, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094–95 (1981); Vaughn, 665 F.3d at
636. This is a burden of production, not of persuasion. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
142, 120 S. Ct. at 2016. To meet its burden, TSU “must clearly set forth, through
the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for [Walcott’s firing].” See
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S. Ct. at 1094. TSU is allowed to be incorrect in its
assessment of the facts on which it relies to justify firing Walcott, but it is not
allowed to have any discriminatory animus against him in making its decision. See
Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 636; Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 899.
To meet its burden of production, TSU proffered Nicholson-Jones’s and
Bunch’s deposition testimony. They each testified that Walcott was not
satisfactorily performing his job duties as Manager of Custodial Services, which
resulted in his termination. Nicholson-Jones testified (1) she received complaints
that the classrooms and restrooms for which Walcott was responsible were not
being cleaned; (2) Walcott did not delegate cleaning work to his staff; (3) she
received complaints that Walcott was often in campus buildings to which he was
16
not assigned to work; and (4) Nicholson-Jones observed that Walcott did not
appear to know how to do his job.
Bunch testified Walcott’s areas were not being cleaned and “the work just
wasn’t getting done.” He stated that Walcott’s co-workers complained that (1)
Walcott was not completing his assigned tasks; (2) he was not supervising his staff;
and (3) he did not know how to operate the equipment.
An employee’s poor job performance is a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for discharge. Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991);
see McCoy v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 548, 556 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2006, no pet.). Thus, TSU met its burden of production. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at
255, 101 S. Ct. at 1094–95.
The burden then shifted to Walcott to show that TSU’s proffered reason was
a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807, 93 S. Ct. at
1826–27; Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 Fed. App’x. 416, 419–420
(5th Cir. 2009). In other words, to survive summary judgment, Walcott was
required to submit evidence raising an issue of material fact regarding whether
TSU’s stated reason for terminating him—unsatisfactory job performance—was a
pretext for illegal discrimination based on his national origin. See Jenkins v.
Guardian Indus. Corp., 16 S.W.3d 431, 441 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied)
(explaining that, to survive summary judgment, employee is required to come
17
forward with summary-judgment evidence of an unlawful motive once employer’s
summary judgment evidence establishes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the discharge); see also Parker v. Valerus Compression Servs., LP, 365
S.W.3d 61, 68–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (discussing
burden shifting analysis in summary judgment context with respect to worker’s
compensation retaliatory discharge claim).
To establish pretext, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s explanation
for the employment action is false or unworthy of credence. See Ptomey v. Tex.
Tech Univ., 277 S.W.3d 487, 493 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (citing
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095); Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 636. In his
summary judgment responses, Walcott made the following argument with respect
to pretext, “No matter what reason Darrell Bunch gives for terminating Emanuel
Walcott, Walcott was terminated without ever receiving a verbal warning, a written
warning, or any other indication that he wasn’t performing his job properly. This
violates TSU policy.” Related to this argument, Walcott cited specific summary-
judgment evidence as demonstrating that TSU’s given reason was a pretext for
discrimination.3 In this regard, Walcott relied on Bunch’s deposition testimony in
3
On appeal, Walcott argues that pretext for unlawful termination is also shown by
his own deposition testimony in which he stated that Galan called him a “Black
Columbian” and Nicholson-Jones called him her “Hispanic Bulldog.” Walcott did not
include this argument in his summary-judgment responses as evidence of pretext as it
relates to his termination. As a result, we may not consider such argument on appeal to
18
which Bunch stated that he had fired another employee, an African-American man,
after first giving that employee a written and verbal warning.
Although departure from normal institutional procedure might contribute to
a finding of pretext, to survive summary judgment, Walcott was required to
provide evidence showing that the given reason was false or that his termination
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See Spears, 337 Fed. App’x. at 421
(citing Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, 434 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Walcott cited no such evidence when arguing that TSU’s given reason for his
termination was pretext for discrimination.
In addition, Walcott did not offer evidence to show that the African-
American employee mentioned by Bunch in his deposition testimony was an
appropriate “comparator” to show disparate treatment. An employer engages, in
disparate treatment when it treats one employee more harshly than other “similarly
situated” employees for “nearly identical” conduct. See Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917–18 (Tex. 2005); Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 637. The
situations and conduct of the employees in question must be “nearly identical.”
Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d at 917–18. Significantly, Walcott did not offer evidence
showing whether the employee mentioned by Bunch was similarly situated to
reverse summary judgment on his termination claim. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c);
McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341, 343 (Tex. 1993); City of
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).
