Justo Suarez v. State ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00026-CR
JUSTO SUAREZ APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
----------
Introduction
Appellant Justo Suarez appeals his convictions for indecency with a child
by contact, indecency with a child by exposure,2 and attempted aggravated
sexual assault of a child. We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
The State notes that, although Appellant did not raise the issue at trial or
on appeal, his conviction for indecency with a child by exposure ―would seem to
violate double jeopardy.‖ Appellate courts may review issues of double jeopardy
Factual and Procedural Background
In August 2008, twelve-year-old H.U.3 reported to police that earlier that
summer, her stepfather, Appellant, sexually abused her at his mother’s house in
Fort Worth. H.U. later described the abuse to Child Protective Services’ (CPS)
employees of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services.
Appellant was tried before a jury on a three count indictment and he was
convicted of indecency with a child by contact, indecency with a child by
exposure, and attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child. The jury
assessed his punishment at confinement for ten years for indecency with a child
by contact, two years for indecency with a child by exposure, and twenty years
as unassigned error when the violation is apparent from the face of the record.
Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A double jeopardy
violation is not apparent on the face of the record if one of the theories charged
would not constitute a double jeopardy violation, and there is sufficient evidence
in support of that valid theory. Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006) (citing Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
Here, the child complainant, H.U., testified that on a weekend day during the
summer of 2008, Appellant exposed himself to her, left the room, returned,
exposed himself again, and then pulled her head towards his exposed sexual
organ. Because evidence of the first exposure is sufficient to support a
conviction for indecency with a child and because the first exposure was a
separate act, independent of the second exposure that occurred in conjunction
with the attempted aggravated sexual assault, we hold that it is not apparent from
the face of the record that Appellant suffered double jeopardy. See Patterson v.
State,152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that two separate
aggravated sexual assaults were committed when the complainant had left the
room to use the restroom between two identical sexual acts committed by
appellant). Accordingly, we will not address this unpreserved issue as
unassigned error.
3
We use initials for the child complainant throughout this opinion.
2
for attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child. The jury also assessed fines
of $10,000 for each of the three counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant
accordingly and ordered his sentences to run concurrently.
Standard of Review
Appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his
convictions. The court of criminal of appeals has held that there is no meaningful
distinction between the legal sufficiency standard and the factual sufficiency
standard. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Thus, the
Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard is the ―only standard that a reviewing
court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support
each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.‖ Id. at 895; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Therefore, we will review Appellant’s sufficiency
challenge by applying the standard of review set out in Jackson.
In our due process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
3
A child complainant’s testimony, standing alone, can be sufficient to
establish the elements of the offenses for which the jury found Appellant guilty.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art. 38.07 (West 2005); see Garcia v. State, 563
S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App.1978); Connell v. State, 233 S.W.3d 460, 466
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). Courts give a great deal of leeway with
respect to the testimony of child complainants of sexual crimes. Villalon v. State,
791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his three
convictions because H.U. lacked credibility as a witness. Specifically, he
contends that, because of contradictions between H.U.’s testimony and her
statements to police and to CPS employees, her testimony is unreliable and that
no rational jury could have believed her. Under the proper standard of review,
however, the jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we defer to the jury’s
resolution of any conflicts in the testimony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art.
38.04 (West 1979); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007); Cook v. State, 328 S.W.3d 95, 100 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2010, pet.
ref’d). We, as a reviewing court, do not resolve any conflict of fact or weigh
credibility of the witnesses because that is the function of the trier of fact. See
Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1131, 120 S. Ct. 2008 (2000). Inconsistencies in the evidence must be
4
resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000). Thus, the entire thrust of Appellant’s argument is based on a theory
that is unsupported in the law.
In his first point, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict him of indecency with a child by contact. A person commits indecency
with a child by contact by engaging in sexual contact with a child younger than
seventeen years of age who is not the person’s spouse. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). Sexual contact includes touching the anus, breast, or
any part of the genitals of a child, including through clothing, with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(1).
At trial, H.U. testified that on a weekend sometime during the summer of
2008, when she was twelve years old, Appellant kissed her neck, reached into
her shirt, and grabbed her breast while she was in Appellant’s mother’s bedroom
in Fort Worth. This evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for indecency
with a child by contact, and we overrule Appellant’s first point.
In his second point, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction for indecency with a child by exposure. A person commits
indecency with a child by exposure if, with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, the person exposes the person’s anus or any part of the
person’s genitals, knowing that the child is present. Id. § 21.11(a)(2)(A).
5
H.U. also testified at trial that, on a weekend sometime during the summer
of 2008, while H.U. sat at the computer in Appellant’s mother’s bedroom,
Appellant entered the bedroom, unbuttoned and unzipped his pants, exposed his
sexual organ to her, and began masturbating. We hold this testimony was
sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for indecency with a child by
exposure, and we overrule Appellant’s second point.
In his third and final point, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict him of attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child. A
person commits attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child if the person,
with specific intent to penetrate the mouth of a child younger than fourteen years
of age with the person’s sexual organ, does an act that is more than mere
preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the intended act. Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01, 22.021(a) (West 2011).
H.U. testified that in Appellant’s mother’s bedroom on a weekend during
the summer of 2008, Appellant grabbed H.U. and pulled her head towards his
exposed sexual organ. We hold this evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s
conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child, and we overrule
Appellant’s third point.
6
Conclusion
Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
having overruled all of Appellant’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 23, 2011
7