Miguel Castellano Garcia v. State ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00286-CR
MIGUEL CASTELLANO GARCIA APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A jury convicted Appellant Miguel Castellano Garcia of felony driving while
intoxicated (DWI), assessed his punishment at ten years’ confinement, and
recommended that imposition of his sentence be suspended and that he be
placed on community supervision for ten years. The trial court sentenced him
accordingly. In a single point, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the operator of the
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
vehicle involved in the collision leading to his DWI arrest. Because the evidence
is sufficient to show that Appellant was operating the vehicle while he was
intoxicated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
On January 8, 2009, Lake Worth police officer Matt Rietfors investigated a
two-car wreck. When Rietfors arrived at the scene, Appellant was sitting in the
driver’s seat of one of the vehicles, a Dodge Dakota, and talking to a fireman.
Rietfors noticed that Appellant’s breath had an odor of alcohol, his speech was
slurred, and his eyes were glassy and bloodshot.
Rietfors asked Appellant to step out of the truck and produce his driver’s
license. Appellant got out of the truck but refused to produce his license. After
conducting field sobriety tests, Rietfors concluded that Appellant was intoxicated
and arrested him.
At trial, Rietfors testified that the other driver involved in the wreck had
indicated that Appellant had been driving the truck. Rietfors also testified that
Appellant owned the truck and had no other passengers in the truck with him.
Appellant’s sole argument is that the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was the operator of the Dodge Dakota involved in the
wreck leading to the DWI arrest. He does not contend that he was not
intoxicated at the time the vehicle was being operated. A person commits the
offense of DWI if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a
public place.2
In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to
2
Tex Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (West 2011).
2
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 3
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.4 The trier of fact is the sole judge of
the weight and credibility of the evidence.5 Thus, when performing an evidentiary
sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. 6 Instead, we
Adetermine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the
combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict.”7 We must presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution.8
The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence
cases; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing
the guilt of an actor.9
3
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
4
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
5
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Brown v. State,
270 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2075
(2009).
6
Will. v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
7
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
8
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
9
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
3
This is an unusual case in that the State proved that Appellant was
operating the vehicle by relying solely on hearsay and circumstantial evidence.
No one who actually saw the wreck testified at trial. Rietfors did not see the
wreck and, consequently, did not see who was operating either vehicle. He saw
Appellant sitting behind the wheel of the Dodge Dakota, alone in the truck, when
he arrived on the scene, but the engine was not running. The driver of the other
vehicle involved in the wreck had told Rietfors that Appellant was driving the
Dodge Dakota at the time of the wreck, and Rietfors relied on this information
and relayed it to the jury at trial. Appellant did not object to the hearsay
testimony but rather elicited the evidence from Rietfors.
Applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that the evidence is
sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find that the State had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant operated the vehicle involved in the accident
leading to his DWI arrest. We therefore overrule Appellant’s sole point and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 3, 2011
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