City of Boerne v. David Vaughan and Vaughan's Hill Country Funeral Home, Inc. ( 2012 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-12-00177-CV
CITY OF BOERNE,
Appellant
v.
David VAUGHAN and Vaughan’s Hill Country Funeral Home, Inc.,
Appellees
From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009-CI-17409
Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 11, 2012
REVERSED AND RENDERED
The City of Boerne appeals the trial court’s order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and
affording appellees, David Vaughan and Vaughan’s Hill Country Funeral Home, Inc.
(collectively “Vaughan”), an opportunity to amend their pleadings. Because Vaughan’s
pleadings affirmatively demonstrate that no cause of action exists for which the City’s immunity
is waived, the trial court erred in affording Vaughan the opportunity to amend. We reverse the
trial court’s order and dismiss the underlying claims against the City.
04-12-00177-CV
BACKGROUND
Vaughan was an independent contractor engaged by the City as a cemetery sexton for the
Boerne Cemetery. Vaughan sold two cemetery plots to Debbie Thomas after verifying the
availability of the plots with the City. Thomas’s husband was buried in one of the plots. Eight
years later, the City discovered that the plot in which Thomas’s husband was buried had
previously been sold to another person.
After unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a resolution of the matter, the City and
Vaughan, without any prior notice to Thomas, disinterred the remains of Thomas’s husband from
the plot and reinterred the remains in another section of the Boerne Cemetery. Thomas sued
Vaughan alleging breach of contract and numerous other tort claims. Vaughan filed a third-party
petition against the City for indemnity and contribution, asserting the plot was sold by Vaughan
to Thomas based on the City’s representation that the plot was available and that the remains of
Thomas’s husband were moved by the City based on the City’s decision.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction. Vaughan responded that the City waived its
immunity because Vaughan was merely acting as the City’s agent when he signed the contract to
sell the plot to Thomas. Vaughan further responded that the City was engaged in a proprietary
function for which it is not entitled to immunity. After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea,
but ordered Vaughan to amend his pleadings. Before Vaughan’s deadline for amending his
pleadings, the City filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (West Supp. 2011) (interlocutory appeal from order denying
plea to the jurisdiction stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of the
appeal).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Immunity from suit deprives a trial court of jurisdiction.” City of Houston v. Williams,
353 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. 2011). “Whether a trial court possesses jurisdiction is a question of
law we review de novo.” Id.
“The trial court must determine at its earliest opportunity whether it has the constitutional
or statutory authority to decide the case before allowing the litigation to proceed.” Tex. Dept. of
Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). “When a plea to the jurisdiction
challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively
demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id. “We construe the pleadings liberally
in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders’ intent.” Id. “If the pleadings do not contain
sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively
demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the
plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend.” Id. at 226-27. An incurable defect
exists if “the petition affirmatively demonstrates that no cause of action exists or that plaintiff’s
recovery is barred.” Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1989).
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Liability of an Agent
In its response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, Vaughan asserted that the City
waived its immunity by entering into a contract with Thomas for the sale of the cemetery plots at
issue. Vaughan contends that because he was acting as the City’s agent in entering into the
contract, he is entitled to indemnity. Under ordinary principles of agency involving private
litigants, this is a correct proposition. See Ross F. Meriwether & Assocs., Inc. v. Aulbach, 686
S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ).
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Here, however, the litigation involves private litigants and a governmental entity, and that
distinction is significant. The City’s immunity is waived as to breach of contract claims only if
the contract is for the provision of goods and services to the City. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
ANN. §§ 271.152, 271.151(2) (West 2005). Because the contract relating to the sale of the
cemetery plots to Thomas was not a contract for the provision of goods and services to the City,
Vaughan cannot allege facts that would establish a waiver of immunity for this claim. See id.;
see also Tex. A&M Univ. v. Bading, 236 S.W.3d 801, 802-03 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007), pet.
denied, Zachary Const. Corp. v. Tex. A&M Univ., 298 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. 2009) (holding
university immune from claims seeking contribution and/or indemnity). Accordingly, Vaughan
cannot establish jurisdiction under a breach of contract theory.
TORTS
Proprietary v. Governmental Functions
A governmental entity’s liability for its tortious conduct often depends in part on whether
the entity’s conduct involved a proprietary or governmental function. When a municipality
commits a tort while engaged in a proprietary function, it is liable to the same extent as a private
entity or individual. Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006); Martinez v. City
of San Antonio, 220 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). When a
municipality commits a tort while engaged in a governmental function, its liability is determined
by the provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Martinez, 220 S.W.3d at 14. Vaughan contends
that selling cemetery plots is a proprietary function; therefore, the City is not immune from suit.
