in the Interest of W. K. Jr., T. M. and C. M. ( 2012 )


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  • Opinion issued December 13, 2012.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-12-00285-CV
    ———————————
    IN THE INTEREST OF W.K., Jr., T.M. and C.M.
    On Appeal from the 313th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 2010-05664J
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In this accelerated appeal,1 appellant, C.V.M., challenges the trial court’s
    order terminating her parental rights to her three minor children. Appellant’s
    court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders2 brief and informed this Court that he
    1
    See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a) (West Supp. 2012).
    2
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 1400 (1967).
    has “made a professional evaluation of the record” and can find no arguable
    grounds for appeal.3
    We affirm.
    Background
    On August 26, 2010, the Texas Department of Family and Protective
    Services (“DFPS”) filed its original petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights
    to her three children. On February 22, 2012, the day of trial, appellant executed an
    “Irrevocable Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights to the
    Department of Family and Protective Services” pertaining to the children.4 In her
    affidavit, appellant testified that “[t]ermination of the parent-child relationship is in
    the best interest of the children” and she gave “up all” her “parental rights and
    grant[ed] them to the Department and/or to the adoptive parents” with whom her
    children might be placed.
    At trial, DFPS relied solely on appellant’s affidavit of relinquishment in
    support of its petition. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that
    appellant had “executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment”
    and termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. It ordered
    3
    See In re K.D., 
    127 S.W.3d 66
    , 67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)
    (following sister courts in holding procedures set forth in Anders are applicable to
    appeal from termination of parental rights when appointed counsel concludes that
    there are no arguable issues to assert on appeal).
    4
    See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(K) (West Supp. 2012).
    2
    appellant’s parental rights terminated. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for
    new trial, wherein she asserted that she “desire[d] to revoke and withdraw” her
    affidavit of relinquishment and “she was pressured by the Court” to sign the
    affidavit. After a hearing, at which appellant did not appear, the trial court denied
    her motion for new trial.
    Anders
    Anders procedures are appropriate in parental-rights termination cases. In re
    K.D., 
    127 S.W.3d 66
    , 67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The brief
    submitted by appellant’s counsel on appeal states his professional opinion that no
    arguable grounds for reversal exist and any appeal would lack merit. See Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief meets
    the minimum Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the
    record and stating why there are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. See
    id.; In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
    Appellant’s counsel has certified to this Court that he delivered a copy of the brief
    to appellant by certified mail and informed her that she had the right to file a pro se
    response. Appellant has not filed a pro se response or a motion requesting an
    extension of time to file a response with this Court.
    When we receive an Anders brief from an appellant’s court-appointed
    attorney who asserts that no arguable grounds for appeal exist, we must determine
    3
    that issue independently by conducting our own review of the entire record. See
    
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    , 87 S. Ct. at 1400 (emphasizing that reviewing court—and
    not counsel—determines, after full examination of proceedings, whether case is
    “wholly frivolous”); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 510 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1991). We also consider any pro se response. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    Thus, our role in this Anders appeal, which consists of reviewing the entire
    record, is to determine whether arguable grounds for appeal exist. See 
    id. at 827.
    If we determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist, we abate the appeal and
    remand the case to the trial court to allow the court-appointed attorney to
    withdraw. See 
    id. Then, the
    trial court appoints another attorney to present all
    arguable grounds for appeal. See 
    id. “Only after
    the issues have been briefed by
    new counsel may [we] address the merits of the issues raised.” 
    Id. On the
    other hand, if our independent review of the record leads us to
    conclude that an appeal would be wholly frivolous, we may affirm the trial court’s
    judgment by issuing an opinion in which we explain that we have reviewed the
    record and find no reversible error. 
    Id. Appellant may
    challenge the holding that
    there are no arguable grounds for appeal by petitioning for review in the Texas
    Supreme Court. See 
    id. at 827
    & n.6.
    4
    Conclusion
    We have reviewed the entire record, and we hold that there are no arguable
    grounds for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court, and we
    grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.5
    Terry Jennings
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.
    5
    We note that counsel still has a duty to inform appellant of the result of this appeal
    and also to inform appellant that she may, on her own, pursue a petition for
    discretionary review of this Court’s judgment in the Texas Supreme Court. See In
    re 
    K.D., 127 S.W.3d at 68
    n.3; see also Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827 &
    n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    5