Dedric Adams v. State ( 2012 )

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Opinion issued March 1, 2012



In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-10-00872-CR

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Dedric Adams, Appellant

V.

THE State of Texas, Appellee

On Appeal from the 337th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1163980

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury convicted appellant, Dedric Adams, of injury to a child and assessed his punishment at twenty years’ confinement. [1] In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the trial court improperly limited his opportunity to question the venire.      We affirm.

Background

Appellant was indicted for injury to a child after the death of his two-month-old daughter from injuries apparently caused by severe shaking and blunt force trauma. Appellant was tried before a jury.

Prior to the commencement of voir dire, the trial court instructed the venire that appellant was charged with the offense of injury to a child. During its voir dire, the State elaborated on the meaning of “serious bodily injury” by informing the venire that it “means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that actually causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” The State used several hypothetical scenarios to determine whether any member of the venire would be unable to apply that definition, including a scenario in which someone actually suffered death.

During his voir dire, appellant’s attorney stated, “Now [appellant] is charged with injury to a child resulting in death. Is there anyone who believes that the nature or seriousness of this offense is such that it would make it difficult or impossible for you to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?” The State objected to this question because it revealed a specific fact in the case in violation of Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The trial court sustained the objection.

The following exchange then took place:

[Appellant]:          Does everyone understand that it is normal to get emotional about certain types of cases?

[Venire]:               Yes.

[Appellant]:          And no one is going to hold it against you if you get emotional, but we need to know if you think that your emotions would get in your way with sitting on this case.

[Venireperson]:    Yes.

[Venireperson]:    Yes.

[Trial court]:         Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, understand this: All cases that we come down here on can be very difficult cases for individual jurors. . . . So, sometimes you just have to—we’re adults—put your emotions aside and realize that we’re here to do a civic job, to do a civic duty. . . . And so, I’m just asking each of you to give honest and fair answers; and to the best of your ability, try to put yourself in a frame of mind that you could be a fair and impartial juror in this type of case. . . .

[Appellant]:          What we need to know is, for those of you who said “yes”—and I didn’t get your numbers—do you think you could put your emotions aside, not knowing any of the facts of this case, and decide this case based on the evidence you hear in here?

More than fifteen members of the venire responded that they would be unable to put their emotions aside.

Appellant continued his voir dire by asking questions regarding false allegations of child abuse and using hypothetical situations involving unexplained or natural deaths of children. Appellant subsequently asked to approach the bench and requested that the court allow him to ask the venire whether “everyone understand[s] that just because a child dies does not mean a crime occurred?” The following colloquy occurred:

[Trial court]:         You’re going into the facts of the case? Haven’t you already gone into the facts of the case?

[Appellant]:          Your Honor, the question here is, Your Honor, I’m entitled to know what biases they come into the trial with; and if they’re coming into the trial with a bias that if a child died, a crime must have been committed—

[State]:                 The problem is, Judge, he’s not charged with killing her. It’s not a murder case. It’s not a capital murder case. It’s only injury. Now, obviously, that’s what we intend to prove; but that’s not what this jury can know about at this point. If he wants to say if a baby is injured, has a crime occurred, I think that that might be acceptable. . . .

The State also objected that appellant’s question sought an improper commitment from the jurors based on their opinions regarding the death of a child and based on a specific fact not contained in the indictment. The trial court did not permit the question and noted appellant’s objection. Appellant then proceeded with the remainder of his voir dire.

          Following a trial, the jury convicted appellant of injury to a child and assessed his punishment at twenty years’ confinement. This appeal followed.

Limitation of Voir Dire

In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request to ask the venire whether “everyone understand[s] that just because a child dies does not mean a crime occurred?” The State argues that the trial court properly excluded the question because it “included impermissible facts to form an improper commitment question.” The State also argues that “the phrasing of the question was unduly vague and overbroad[,] merely attempting a global fishing expedition which the trial court may permissibly disallow.”

A. Standard of Review

The trial court has broad discretion over the process of selecting a jury. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Braxton v. State, 226 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d, untimely filed). We therefore review the trial court’s ruling on an allegedly improper question during voir dire for an abuse of discretion. See Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38; Braxton, 226 S.W.3d at 604. A trial court abuses its discretion “only when a proper question about a proper area of inquiry is prohibited.” Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38.

