John Murray Bennett v. State ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-09-00437-CR
JOHN MURRAY APPELLANT
BENNETT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
------------
FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
------------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
------------
I. Introduction
In a sole point, Appellant John Murray Bennett appeals from the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Procedural History
Bennett was charged with DWI-felony repetition. The trial court carried
Bennett’s motion to suppress until trial and held a suppression hearing during
Azle Police Officer Rusty Wingate’s testimony, discussed below. Following the
hearing, the trial court denied the motion and proceeded with trial. The jury
convicted Bennett of felony DWI, the trial court assessed five years’ confinement
as punishment, and this appeal followed.
III. Discussion
Bennett argues that the trial court erred by finding that his detention was
properly supported by the evidence and by denying his motion to suppress.
A. Community Caretaking Function
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede v. State, 214
S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). An officer’s community caretaking
function is a narrowly applied exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Under the community caretaking exception, an officer may stop and assist an
individual whom a reasonable person would believe is in need of help given the
totality of the circumstances. Id. However, in order to invoke his community
caretaking function, the officer’s primary motive must be concern for the
individual’s well-being. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
2
Determining whether the officer properly invoked his community caretaking
function is a two-step process. Swaffer v. State, 258 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277). We must
first determine whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community
caretaking purpose and then whether the officer’s belief that his assistance was
required was reasonable. Swaffer, 258 S.W.3d at 260–61. Then we consider
these non-exclusive factors: (1) the nature and level of distress exhibited by the
individual; (2) the individual’s location; (3) whether the individual was alone or
had other access to assistance besides that of the officer; and (4) to what extent
the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Wright, 7
S.W.3d at 151–52. The first factor is entitled to the greatest weight. Corbin, 85
S.W.3d at 277.
B. Analysis
During the suppression hearing, Officer Wingate testified that on the night
of November 5, 2006, during his conversation with two pedestrians who had
been walking in the street ―right down a hill from where the accident occurred . . .
a vehicle . . . [a] guy stops me and says, hey, a guy wrecked out on his
motorcycle, you need to go check on him.‖ He stated that he stopped Bennett
because he thought an accident had occurred and that the parties involved were
in distress and that ―[i]f anyone had come around that blind corner where they[2]
2
There were two people on the motorcycle. The parties do not dispute that
Bennett was the driver.
3
were stalled out there, it would have been easy for them to have been r[u]n over.‖
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court overruled Bennett’s
objection.
During trial, Officer Wingate added that the streets were wet and slippery
that night and that he learned of the motorcycle accident, which was about a
block away from his location, around 8:00 p.m. The DVD from his patrol unit’s
dashboard camera, which was admitted in evidence and published to the jury
during his testimony, shows that the roads were wet, that it was very dark, that
Bennett pulled into a parking lot shortly after restarting his motorcycle, and that a
highway road sign warns of curves in the road just beyond the parking lot
entrance.
The trial court reasonably could have found that Officer Wingate was
primarily motivated by his community caretaking function because Officer
Wingate testified that he stopped Bennett and his passenger because they
appeared to be in distress and that he ―was unsure if anyone was hurt or not.‖
See Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277; Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet ref’d).
Furthermore, the trial court could have reasonably found that the Wright
factors support a finding that Officer Wingate acted reasonably in stopping
Bennett to determine if he needed help because Officer Wingate could have
concluded that Bennett did not have access to assistance; Bennett’s passenger
was also involved in the accident; the accident occurred at night; and,
4
immediately after the accident, Bennett pulled into an empty parking lot. We
conclude that Officer Wingate’s exercise of his community caretaking function
was reasonable; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Bennett’s motion
to suppress. We overrule Bennett’s sole point.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Bennett’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BOB MCCOY
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: January 27, 2011
5