in the Interest of J.L. and A.E., Children ( 2012 )

Opinion issued December 7, 2012
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00464-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF J.L. AND A.E., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2010-03655J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant J.R. attempts to appeal from the trial court’s final decree
terminating her parental rights to J.L. and A.E., the minor children made the
subject of this suit, and granting sole managing conservatorship of the children to
the Department of Family and Protective Services.1
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To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to appellant and the children
by initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.8.
An appeal from a final order terminating parental rights is governed by the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure for accelerated appeals. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 109.002(a), 263.405(a) (West Supp. 2012). In an accelerated appeal, absent a
motion to extend time under Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, “the deadline for
filing a notice of appeal is strictly set at twenty days after the judgment is signed,
with no exceptions. . . .” In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. 2005); see TEX.
R. APP. P. 26.1(b). “Filing a motion for new trial, any other post-trial motion, or a
request for findings of fact will not extend the time to perfect an accelerated
appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(b). A motion for extension of time to file the notice
of appeal, if any, must be filed within fifteen days after the twenty-day deadline for
filing a notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3; K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927. A
motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in
good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by rule 26.1, but within
the 15-day extension period provided by Rule 26.3. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 26.3;
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617–18 (Tex. 1997).
Because the trial court signed the final decree on April 4, 2012, appellant’s
notice of appeal was due by April 24, 2012. Appellant did not file her notice of
appeal until May 10, 2012, which was thirty-six days after the decree was signed.
Hence, appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. See K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d
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at 927. Further, appellant did not file a motion to extend time to file her notice of
appeal and did not file her notice of appeal within the Verburgt period. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 26.3; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617–18.
In the absence of a timely notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction over the
appeal and therefore can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 25.1; K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617.
On October 22, 2012, we notified appellant that her appeal was subject to
dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless she filed a response showing grounds for
continuing the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Appellant, through her
appointed counsel, filed a response stating that, based on a review of the complete
record and the governing law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the
appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
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