in Re Emily Aslam ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00172-CV
IN RE EMILY ASLAM RELATOR
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
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OPINION
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Relator Emily Aslam seeks mandamus relief against the Honorable Ralph
Walton, Judge of the 355th Judicial District Court of Hood County.
Emily complains of the trial court‘s November 10, 2010 ―Order on Motion for
Enforcement,‖ which holds her in contempt for allegedly violating a provision of
the court‘s ―Agreed Final Decree of Divorce.‖ We conditionally grant the writ of
mandamus.
Background Facts
Through the agreed final decree, Emily and Jamil Aslam divorced on June
3, 2010. Emily and Jamil are the parents and joint managing conservators of one
child, Josiah.1 Under the decree, each parent has the right to receive information
from the other parent about the health of Josiah and the right to access Josiah‘s
medical records. Emily must provide health insurance for Josiah, and when
Josiah is with Jamil, Emily must provide any forms necessary for Josiah to be
provided health care.
The trial court required Emily and Jamil to, within thirty days of the decree,
―execute . . . all necessary releases pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) . . . to permit the other conservator to obtain
health-care information regarding [Josiah].‖ The trial court also ordered the
parents to ―designate the other conservator as a person to whom protected
health information regarding [Josiah] may be disclosed whenever the party
executes an authorization . . . pursuant to . . . HIPAA.‖
On August 26, 2010, Jamil filed a motion for enforcement of the divorce
decree. In the motion, Jamil alleged that Emily ―wholly failed to execute the
necessary HIPAA releases to permit Jamil . . . to obtain health care information
regarding the child as is required by [the decree].‖ [Emphasis added.] This
allegation was labeled ―Violation 17.‖2 Jamil asked the trial court to hold Emily in
1
Emily, who serves overseas in the United States Armed Forces, has the
exclusive right to designate Josiah‘s primary residence.
2
Jamil also alleged eighteen other violations, but since the trial court
denied Jamil‘s motion on each of those allegations, we will not address them.
We will also not address Emily‘s motion for enforcement, which the trial court
also denied.
2
contempt and possibly confine her. Emily answered the motion by stating that
she had ―completed the actions requested.‖
The parties appeared for an evidentiary hearing on Jamil‘s motion in
September 2010. Emily testified that she had executed a proper HIPAA release
and had placed it in Josiah‘s medical record. She said that she had not provided
the release to Jamil.
Jamil testified that Emily had not communicated with him with regard to
Josiah‘s health.3 Jamil said that he had not received a HIPAA release from Emily
and that she was trying to thwart his ability to get information about Josiah, which
has been her pattern.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Jamil‘s allegation regarding
the non-execution of a HIPAA release to be true, held Emily in contempt,
assessed punishment at three days‘ confinement, and suspended imposition of
that punishment for thirty days, conditioned on Emily delivering the HIPAA
release to Jamil by 5 p.m. on October 18, 2010. On November 10, 2010, the trial
court signed an Order on Motion for Enforcement. The order contained the same
contempt finding and punishment.4
3
Emily said that she had received one e-mail from Jamil and that she had
replied to the e-mail by informing Jamil about Josiah‘s daycare provider.
She also testified that Jamil has the contact information for Josiah‘s doctors
because Jamil ―used to live in Okinawa.‖
4
Thus, the November 10 order required Emily to deliver the HIPAA release
by October 18. The parties approved the order as to form. The mandamus
record does not disclose whether the HIPAA document has since been provided
3
In January 2011, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law. One of the findings states, ―[Jamil] then proceeded with prosecuting
Violation 17, alleging [Emily‘s] willful failure to execute HIPAA releases to permit
[Jamil] to obtain health care information as required by the parties‘ Decree.
[Emily] testified, in two separate statements, that she did not provide HIPAA
releases as required.‖ [Emphasis added.] A conclusion of law states, ―Upon
being asked about [Emily‘s] failure to follow the provisions regarding the HIPAA
release, [Emily] herself admitted that she had failed to follow the orders.
