Jason Wayne Roller v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                             NUMBER 13-09-00175-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    JASON WAYNE ROLLER,                                                          Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                          Appellee.
    On appeal from the 290th District Court
    of Bexar County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Vela
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    Appellant, Jason Wayne Roller, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
    deferred adjudication community supervision. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 42.12
    §§ 5(b), 23 (Vernon Supp. 2009). Roller’s community supervision was revoked based on
    an allegation that he possessed pornographic material, in violation of the terms of his
    community supervision. By two issues, Roller argues that (1) the trial court abused its
    discretion by finding that Roller possessed pornographic material; and (2) the State
    violated his right to a speedy trial by delaying prosecution of the alleged violation of Roller’s
    community supervision. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On September 30, 2005, Roller was charged by information with fraudulent use and
    possession of identifying information. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 32.51 (Vernon Supp.
    2009). The accompanying complaint alleged that on or about June 21, 2005, Roller
    committed the offense by “posting on the internet without her permission the name and
    photos of [A.H.] and causing said information to harm [A.H.] by causing unwanted
    individuals to contact her and putting out to the public information meant to be kept
    private.”1
    Roller pleaded “nolo contendere” and stipulated to the facts supporting the
    information. The stipulated facts included the following: In 2005, Roller, who was A.H.’s
    ex-boyfriend, created an internet profile on myspace.com in A.H.’s name and posted
    explicit photographs of her that were taken during their relationship. Thereafter, A.H. was
    contacted by several of her friends saying that Roller was having conversations with her
    friends, posing as her, through the internet site. On November 9, 2005, the trial court
    deferred adjudication of the offense and placed Roller on community supervision for three
    years. During the period of community supervision, Roller was prohibited from possessing
    “contraband in your home, vehicle, or on your person, including, but not limited to . . .
    pornographic materials . . . .”
    1
    W e will refer to the com plainant in this case by her initials to protect her privacy.
    2
    Roller’s community supervision was set to expire on November 9, 2008. On
    November 6, 2008, however, the State filed a motion to enter an adjudication of guilt and
    to revoke Roller’s community supervision. The motion alleged that on November 17, 2006,
    Roller possessed pornography in violation of the terms of his community supervision.
    On February 17, 2009, Roller filed a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations.
    The motion argued that the State unreasonably delayed in prosecuting the alleged violation
    of Roller’s community supervision, impairing his right to defend against the allegation.
    Specifically, Roller argued that the alleged violation occurred in November 2006 and was
    based on Roller’s alleged posting of pictures on the Internet. Because of the delay, Roller
    argued that he was unable to obtain information from AT&T Internet Services regarding the
    location of the computer that transmitted the images, which would have proved the images
    did not come from his computer. On February 26, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on
    the State’s motion to adjudicate and on Roller’s speedy trial motion. Roller pleaded “not
    true” to the alleged violations of his community supervision.
    The State called David Getrost, a criminal investigator for the Bexar County District
    Attorney’s Office. Getrost testified that in September 2006, it came to his attention that
    images of A.H. had been posted on a website called oneclickchicks.com. Getrost testified
    that in order to access the oneclickchicks.com, a person must create a username, verify
    that the person is over eighteen years of age, and provide the address to an active e-mail
    account. At the time an account is created, the website sends an e-mail to the e-mail
    address provided, and the user must access his e-mail account and click a link in the e-
    mail to “activate” the account. The user then can browse and post pictures on the website.
    Getrost went to the website and printed the images that appeared. The State
    3
    offered State’s Exhibit 1, which Getrost testified were “the pages of the web page that [he]
    captured and printed out depicting when images were posted to this website.” State’s
    Exhibit 1 shows postings on an internet forum on several dates in September 2006 by a
    user named “stoneman77." On September 9, 2006, a posting states, “This is [A.H.] at 19,”
    and includes ten pictures of A.H. in various positions either naked or wearing lingerie. On
    September 17, 2006, another posting by stoneman77 titled, “More of my Ex-girlfriend,”
    states, “These are the last ones I am going to post so let me know what you think.” The
    pictures attached include four naked pictures of A.H. In one of the pictures, A.H. is
    touching her vagina, apparently masturbating. When asked if it was “fair to say that
    whoever—the person who uploads these photos has care, custody and control of these
    photos on this website?,” Getrost responded, “Yes.”
    Getrost testified that he contacted a company called Cheshire Web, who owns the
    website oneclickchicks.com. He provided Cheshire Web information as to the user name
    on the web page to “ascertain any type of identifiers, IP addresses and so forth that they
    would have along with dates and times these pictures were uploaded to that web server.”
    Getrost testified that Cheshire Web informed him that the account for “stoneman77" was
    created on September 8, 2006, using an e-mail address of “jwroller@yahoo.com.”
    Cheshire provided Getrost with a CD of pictures that were posted by stoneman77
    on oneclickchicks.com. The photos were printed and admitted into evidence as State’s
    Exhibit 9. Exhibit 9 includes, among others, sixteen pictures depicting A.H. in various
    positions, either naked or wearing lingerie. One of the pictures shows her performing
    fellatio on a man whose face is not shown.