Legislative Determination of Governmental Function
Although in certain cases a court must consider the classification of a function as either
proprietary or governmental, such classification is not necessary if the function is defined by
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statute. Martinez, 220 S.W.3d at 14. The Texas Constitution authorizes the Legislature to define
for all purposes those functions of a municipality that are to be considered governmental and
those that are proprietary, including reclassifying a function’s classification assigned under prior
statute or common law. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 13; Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343. For purposes of
tort liability, the Legislature has statutorily included “cemeteries and cemetery care” among a
municipality’s governmental functions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(5)
(West 2011). Moreover, the Legislature has expressly provided that proprietary functions of
a municipality do not include those governmental activities listed in the statute. Id. at
§ 101.0215(c). Therefore, the Legislature has given deference to the judiciary to interpret what
constitutes a proprietary function only to the extent it is not listed in the statute. Herschbach v.
City of Corpus Christi, 883 S.W.2d 720, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); see
also Martinez, 220 S.W.3d at 14.
Sale of Cemetery Plots as Governmental or Proprietary Function
Vaughan argues that although the statute includes “cemeteries and cemetery care” as a
governmental function, selling cemetery plots is proprietary. In support of this argument
Vaughan relies on City of Corpus Christi v. Absolute Indus., 120 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2001, pet. denied). In the Corpus Christi case, however, the city relied on the statutory
listing of “garbage and solid waste removal, collection, and disposal” to argue that it was
immune from a claim against it for intentionally interfering with a contract between a private
company and a refinery. Id. at 2. The court disagreed and held that the actions about which the
private company complained did not center on the removal, collection, or disposal of solid waste,
but on the city’s interference with contractual relations. Id. at 3. The court reasoned that the fact
that the contract at issue pertained to solid waste disposal was irrelevant. Id. at 3.
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In the instant case, the complaint centers directly on the City’s actions in relation to the
cemetery, specifically the sale of a plot previously sold to another person and the disinterring of
remains from the cemetery. Accordingly, the cited case is readily distinguishable from the
instant case. Furthermore, we note that a plaintiff may not “‘split various aspects of [a
municipality’s] operation into discrete functions and recharacterize certain of those functions as
proprietary.’” Martinez, 220 S.W.3d at 15 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Butler, 131 S.W.3d
170, 178 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied)). Therefore, Vaughan is precluded from
splitting the sale of cemetery plots from the City’s operation of the cemetery to argue that the
selling of cemetery plots is proprietary. See id.
Waiver of City’s Immunity
Because the City’s actions related to a governmental function, Vaughan was required to
allege facts that would show a waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Martinez,
220 S.W.3d at 14. Vaughan attempts to do this by asserting that Thomas’s claims in this case
were for personal injury “caused by a condition or use of” real property. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (West 2011). Even if we ignore that Vaughan’s claims against
the City are not the same as Thomas’s claims against Vaughan, see Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. City
of Floresville Power & Light Sys., 53 S.W.3d 447, 455 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.)
(noting waiver of immunity must be examined based on cross-claim brought by defendant
against governmental entity not on claim brought by plaintiff against defendant), Vaughan’s
argument would still fail. In order for immunity to be waived under this section of the statute, a
premises condition must actually be the instrumentality that causes the plaintiff’s harm. San
Antonio State Hosp. v. Koehler, 981 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
No possible amendment to Vaughan’s pleadings, or to Thomas’s for that matter, could establish
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that a premises condition was the cause of harm alleged in the instant case. Instead, it was
actions taken pertaining to the cemetery plot that allegedly caused the harm, not the cemetery
plot itself. See id.; see also Tex. Dept. of Transp., 53 S.W.3d at 455-56 (holding claim for
indemnity is claim for financial loss not personal injury damages).
CONCLUSION
We are cognizant of the distress that can arise from an unwanted disinterment of a loved
one’s remains. Likewise, we are aware of an agent’s frustration when the agent is sued for
actions taken based on information provided by a principal, especially where the principal admits
its fault in providing erroneous information to the agent. However, policy considerations
reviewed by the Legislature favor governmental immunity, and we are obligated to apply the
Legislature’s enactments.
Because the pleadings in this case affirmatively demonstrate that no cause of action exists
for which the City’s immunity is waived, the trial court erred in denying the plea to the
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed, and the claims against the City are
dismissed.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
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