19
Walcott with respect to probationary status. Cf. Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574
F.3d 253, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2009) (providing that employees with different
supervisors, different work responsibilities, or dissimilar violations are generally
inappropriate comparators). The summary judgment evidence showed that some
of TSU’s employment policies did not apply to probationary employees.
Walcott also cited evidence showing that his termination followed his report
to Nicholson-Jones regarding Bunch’s comment that he did not “look Hispanic
enough.” While it is arguably probative of retaliation, such evidence, alone, does
not show that TSU’s stated reason for Walcott’s discharge was false; nor does it
show that the termination was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.4
We conclude that TSU met its summary judgment burden by presenting
conclusive evidence that it did not terminate Walcott based on his national origin
but that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing him. Walcott, in
turn, did not meet his summary judgment burden to present evidence raising an
issue of material fact regarding whether TSU’s proffered reason for his termination
was pretext for unlawful discrimination. We hold that the trial court did not err
4
We also note that Walcott asserts a hostile work environment claim in his
appellate briefing. Walcott did not assert a hostile work environment claim in his
original petition or in the summary-judgment proceedings. This assertion may not be
raised for the first time on appeal as a ground to reverse summary judgment on his
discrimination claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 341, 343;
Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 678.
20
when it granted summary judgment on Walcott’s discrimination claim arising from
his termination.
We overrule Walcott’s first issue.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
TSU filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that Walcott failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation claim because he did not
allege the retaliation claim in his EEOC charge form. TSU argued that, as a result,
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim. Walcott
responded that he exhausted his administrative remedies because the allegations in
his EEOC charge should be construed broadly to encompass the retaliation claim.
He also asserted that his retaliation and national origin discrimination claims are
factually related claims that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the
administrative agency’s investigation of his charge.
The trial court granted TSU’s plea to the jurisdiction. In his second issue on
appeal, Walcott contends that the trial court erred by granting the plea to the
jurisdiction.
A. Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Its purpose is “to defeat a cause of action
without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Id. A plea to the
21
jurisdiction may challenge whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to
affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction or whether the jurisdictional facts alleged by
the plaintiff actually exist. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex.
2009). Here, TSU’s plea to the jurisdiction challenged the existence of
jurisdictional facts.
If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts,
the trial court must consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). When the jurisdictional facts are
undisputed, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law,
and on appeal the trial court’s ruling is reviewed de novo. Id. at 228. In this case,
the issue is whether Walcott properly exhausted his retaliation claim at the
administrative level, and the evidence bearing on that issue is not disputed. Thus,
whether Walcott exhausted his administrative remedy with respect to his retaliation
claim is a question of law that we review de novo. See id.; see also Lopez v. Tex.
State Univ., 368 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. filed).
B. Analysis
The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
filing suit for unlawful employment practices. See Specialty Retailers, Inc. v.
DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996); Santi v. Univ. of Tex. Health
22
Science Ctr. at Houston, 312 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, no pet.). To exhaust administrative remedies under the TCHRA, a plaintiff
must (1) file a complaint with the TWC or the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory act; (2) allow the agency 180 days to dismiss or to resolve
the complaint; and (3) file suit in district court within 60 days of receiving a right-
to-sue letter from the agency and no later than two years after the complaint was
filed. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.202, .208, .254, .256 (Vernon 2006). “The
purposes underlying the administrative-complaint requirement include giving the
charged party notice of the claim, narrowing the issues for speedier and more
effective adjudication and decision, and giving the administrative agency and the
employer an opportunity to resolve the dispute.” Lopez, 368 S.W.3d at 700–01
(citing Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2006); Manning v. Chevron
Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 878–79 (5th Cir. 2003)).
TSU does not dispute that the administrative charge was timely filed.
Instead, the issue on appeal is whether Walcott’s retaliation claim alleged in his
lawsuit falls within the scope of the administrative charge filed with the EEOC.
The law is well settled that the scope of TCHRA litigation is limited to claims that
were included in the administrative charge and to factually related claims that
could reasonably be expected to grow out of the agency’s investigation of the
23
claims stated in the charge. See Lopez, 368 S.W.3d at 701; Santi, 312 S.W.3d at
805.
We should construe the administrative charge with “utmost liberality.”