As such, [Jamil] was successful in proving his claim.‖5
On May 16, 2011, Emily filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court.
In the petition, she contends, among other arguments, that Jamil‘s motion for
enforcement alleged only that she failed to execute a HIPAA form, not that she
failed to deliver one; thus, the motion did not provide her with notice of why she
could have been held in contempt. She also argues that she simply did not
violate the divorce decree because the express terms of the decree require her
to execute the form, not deliver it, and interpretation of a contempt order should
not rest on implication. Jamil contends that the enforcement order is not
by Emily to Jamil. The record also does not show whether any consequence
came from Emily‘s possible failure to provide the document by October 18.
5
During the hearing, Emily testified that her failure to provide the HIPAA
release to Jamil would be a violation of the divorce decree ―[i]f that‘s what [the
decree] says.‖
4
improper because in reading all of the language of the divorce decree, Emily
knew that she had to deliver the HIPAA form to him, not just execute it.
The Propriety of the Contempt Order
Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when
there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses
its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). With respect to the resolution of factual
issues or matters committed to the trial court‘s discretion, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court unless the relator establishes that the trial
court could reasonably have reached only one decision and that the trial court‘s
decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 839–40. This burden is a heavy
one. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
We give deference to a trial court‘s factual determinations, but we review the trial
court‘s legal determinations de novo. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d
640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it
incorrectly interprets or improperly applies the law. In re Dep’t of Family &
Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642–43 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding);
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
Contempt orders are not reviewable by appeal; therefore, if a trial court
abuses its discretion by holding someone in contempt, there is no adequate
5
remedy by appeal, and the second prong of mandamus review is satisfied. In re
Office of Attorney Gen. of Tex., 215 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2007, orig. proceeding).6 In an original proceeding challenging a trial court‘s
contempt order, the relator bears the burden of showing that the order is void.
See In re Coppock, 277 S.W.3d 417, 418 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).
An order is void if it is beyond the power of the court to enter it or if it deprives the
relator of liberty without due process of law. Id. ―To be enforceable by contempt,
an order must set out the terms of compliance in clear and unambiguous terms.
Moreover, a person cannot be sentenced to confinement unless the order
unequivocally commands that person to perform a duty or obligation.‖ Id.
(citation omitted).
A motion for enforcement must, ―in ordinary and concise language,‖
identify the provision of the order allegedly violated, state the manner of the
respondent‘s alleged noncompliance, and state the relief requested by the
movant. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.002 (West 2008). An enforcement order
must include the language of the provisions of the order for which enforcement
was requested, the acts or omissions that are the subject of the order, and the
manner of the respondent‘s noncompliance. Id. § 157.166 (West 2008).
The provision of the trial court‘s divorce decree that Jamil cited within
Violation 17 of his motion for enforcement requires Emily to ―execute‖ a HIPAA
6
Where a contemnor is confined, a contempt order may be challenged by a
writ of habeas corpus. See id.
6
release ―to permit [Jamil] to obtain health-care information‖ regarding Josiah.
Emily testified that she executed the release and placed it in Josiah‘s medical
record, and Jamil did not present evidence to the contrary. The provision quoted
above does not unequivocally require Emily to deliver the HIPAA form to Jamil.
Thus, the trial court‘s finding of fact that Emily did not ―provide HIPAA releases
as required‖ is in error and does not comport with the allegation of Violation 17.7
As the supreme court has explained,
For a person to be held in contempt for disobeying a court
decree, the decree must spell out the details of compliance in clear,
specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily
know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him.
Interpretation of the provisions of the court order in question should
not rest upon implication or conjecture. The allegedly contemptuous
acts must be directly contrary to the express terms of the court
order.