    Getrost stated that he then subpoenaed records from Yahoo!. Yahoo! responded
    4
    and informed Getrost that the e-mail account, jwroller@yahoo.com, was created on July
    26, 2000 and that the full name used to create the account was “Mr. Patricia Benavides.”
    Yahoo! provided a New Braunfels address with a New Braunfels telephone number,
    showed that the account was active at that time, and provided a subscriber information
    page. Getrost located and spoke to Patricia Benavides, who provided a statement.
    Benavides informed Getrost that at one time, she had been Roller’s supervisor while
    working at the attorney general’s office. She claimed to be unaware of the e-mail account.
    Yahoo!’s records were admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 5. As part of the
    records, Yahoo! provided a “Login Tracker” that showed that the user “jwroller” accessed
    the e-mail account on several dates in May and June of 2007. The records also provided
    an IP address. Getrost testified that he contacted AT&T in June of 2007, to attempt to
    locate the computer that posted the images on oneclickchicks.com by tracking the IP
    address, but AT&T responded that it no longer had the relevant records.
    Next, the State called Lee Swafford, who testified that he is a Secret Service agent.
    He administered a polygraph test to Roller on January 30, 2009, with Roller and his
    attorney’s consent. Swafford stated that Roller told him that jwroller@yahoo.com was his
    e-mail account.
    Finally, A.H. testified. A.H. stated that before she got married in 2007, she told her
    future husband about her history with Roller and that he had posted pictures of her on the
    Internet. Her husband was concerned and placed a “Google alert,” which she described
    as follows:
    And so to kind of monitor, I guess, if any other activity was going on, he did
    what they call a Google alert where they send—because of my unique
    spelling in my name and my last name, he would do a Google alert where if
    5
    my name ever popped up or anything affiliated with it, it would come through
    and pop up on our e-mail account. And one day he was checking his e-mail
    and this evidence popped up, this particular website.
    A.H. stated that her husband went to the website, but he had to create an account to view
    the pictures. A.H. said that “[a]fter seeing the first picture, he immediately closed it and
    called [her].”
    A.H. testified that the pictures in State’s Exhibit 9 were the same that she saw on
    oneclickchicks.com. She further stated that some of the photos in State’s Exhibit 9 were
    the same photos that served as the basis for Roller’s original charge for fraudulent use and
    possession of identifying information. A.H. stated that one photo in State’s Exhibit 9,
    however, was taken during a trip with Roller when the two were dating and was “one that
    only he would have had.” She stated that this particular photo was never posted on
    myspace.com, so it was not one that someone could have pulled off the internet. A.H.
    testified that she was familiar with the e-mail account jwroller@yahoo.com and that she
    had communicated with Roller through that e-mail account.
    The trial court denied Roller’s speedy trial motion, found that the allegations in the
    motion to revoke were “true,” adjudicated Roller guilty of the original charge of fraudulent
    use and possession of identifying information, and sentenced Roller to nine months’
    imprisonment in the state jail. This appeal ensued.
    II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
    By his first issue, Roller argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
    the motion to revoke his community supervision and adjudicating guilt because there was
    no evidence showing: (1) that Roller “possessed” the photographs posted to
    oneclickchicks.com; and (2) that the photographs constituted pornography. We disagree.
    6
    A.       Standard of Review
    We review the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision for abuse of
    discretion. Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The State must
    prove a violation of the terms of community supervision by a preponderance of the
    evidence. 
    Id. The State
    meets its burden when the greater weight of the credible evidence
    creates a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the condition of probation
    has been violated. 
    Id. at 763-64.
    We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    trial court’s judgment. Davila v. State, 
    173 S.W.3d 195
    , 197 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi
    2005, no pet.). “When the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the record must
    simply contain some evidence to support the decision made by the trial court.” 
    Id. B. Possession
    First, Roller argues that there is no evidence in the record to show that he
    possessed pornographic materials as that term is defined by the order granting community
    supervision. The terms of Roller’s community supervision stated, “You shall not possess
    any contraband in your home, vehicle, or on your person, including, but not limited
    to . . . pornographic materials . . . .” Roller argues that this provision
    did not prohibit him from having access to pornographic material through an
    e-mail[-]linked internet site that contained what were shown to be pictures of
    [his] ex-girlfriend . . . . The State may have demonstrated that the appellant
    had access to the materials in dispute[, but] they wholly failed to demonstrate
    that he possessed them in a manner prohibited by the order of the trial court.
    Neither party cites any case that interprets a provision such as this one, and we have not
    located any.
    Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word “possession” as follows: “the act of
    having     or   taking   into   control.”    See    Merriam-Webster       Online   Dictionary,
    7
    http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/possession (last visited June 21, 2010). The
    Texas Penal Code likewise defines possession as “actual care, custody, control, or
    management.” TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 1.07(39) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
    Getrost testified that a person with the username “stoneman77" posted the images
    in State’s Exhibit 9 to the website oneclickchicks.com in September 2006. A.H. testified
    that one of the photographs was taken by Roller during their relationship, that the photo
    was in Roller’s exclusive possession, and that prior to the posting on oneclickchicks.com,
    the picture was not available on the internet. That photo was posted along with other
    photos to oneclickchicks.com by a user with an e-mail address admittedly owned by Roller.