Santi, 312 S.W.3d at 805 (citing Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d
317, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied)). Nonetheless, the charge
must contain an adequate factual basis to put the employer on notice of the
existence and nature of the charges. Bartosh, 259 S.W.3d at 321.
The crucial element of a discrimination charge is the factual statement
contained in the administrative complaint. Santi, 312 S.W.3d at 805 (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2009) (“a charge is sufficient when . . . sufficiently precise to
identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained
of”)). “We will not construe the charge to include facts that were initially
omitted.” Cnty. of Travis ex rel. Hamilton v. Manion, No. 03–11–00533–CV, 2012
WL 1839399, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Harris v. David McDavid Honda, 213 F. App’x 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2006)).
In his EEOC charge, Walcott averred as follows:
On May 21, 2009, I was discharged from position as Manager of
Custodial Services. Prior to my discharge, I inquired about a position
that was filled a month earlier that I felt qualified for. I was not
selected. A Hispanic female was hired as the Asst. Director of
Custodial Services. After my inquiry, I was harassed and placed in a
hostile work environment on behalf [sic] of Diane Jones, Director of
Custodial Services. The new Asst. Director, Griselda Galan notified
me of my discharge. . . .
24
The reason given for my termination was poor performance and that I
did not fit into the University’s plan. During my entire tenure with the
University, I had never been given [] performance counseling. No
reason was given [for] the way Diane Jones treated me.
I believe that I was subjected to discrimination due to my national
origin, Hispanic (Panamanian) in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Walcott argues that this language was sufficient to put TSU on notice that he was
asserting a retaliation claim.
In a retaliation action brought under the TCHRA, a plaintiff is required to
make a prima facie showing that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) an
adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., 214 S.W.3d
672, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Niu v. Revcor
Molded Prods. Co., 206 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
Protected activities consist of (1) opposing a discriminatory practice; (2) making or
filing a charge; (3) filing a complaint; or (4) testifying, assisting, or participating in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055 (Vernon
2006); Dias, 214 S.W.3d at 676.
In his opening brief, Walcott asserts as follows:
While it would have been better to add that Walcott was retaliated
against by Diane Jones, saying that he was harassed and placed in a
hostile work environment by Diane Jones clearly puts TSU on notice
that Walcott is complaining about treatment he received after
25
complaining to his boss about discrimination. This is sufficient under
the law to constitute a charge of retaliation . . . .
TSU contends that Walcott’s EEOC charge states only a claim for
discrimination. It asserts that the charge does not contain any factual allegations of
retaliation. We agree.
In his lawsuit, Walcott alleged that he suffered adverse employment actions
after he engaged in the protected activity of reporting Bunch’s discriminatory
remarks and the concomitant denial of Walcott’s ability to apply for a promotion to
Nicholson-Jones. In contrast, the factual allegations in the EEOC charge are
devoid of any allegation that Walcott engaged in a protected activity resulting in an
adverse employment action against him. More precisely, the charge does not
allege that Walcott reported Bunch’s alleged discriminatory conduct to Nicholson-
Jones, as he later claimed in his lawsuit. Rather, in the EEOC charge, the only
action Walcott alleges that he took was to inquire about a position. He stated that,
after his inquiry, the position was given to a person of a different national origin.
Walcott alleged that he was harassed, placed in a hostile work environment, and
terminated after inquiring about the position. However, making an inquiry about a
position is not a protected activity for purposes of basing a retaliation claim. See
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055. Even when broadly construed, the EEOC charge
contains no statement from which an inference may be drawn that unlawful
employment practices were taken against Walcott based on his report of
26
discriminatory practices to Nicholson-Jones. The charge contains no allegations
that would serve to put TSU on notice that Walcott was asserting a claim of
retaliation. See El Paso Cnty. v. Navarrete, 194 S.W.3d 677, 683–84 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2006, pet. denied) (holding trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over retaliation claim because charge contained no allegation that plaintiff had
suffered adverse employment action based on the protected activity that plaintiff
later alleged in the lawsuit). Similarly, the lack of any allegation that Walcott had
engaged in a protected activity also leads us to conclude that the administrative
charge could not have reasonably given rise to an investigation of retaliation. See
Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 810 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.).
We conclude that Walcott failed to exhaust his administrative remedy
regarding his retaliation claim. As a result, the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over Walcott’s retaliation claim. We hold that the trial court did not
err in granting TSU’s plea to the jurisdiction.
We overrule Walcott’s second issue.
27
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.
28