Albert Dewayne Beasley v. State ( 2012 )


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  • Opinion issued December 28, 2012
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-11-00987-CR
    ———————————
    ALBERT DEWAYNE BEASLEY, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 56th District Court
    Galveston County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 10-CR-2663
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A jury convicted appellant, Albert Dewayne Beasley, of the first-degree
    felony offense of aggravated robbery and, after finding the allegations in an
    enhancement paragraph true, assessed punishment at fifty years’ confinement.1 In
    one issue, appellant contends that the State failed to preserve evidence of his
    videotaped confession, in violation of Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22,
    which requires a videotaped recording of a defendant’s statement to be preserved
    until the conviction is final and all appeals are exhausted.
    We affirm.
    Background
    The complainant, Gary Billiot, owned and operated an automotive shop in
    Texas City. Appellant occasionally worked at the shop by washing cars and
    assisting with Billiot’s upholstery work. On August 25, 2010, appellant and a man
    named Romeo were working with Billiot at the shop. At the end of the day, Billiot
    locked up the shop, but he intended to stay for a while longer to work on
    upholstering some car seats. Appellant asked Billiot if there was a way for him to
    make any extra money, and Billiot responded that appellant could help upholster
    the seats. Appellant and Romeo then briefly left to get some beers.
    When appellant and Romeo returned, Billiot was working on the seats.
    Romeo eventually left the shop, and appellant remained with Billiot. They were
    the only two people in the shop that evening. Billiot told appellant that he was
    going to trace a pattern and then appellant could “take over” work on the seat.
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 2011).
    2
    When Billiot turned back to the work bench, something hard hit him in the head.
    Billiot remembered ending up outside, where he spoke with his cousin who had
    stopped by the shop, and waking up in the hospital.           Billiot had had over a
    thousand dollars in cash on him on the day of the incident.
    After he was arrested, appellant gave two written confessions and a
    videotaped confession. In these confessions, appellant admitted to hitting Billiot
    with something, probably a pipe, taking the money that Billiot had on him, and
    running away. Appellant’s descriptions of the events that transpired at the shop in
    his confessions were consistent with Billiot’s testimony at trial.
    The trial court entered a discovery order requiring the State to produce
    (1) all statements by appellant pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article
    38.22 and all written statements made by appellant in connection with this offense
    and (2) any exculpatory or mitigating evidence within the possession, custody, or
    control of the State.     The discovery order required the parties to complete
    discovery by the date of the pre-trial conference—March 11, 2011—and imposed
    upon the State a continuing duty to supplement.
    Appellant moved to suppress his written confessions, arguing that they were
    not voluntary because he was intoxicated at the time that he made the statements.
    At the February 24, 2011 suppression hearing, Texas City Police Department
    Officer D. Matheson testified that no videotaped confession existed. Defense
    3
    counsel asked Officer Matheson why he did not record appellant’s confession, and
    Matheson responded, “We don’t have a room that’s dedicated solely for video. We
    have eight detectives and I didn’t video.” Defense counsel asked whether officers
    sometimes videotape interviews, and Officer Matheson responded that some
    interviews are recorded. When asked why one interview would be video-recorded
    and another one would not be video-recorded, Matheson replied, “The vast
    majority are written statements. We have no dedicated video room where there’s a
    video set up, availability of equipment.”
    The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the written confessions.
    The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it ultimately
    concluded that the written confessions were made voluntarily.
    At trial, the State introduced both of appellant’s written confessions, as well
    as a videotaped confession. Defense counsel stated on the record that he received a
    copy of the video in May or June 2011, approximately four or five months before
    trial.    Defense counsel re-urged the previous motion to suppress the written
    confessions and objected to the admission of the videotaped confession on the
    basis that this confession was also not made voluntarily. Defense counsel noted
    that Officer Matheson had testified at the suppression hearing that no videotaped
    confession existed, but counsel did not argue at trial that the State had wrongfully
    withheld evidence in violation of the trial court’s discovery order, nor did he argue
    4
    that the State failed to preserve the videotaped confession. The court, “knowing
    that the video statement has been presented with a sufficient amount of time for
    everybody to look at,” denied appellant’s motion to suppress the videotaped
    confession.2
    Officer Matheson acknowledged that, at the suppression hearing, defense
    counsel asked him if he had taken a video statement and he said no. He testified
    that he “totally forgot about” the videotaped confession. He stated that, on the
    morning of the hearing, he was called out on another matter very early in the
    morning, and he asked the records department to pull a copy of his report in
    appellant’s case before the hearing, but “[t]hey didn’t pull the actual case file that
    had the video in it.” He discovered the videotaped confession in the file several
    months before trial when a representative of the district attorney’s office requested
    2
    The clerk’s record contains further indications that appellant and his trial counsel
    knew of the videotaped confession several months before trial. Appellant’s trial
    counsel sent appellant a letter dated May 7, 2011, in which he stated, “You
    previously had a hearing on your confession in which you signed two confessions
    of your crime. The video was not available at that time. However, you have now
    had the opportunity to view the confession video. You chose not to watch it in its
    entirety. The court has ruled that the confession is admissible and will be viewed
    by the jury.” Appellant’s original trial counsel moved to withdraw on June 8,
