Wesley Joseph Hogan v. State ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-11-00535-CR
    Wesley Joseph HOGAN,
    Appellant
    v.
    The STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2009CR2706B
    Honorable Angus McGinty, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:      Rebecca Simmons, Justice
    Sitting:         Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Rebecca Simmons, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: August 1, 2012
    AFFIRMED
    Appellant Wesley Joseph Hogan pleaded no contest to sexual assault. Hogan and the
    State agreed to all of the terms of a plea bargain except for the issue of the amount of restitution.
    The trial court held a hearing on restitution and ordered Hogan to pay the victim $6,000.00. In
    his sole issue on appeal, Hogan contends the trial court abused its discretion in setting restitution
    at $6,000.00. 1 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    1
    Hogan agreed to pay restitution in his signed plea agreement. However, the State and Hogan could not agree to the
    amount. Thus, Hogan does not challenge the applicability of restitution; rather, he challenges only the amount.
    04-11-00535-CR
    BACKGROUND
    The facts regarding the underlying offense are undisputed. On November 1, 2005, Hogan
    and another man broke into the home of C.R. The men tied up C.R. and her children and waited
    for C.R.’s husband to return home. 2 While the men were waiting, Hogan sexually assaulted C.R.
    When the husband returned, Hogan and his accomplice robbed the family. Before the men fled
    the scene, C.R.’s husband escaped from the house, ran to a store, and called 911.
    When the police arrived, C.R. and her husband reported that among the items stolen were
    cash; a DVD player; two televisions; jewelry; and the stereos, amplifiers, and speakers from five
    vehicles parked on the premises.
    Hogan was subsequently arrested and pleaded no contest to sexual assault. C.R. was the
    sole witness to testify at the hearing on restitution. C.R. described to the court the stolen
    property. She testified that she and her husband had lost all of the receipts when they moved
    from their home. She also testified that the total value of all of the property stolen by Hogan
    amounted to approximately $8,000.00. She used a list prepared by her husband to estimate the
    value of the total property loss. The list was admitted into evidence without objection. The
    court ordered restitution of $6,000.00 to be paid to C.R. and her husband.
    RESTITUTION
    On appeal, Hogan asserts the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the
    amount of $6,000.00 because the amount was not supported by a factual basis. Specifically, he
    argues that because C.R. had no personal knowledge of the value of the property, the trial court
    was presented with insufficient evidence to support the restitution amount.
    2
    To protect the identity of the victim, we will use the initials “C.R.” throughout the opinion. At the time of the
    offense, C.R. and her boyfriend were not yet married. Prior to trial they were wed. For clarity, we will refer to the
    male victim as C.R.’s husband.
    -2-
    04-11-00535-CR
    A sentencing court is authorized to order a defendant to pay restitution to the victim of an
    offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 42.037(a) (West Supp. 2011); Idowu v. State, 
    73 S.W.3d 918
    , 920 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We review a trial court’s determination of the
    amount of restitution for an abuse of discretion. Campbell v. State, 
    5 S.W.3d 693
    , 696–97 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1999); Reasor v. State, 
    281 S.W.3d 129
    , 135 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet.
    ref’d). Due process implications arise when the amount of restitution is not supported by a
    factual basis. 
    Campbell, 5 S.W.3d at 696
    ; Cartwright v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 287
    , 289 (Tex. Crim.
    App. [Panel Op.] 1980). A witness’s testimony regarding the value of property may be sufficient
    to support a trial court’s restitution order. See Maes v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 68
    , 73 (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio 2008, no pet.); Burris v. State, 
    172 S.W.3d 75
    , 78 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no
    pet.).
    Based on the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting
    restitution at $6,000.00 because the amount was supported by the facts. See 
    Campbell, 5 S.W.3d at 696
    –97; 
    Maes, 275 S.W.3d at 73
    . The trial court had before it (1) the police report identifying
    the objects taken by Hogan, (2) C.R.’s testimony, and (3) a list containing estimated values of the
    property. Hogan did not object to C.R.’s testimony, nor did he object when the State offered into
    evidence the list of estimates prepared by C.R.’s husband. While the list may have been hearsay,
    Hogan did not object to its admission. Thus, the list has probative value. See TEX. R. EVID. 802
    (“Inadmissible hearsay admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely
    because it is hearsay.”); Fernandez v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 451
    , 455–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
    (same). Accordingly, the amount of restitution was supported by a factual basis. See TEX. R.
    EVID. 802; 
    Maes, 275 S.W.3d at 73
    ; 
    Burris, 172 S.W.3d at 78
    .
    -3-
    04-11-00535-CR
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Hogan to pay restitution in the
    amount of $6,000.00. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Rebecca Simmons, Justice
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    -4-