Ex parte Blasingame, 748 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding)
(citation omitted); see Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1995)
(orig. proceeding); see also Ex parte Jones, 160 Tex. 321, 325, 331 S.W.2d 202,
204 (1960) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that an order that is subject to a
contempt dispute must be strictly construed). Emily‘s allegedly deficient act—
failing to deliver the HIPAA form to Jamil—is not directly contrary to the part of
7
Other parts of the divorce decree could be construed to require Emily to
send the HIPAA release to Jamil. For example, the decree requires Emily to
deliver all ―forms necessary for [Josiah] to be provided health care through all
facilities available to the child as a dependent of a United States Armed Forces
member.‖ But Violation 17 did not expressly allege that Emily violated this
provision or other similar provisions; thus, Violation 17 did not give Emily notice
that she could be held in contempt for violating those provisions.
7
the trial court‘s order that was quoted within Violation 17, particularly when that
language is given a strict construction.
Jamil correctly observes that the divorce decree requires Emily to execute
the HIPAA form for the purpose of permitting ―the other party to obtain health-
care information.‖ Thus, Jamil argues that Violation 17 of his motion for
enforcement ―complain[ed] not merely about the failure to execute, but that this
did not permit [Jamil] to obtain health care information.‖ But Jamil did not present
evidence that he had attempted to obtain records from Josiah‘s medical
providers but had not been able to do so because Emily had not executed,
deficiently executed, or improperly filed the HIPAA release.8 He did not show
that he tried to get Josiah‘s medical records but was unable to because he did
not personally have a copy of the HIPAA release. It was Jamil‘s burden to prove
in the trial court that Emily should be held in contempt. See Ex parte McIntyre,
730 S.W.2d 411, 417 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, orig. proceeding). He did
not meet this burden. The trial court had no basis to determine that Emily
executed the release in a fashion that prevents Jamil‘s access to Josiah‘s health
care information. The trial court therefore also had no reason to conclude that
8
Jamil said that Josiah‘s school has refused to give him records because
he was informed that ―Emily did not allow that.‖ But Jamil did not state the same
with regard to Josiah‘s medical providers. Jamil also testified that Emily has
resisted giving him various requested information about Josiah, but the purpose
of the HIPAA release is to allow Jamil to obtain medical information from third
parties, not from Emily.
8
delivery of the HIPAA release was necessary to achieve the purpose of the part
of the divorce decree quoted in Violation 17.9
We hold that Violation 17 of Jamil‘s motion for enforcement did not give
Emily notice of the factual allegation that she was eventually held in contempt for,
and we conclude that the contempt order is therefore void.10 See Ex parte
Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Gordon,
584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding) (―Due process of law
requires that the constructive contemnor be given ‗full and complete notification‘
and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges by way of defense or
explanation. . . . A contempt judgment rendered without such notification is a
nullity.‖); In re Mann, 162 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig.
proceeding). We hold therefore that the trial court necessarily abused its
discretion by signing the contempt order. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839.11
9
Jamil argues, ―Obviously, [he] would need to receive the HIPAA Form to
obtain the health-care information.‖ The record does not contain evidence
supporting this assumption.
10
Because we hold that the trial court‘s order is void, we need not address
Jamil‘s argument that the petition for writ of mandamus was untimely. Although
laches may preclude the issuance of a writ of mandamus in some circumstances,
laches does not preclude a challenge to a void order. See In re Choice! Energy,
L.P., 325 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig.
proceeding).
11
We do not in any way condone Emily‘s actions or omissions as found by
the trial court, which do not appear to comport with the spirit of the agreed decree
of divorce, nor to promote the best interest of the child as contemplated by the
decree in which Emily and Jamil are named joint managing conservators.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002 (West 2008).
9
Conclusion
We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus. We are confident that the
trial court will vacate its November 10, 2010 ―Order on Motion for Enforcement.‖
A writ will issue only if it fails to do so.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.
DAUPHINOT, J. filed a concurring opinion.
DELIVERED: July 5, 2011
10
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00172-CV
IN RE EMILY ASLAM RELATOR
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
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CONCURRING OPINION
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I cannot join the dicta and expression of personal opinion found in the
majority‘s eleventh footnote; otherwise, I join the majority opinion.
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
DELIVERED: July 5, 2011