    2011, and he mentioned in his motion that he and appellant were having
    “substantial conflicts as to trial strategy as to defendant’s written and videotaped
    confessions.” Appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the prosecution, in which
    he stated that, on May 6, 2011, the district attorney informed him that a videotaped
    confession existed and that he watched the confession with his trial counsel and a
    bailiff at the district attorney’s office. On June 12, 2011, appellant filed a pro se
    motion to suppress the written and the videotaped confessions. Appellant’s
    second appointed attorney also acknowledged the videotaped confession in a
    motion for continuance filed on July 22, 2011.
    5
    the hard copy of the file. The State notified defense counsel at that time, and
    appellant and his counsel watched the video at the district attorney’s office.
    The jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and, after finding the
    allegations in an enhancement paragraph true, it assessed punishment at fifty years’
    confinement.
    Preservation of Videotaped Confession
    In his sole issue, appellant contends that the State erred by failing to
    preserve evidence of his videotaped confession in violation of Code of Criminal
    Procedure article 38.22. The State contends that this issue is meritless because
    (1) the State preserved the videotape, appellant was aware of the videotape and had
    an opportunity to view it several months before trial, and the videotape was
    actually admitted at trial; and (2) at trial, appellant objected to the admission of the
    videotape solely on the basis that his confession was not voluntary, and he did not
    object on the grounds that the State failed to preserve the videotape or that the
    State wrongfully withheld production of the videotape in violation of the discovery
    order. We agree with the State.
    Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 provides, “Every electronic
    recording of any statement made by an accused during a custodial interrogation
    must be preserved until such time as the defendant’s conviction for any offense
    relating thereto is final, all direct appeals therefrom are exhausted, or the
    6
    prosecution of such offenses is barred by law.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    38.22, § 3(b) (Vernon 2005).
    Here, the State did not violate article 38.22, section 3(b). 
    Id. The State
    did
    not destroy the videotape of appellant’s confession; instead, it did not discover that
    the videotaped confession existed until after the trial court had ruled on appellant’s
    motion to suppress his written confessions. When it discovered that it had the
    videotaped confession in its possession, but had not produced it, it notified defense
    counsel, who viewed the videotape with appellant at the district attorney’s office.
    At trial, defense counsel acknowledged that he had received a copy of the
    videotaped confession several months before trial. The State offered, and the trial
    court admitted into evidence, the videotaped confession. Thus, the videotaped
    confession has been preserved in accordance with article 38.22, section 3(b).
    To the extent appellant contends that the State violated the trial court’s
    discovery order requiring the State to produce all of appellant’s statements and any
    mitigating or exculpatory evidence, and therefore that the trial court erroneously
    admitted the videotaped confession, we conclude that appellant failed to preserve
    this issue for appellate review.     When the State discloses evidence that was
    withheld in violation of a discovery order at trial, the defendant’s failure either to
    object to the admission of the evidence on this basis or to request a continuance
    waives the error “or at least indicates that the delay in receiving the evidence was
    7
    not truly prejudicial.” See Apolinar v. State, 
    106 S.W.3d 407
    , 421 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) (holding that failure to request continuance waives
    complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.
    Maryland),3 aff’d on other grounds, 
    155 S.W.3d 184
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see
    also Smith v. State, 
    314 S.W.3d 576
    , 586 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.)
    (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on
    complaint); Jones v. State, 
    234 S.W.3d 151
    , 158 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007,
    no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady
    complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review);
    Young v. State, 
    183 S.W.3d 699
    , 706 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d) (“The
    failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any
    violation of a discovery order.”).
    Here, appellant became aware of the videotaped confession approximately
    four or five months before trial.        Appellant and his trial counsel had the
    opportunity to view this videotape. When the State offered the videotape into
    evidence at trial, defense counsel objected solely on the ground that appellant’s
    confession was not voluntary.        He did not object on the basis that the State
    wrongfully withheld material evidence in violation of the discovery order, nor did
    he file a motion for new trial raising this argument. Cf. Kirksey v. State, 132
    3
    See Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    (1963) (requiring that State
    turn over material, favorable evidence to defendant).
    
    8 S.W.3d 49
    , 54 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (holding complaint preserved
    when “colloquy among counsel and the court [made it clear] that all parties
    understood that Appellant was objecting to the timeliness of the State’s production
    of certain photographs in alleged violation of the pre-trial discovery order”).
    Moreover, a defendant’s trial objection must comport with his objection to the
    evidence on appeal in order for error to be preserved.       See TEX. R. APP. P.
    33.1(a)(1)(A); Pena v. State, 
    285 S.W.3d 459
    , 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing
    Reyna v. State, 
    168 S.W.3d 173
    , 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). We therefore
    conclude that appellant failed to preserve for appellate review any complaint that
    the State violated the discovery order or otherwise wrongfully withheld evidence.
    We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Evelyn V. Keyes
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Brown.
    Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-11-00987-CR

Filed Date: 12/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015