    When asked if it was “fair to say that whoever—the person who uploads these photos has
    care, custody and control of these photos on this website?,” Getrost responded, “Yes.”
    We hold that this testimony was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Roller
    possessed, although in electronic format, these photos on his person at the time they were
    uploaded to the internet. Accordingly, we overrule Roller’s argument.
    C.     Pornography
    Second, Roller argues that the State did not demonstrate that the photographs were
    pornographic. Specifically, Roller argues that the State was required to put on testimony
    showing that (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
    find that the work taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (2) the work
    depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as specifically defined; and
    (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
    8
    See 
    id. § 43.21(a)(1)
    (Vernon 2003).2 He argues that the State cannot satisfy this burden
    by merely presenting the photos to the trial court without any other evidence to support a
    finding that the materials were pornographic. We disagree.
    Roller cites no authority for his argument that the State needed to offer anything
    more than the photographs to show that they were pornographic in nature. In fact, “[i]n
    cases involving hard-core pornography, the trier of fact needs no expert advice,” and the
    alleged pornographic material itself can support a finding that the material is pornographic.
    Rees v. State, 
    909 S.W.2d 264
    , 270 (Tex. App.–Austin 1995, pet. ref’d); Ho v. State, 
    856 S.W.2d 495
    , 500 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (“[W]here the items charged
    as obscene are introduced and admitted into evidence, the State is not required to
    introduce testimony as affirmative evidence of community standards.”). As described
    above, the photos show A.H. masturbating and performing fellatio on an unidentified man.
    Thus, there was some evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the photos were
    2
    Section 43.21(a)(1) defines “obscene” m aterial as m aterial that:
    (A)        the average person, applying contem porary com m unity standards, would find that
    taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
    (B)        depicts or describes:
    (i)      patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultim ate sexual acts,
    norm al or perverted, actual or sim ulated, including sexual intercourse,
    sodom y, and sexual bestiality; or
    (ii)     patently offensive representations or descriptions of m asturbation, excretory
    functions, sadism , m asochism , lewd exhibition of the genitals, the m ale or
    fem ale genitals in a state of sexual stim ulation or arousal, covered m ale
    genitals in a discernibly turgid state or a device designed and m arketed as
    useful prim arily for stim ulation of the hum an genital organs; and
    (C)        taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value.
    T EX . P EN AL C OD E A N N . § 43.21(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).
    9
    pornographic. See 
    Ho, 856 S.W.2d at 500
    . Roller’s first issue is overruled.
    III. SPEEDY TRIAL
    By his second issue, Roller argues that the trial court erred by denying his speedy-
    trial motion. The State argues that in Texas, a speedy trial inquiry is triggered by an
    unreasonable delay between the time of arrest and the time of formal accusation. Here,
    the State argues, there was no unreasonable delay because the motion to revoke was filed
    on November 6, 2008, and was heard on February 26, 2009. We agree with the State.
    In Martinez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed a situation
    similar to the instant case. See generally 
    531 S.W.2d 343
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). In that
    case, on April 9, 1973, Martinez pleaded guilty to burglary and was placed on community
    supervision for three years. 
    Id. at 344.
    Martinez was convicted of DWI on September 4,
    1973. 
    Id. On January
    16, 1975, the State filed a motion to revoke Martinez’s probation
    based on the DWI conviction, and the trial court held a hearing on that motion one month
    later. 
    Id. at 345.
    On appeal, Martinez argued that he was denied the right to a speedy trial
    because of the seventeen-month delay between the violation of his probation and the filing
    of the motion to revoke. 
    Id. The court
    of criminal appeals disagreed, holding that “an
    accused's right to a speedy trial does not attach until he first becomes the accused.” Id.;
    see also Cavazos v. State, No. 04-98-01054-CR, 
    2000 WL 124911
    , at *2 (Tex. App.–San
    Antonio Feb. 2, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“Because a defendant
    becomes an ‘accused’ at the moment the motion to revoke probation is filed, the timetable
    for speedy trial rights commences on that date.”).
    In this case, the delay between the motion to revoke and the hearing on that motion
    10
    was less than four months. “The length of the delay is, to some extent, a triggering
    mechanism, so that a speedy trial claim will not be heard until passage of a period of time
    that is prima facie unreasonable under the circumstances.” See Shaw v. State, 
    177 S.W.3d 883
    , 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Generally, delay is not deemed unreasonable
    until it approaches one year. 
    Id. We hold
    that Roller has not shown an unreasonable
    delay, and accordingly, we overrule his second issue. See 
    id. IV. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled both of Roller’s issues, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    __________________________
    GINA M. BENAVIDES,
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    See TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered and filed the
    15th day of July, 2010.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-09-00175-CR

Filed Date: 7/15/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015