A proper question seeks to discover a juror’s views on an issue applicable to the case. Id.; Watson v. State, 176 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). However, a trial court may prevent a voir-dire question that is so vague or broad in nature as to constitute a global fishing expedition. Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 39; Watson, 176 S.W.3d at 415. A trial court may properly exercise its discretion to “require that parties phrase questions in a way that is precise enough to glean relevant information from the venire member’s answer.” Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 39; Watson, 176 S.W.3d at 415–16. A trial court may also limit voir dire under other circumstances, such as when the questions are duplicative or repetitious. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Guerra v. State, 771 S.W.2d 453, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).

B. Analysis

Appellant sought to ask the venire, “[Does] everyone understand that just because a child dies does not mean a crime occurred?” Thus, the proposed question here seeks to have potential jurors decide whether they would determine that a crime had been committed based on the existence of a particular fact—the death of a child. It is unclear whether any answer to this question would give rise to a valid challenge for cause. Appellant argues that a potential juror who answered in the affirmative (i.e., “yes, a child dying means a crime has been committed”) “could have produced a valid challenge for cause because it would show that a juror, upon hearing the complainant died, would have prematurely decided [a]ppellant’s guilt.” However, the actual question proposed by appellant did not make a direct reference to his guilt or innocence, but instead asked generally about conditions under which potential jurors might believe a crime occurred. See Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 39 (“The trial court may, within its discretion, require that parties phrase questions in a way that is precise enough to glean relevant information from the venire member’s answer.”).

The trial court could have concluded, in its discretion, that the question was phrased too vaguely. In Barajas, the defendant proposed asking the venire members whether they “could be impartial in an indecency case involving a victim who was eight to ten years old or, in the alternative, a victim who was nine years old.” 93 S.W.3d at 38. The court examined various reasons the defendant may have sought to ask that question, and concluded that the question constituted a global fishing expedition. Id. at 41–42 (comparing cases in which questions were “narrowly tailored to an issue relevant to the case” with cases that failed to “seek particular information from a particular panel member” and instead “present[ed] a general topic for discussion” in concluding that appellant’s question was too vague and broad).

Here, the trial court could have determined that the general question whether “everyone understand[s] that just because a child dies does not mean a crime occurred?” did not appear reasonably specific or “calculated to bring out that information which might be said to indicate a juror’s inability to be impartial, truthful, and the like.” See id. at 41 (quoting Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).

We also observe that appellant was allowed to ask other questions regarding the venire members’ ability to put aside the strong emotions raised by cases like this and to provide fair and impartial judgment. Appellant’s attorney asked the venire, “Now [appellant] is charged with injury to a child resulting in death. Is there anyone who believes that the nature or seriousness of this offense is such that it would make it difficult or impossible for you to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?” Although the trial court sustained the State’s objection to this question, it also interjected statements regarding the necessity of having jurors who could sit on emotionally taxing cases, and it allowed appellant to follow up with the question, “Does everyone understand that it is normal to get emotional about certain types of cases?” Appellant was also able to state, “[W]e need to know if you think that your emotions would get in your way with sitting on this case,” and to follow up by asking each venire member, “[D]o you think you could put your emotions aside, not knowing any of the facts of this case, and decide this case based on the evidence you hear in here?” Furthermore, appellant was able to ask the venire multiple questions regarding the venire members’ beliefs about and understanding of infant deaths from natural or unexplained causes—i.e., infant deaths in situations involving no criminal conduct. Thus, the trial court could have determined that appellant’s requested question was duplicative or repetitious. See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 345.

The prosecutor suggested an alternative question by stating, “If he wants to say if a baby is injured, has a crime occurred, I think that that might be acceptable. . . .” Appellant was permitted to continue questioning the venire following the State’s objection to his potential question, but he did not attempt to rephrase and pursue this line of questioning. See Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding, when appellant did not “attempt to determine the basis of the trial court’s ruling” or “attempt to comply with it,” that, “[b]ecause appellant did not follow through on this topic, we cannot say that the trial court improperly restricted his voir dire of this venire member”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Coleman v. State, No. AP-75478, 2009 WL 4696064, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2009) (not designated for publication) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071).

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow appellant to ask his requested question. See Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38.

We overrule appellant’s sole point of error.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                   Evelyn V. Keyes

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

[1]           See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 2011).