in Re American Zurich Insurance Company ( 2012 )


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  • Opinion issued July 12, 2012.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-11-00816-CV
    ———————————
    IN RE AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY
    On Appeal from the 151st District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1081742
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This mandamus petition concerns the scope of discovery in a lawsuit arising
    out of a workers’ compensation proceeding.      Real party in interest, Cathryn
    Thompson, sues relators, American Zurich Insurance Company and its insurance
    adjuster, Fai Hensel (collectively, “Zurich”), alleging that Zurich wrongfully
    denied and delayed payment of workers’ compensation benefits to her in violation
    of the Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and breached its
    common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing.
    Zurich petitions for mandamus relief from the trial court’s September
    23, 2011 order, compelling Zurich to produce monthly operational reports
    containing aggregate claims data on its Texas workers’ compensation claims from
    January 2006 through December 2009. Zurich contends that the discovery is
    foreclosed by Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ruttiger. No. 08-0751, 
    2012 WL 2361697
    (Tex. June 22, 2012) (opinion on rehearing), decided after the trial court
    issued its ruling. In addition, Zurich claims that the discovery is irrelevant to
    Thompson’s claims and overly broad. We conditionally grant mandamus relief
    from the trial court’s order in light of the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in
    Ruttiger.
    Background
    The Underlying Suit
    Thompson alleges that she developed cubital tunnel syndrome while
    working for Conn’s as a forklift operator in April 2009. Contending that her injury
    entitled her to compensation as a beneficiary of Conn’s workers’ compensation
    program, Thompson filed an insurance claim with Zurich, Conn’s workers’
    compensation carrier.    Zurich refused Thompson’s claim on the basis that
    2
    Thompson had not demonstrated that she sustained the injury within the course and
    scope of her employment.
    In response, Thompson filed an administrative claim with the Division of
    Workers’ Compensation (WCD). See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.023(a) (West
    Supp. 2011) (authorizing WCD to conduct benefit review conferences to resolve
    disputed workers’ compensation claims); see also 
    id. § 410.029
    (West 2006)
    (disputes may be resolved in whole or in part at benefit review conference). After
    Thompson and Zurich were unable to reach a settlement at a benefit review
    conference, the matter was set for a contested case hearing to determine whether
    Thompson had suffered a compensable injury and whether she had been disabled
    as a result of her injury. See id § 410.151–.152 (permitting contested case hearing
    before qualified hearing officer). The hearing officer issued a Decision and Order,
    concluding that Thompson had suffered a compensable repetitive trauma in April
    2009 and, as a result of her injury, had been unable to work for a period of time.
    After the WCD found in her favor, Thompson filed this suit in state district
    court. Thompson claims that Zurich wrongfully denied and delayed payment of
    workers’ compensation benefits due her and, therefore, knowingly violated the
    Insurance Code, Deceptive Trade Practices Act and breached its common-law duty
    of good faith and fair dealing.
    3
    Discovery Issues
    Thompson served Zurich with requests for production and interrogatories.
    Relevant to this appeal, Thompson requested that Zurich produce:
    Request No. 16: Documents demonstrating American Zurich
    Company’s claim denial rate for each year commencing 2006-2010.
    Request No. 18: Your report on the total and average claim cost
    (indemnity and medical); medial claim cost (indemnity and medical);
    number of claim; number of denials (medical and indemnity) for
    2006-2010.
    Zurich objected to Requests 16 and 18, contending that the requests were overly
    broad, irrelevant, and unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
    Zurich also responded that it did not maintain any such data summaries.
    In reply, Thompson moved to compel Zurich to produce documents in
    response to Requests 16 and 18. The trial court granted Thompson’s motion and
    ordered Zurich to identify “the report(s) provided to [Zurich claims managers] on a
    recurring basis . . . that are or may be responsive to [Thompson’s] Request for
    Production 16 and 18 . . . .” In accord with the trial court’s order, Zurich identified
    (subject to its objections) monthly operational reports that Zurich distributes to its
    team managers. The reports contain workers’ compensation claims data reflecting:
    (1) the number of new claims filed, (2) sums of actual valuation reserves and
    reserve adequacy, (3) the amount in penalties paid, and (4) amounts paid in
    benefits. After reviewing the reports in camera, the trial court granted the motion
    4
    to compel and ordered Zurich to produce all operational reports for the months
    January 2006 through December 2009.
    Standard of Review
    Mandamus relief is appropriate only if the trial court abuses its discretion
    and no adequate remedy by appeal exists. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 
    164 S.W.3d 379
    , 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins.
    Co. of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer,
    
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). An order compelling
    discovery that exceeds the proper bounds is subject to mandamus review. In re
    Am. Optical Corp., 
    988 S.W.2d 711
    , 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per
    curiam).
    Discussion
    Zurich contends that the discovery order constitutes an abuse of discretion
    because Ruttiger, decided after the trial court ruled, forecloses Thompson’s claims
    in this suit. 
    2012 WL 2361697
    , at *11–13, *18–19. Alternatively, Zurich claims
    that the trial court’s order is overly broad and requires Zurich to produce
    documents that are irrelevant to Thompson’s claims.
    Generally, the scope of discovery is within the trial court’s discretion;
    however, the trial court must impose reasonable discovery limits. In re CSX Corp.,
    
    124 S.W.3d 149
    , 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also Dillard
    5
    Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hall, 
    909 S.W.2d 491
    , 492 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per
    curiam). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(a) provides:
    [A] party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not
    privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action,
    whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
    discovery or the claim or defense of any other party. It is not a ground
    for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if
    the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
    discovery of admissible evidence.
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). “Although the scope of discovery is broad, requests must
    show a reasonable expectation of obtaining information that will aid the dispute’s
    resolution. Thus, discovery requests must be ‘reasonably tailored’ to include only
    relevant matters.” In re CSX 
    Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152
    (citing In re Am. Optical
    
    Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713
    ).
    Thompson contends that Zurich intentionally or knowingly violated the
    Insurance Code in (1) failing to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement
    of her claim, (2) failing to adopt and implement standards for prompt investigation
    of claims arising under its policies, (3) failing to promptly explain why it denied
    her claim, (4) refusing to pay her claim without conducting a reasonable
    investigation, and (5) misrepresenting the terms of the insurance policy under
    which Zurich provides workers’ compensation coverage. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
    § 541.060(a) (West 2009) (prohibiting unfair settlement practices, including failing
    to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claim
    6
    where insurer’s liability has become reasonably clear; failing to provide to
    policyholder reasonable explanation for denial of claim; and refusing to pay claim
    without conducting reasonable investigation); 
    id. § 542.003
    (prohibiting carriers
    from engaging in unfair settlement practices); 
    id. § 541.061(1)–(3)
    (providing that
    misrepresentation an insurance policy by act or omission is unfair method of
    competition or deceptive practice in insurance business).
    In Ruttiger, the Texas Supreme Court held that, in light of the procedures
    and provisions detailed in the amended Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, the
    legislature did not intend to provide for separate causes of action for unfair
    settlement practices against workers’ compensation carriers under sections 541.060
    and 542.003 of the Insurance Code. 
    2012 WL 2361697
    , at *11–13. Given the
    extensive statutory framework for workers’ compensation cases, the Court further
    held that an injured employee may not assert a common-law claim for breach of
    the duty of good faith and fair dealing against a workers’ compensation carrier,
    overruling Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America, 
    748 S.W.2d 210
    (Tex.
    1988). 
    Id. at *18–19.
    We conclude that Ruttiger forecloses Thompson’s claims
    under sections 541.060 and 542.003 of the Insurance Code and her claim for
    breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, the trial court had no
    discretion to order discovery directed to those claims. See 
    id. at *11–13,
    *18–19
    (holding that no action may be brought by insured against workers’ compensation
    7
    carrier under sections 541.060 or 542.003 of the Insurance Code based on delay or
    denial of workers’ compensation benefits and concluding that claim for breach of
    duty   of   good    faith   does     not   obtain   in   light   of   amendments   to
    workers’ compensation scheme).
    Ruttiger does not foreclose Thompson’s claims that Zurich misrepresented
    its workers’ compensation policy in violation of section 541.061 of the Insurance
    Code and engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of the DTPA. We next
    consider whether the operational reports are within the scope of permissible
    discovery with respect to these claims.
    1. Section 541.061 of the Insurance Code
    A plaintiff may sue her insurer for misrepresentations about the scope of
    coverage under the Insurance Code and the DTPA. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
    § 541.061 (prohibiting misrepresentations of insurance policies); see also Brown &
    Brown of Tex., Inc. v. Omni Metals, Inc., 
    317 S.W.3d 361
    , 381 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Thus, evidence supporting allegations of
    misrepresentation is discoverable.
    Discovery of the operational reports, however, is not reasonably calculated
    to lead to evidence that supports Thompson’s remaining claim under these
    provisions. The reports are internal communications distributed to Zurich’s Team
    Managers. They contain monthly data summaries, revealing the number of new
    8
    claims filed, Zurich’s claims reserves, penalties paid, and amounts paid in benefits.
    The reports do not interpret, represent, or analyze Zurich’s workers’ compensation
    policies generally.   Thompson does not contend that the reports contain any
    representation regarding her workers’ compensation policy individually. Nor does
    she allege that Zurich misrepresented its workers’ compensation policy to her
    based on information contained in these reports—they instead reflect general
    claims handling for all of Zurich’s Texas workers’ compensation claims for a
    three-year period. Because the reports sought relate neither to Thompson’s claim
    or injury specifically, nor to interpretation of the insurance policy generally, we
    conclude that the operational reports are not relevant to Thompson’s section
    541.061misrepresentation claim. As the reports are not relevant to Thompson’s
    misrepresentation claim, the request for discovery of the reports to prove an
    intentional or knowing violation of the Insurance Code based on Zurich’s alleged
    misrepresentation of its workers’ compensation policy’s coverage is similarly
    overbroad at this stage of the proceedings. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.152(b)
    (authorizing damages for knowing violations of Insurance Code); see also In re
    Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    227 S.W.3d 667
    , 670 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)
    (granting mandamus relief when trial court ordered claims-handling information
    that was overbroad as to time, location, and scope).
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    2. Deceptive Trade Practices Act
    As pleaded, Thompson’s DTPA claim turns on whether or not Zurich
    misrepresented its insurance policy in violation of section 541.061 of the Insurance
    Code. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.061, 541.151 (authorizing action under
    DTPA for Insurance Code violation, including misrepresentation of insurance
    policy); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 17.46(b) (West 2011). Because we
    conclude that the operational reports are not discoverable as they do not relate to
    Thompson’s claim under section 541.061 of the Insurance Code, we likewise hold
    that the reports are not relevant to her DTPA claim. See Ruttiger, 
    2012 WL 2361697
    , at * 14 (dispensing of DTPA claim in workers’ compensation case when
    claim depended on Insurance Code misrepresentation claim and evidence was
    insufficient to support finding that carrier misrepresented policy).
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    Conclusion
    In light of the Texas Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Ruttiger, we
    conclude that ordering discovery of claims handling operational reports was error.
    We therefore conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to
    vacate its discovery order. We are confident that the trial court will promptly
    comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.
    Jane Bland
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Brown.
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