Olivia Salinas, Individually, and on Behalf of the Estate of Francisca Perez v. Christus Spohn Hospital Memorial ( 2010 )


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  •                             NUMBER 13-09-260-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    OLIVIA SALINAS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND                                        Appellant,
    ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF
    FRANCISCA PEREZ, DECEASED, ET AL.,
    v.
    CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL
    MEMORIAL, ET AL.,                                                        Appellees.
    On appeal from the 94th District Court
    of Nueces County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Vela
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
    Appellant, Olivia Salinas, individually, and on behalf of the estate of Francisca
    Perez, deceased, and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries of Francisca Perez,
    deceased, including, but not limited to, Olivia Salinas, Esparanza Gonzales, Julian
    Camacho and Manuel Camacho, filed suit alleging health care liability claims against
    Christus Spohn Hospital Memorial, Christus Spohn Hospital Corpus Christi, Christus Spohn
    Health System Corporation doing business as Spohn Memorial Hospital, Christus Spohn
    Hospital Memorial, Christus Spohn Hospital Corpus Christi, Christus Spohn Health System
    Corporation, Christus Spohn Health System, Spohn Memorial Hospital (collectively
    “Christus Spohn”), George Magel, M.D., Danell Stuckey, M.D., Robert Caro, M.D., and
    Darrick Nelson, M.D. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    The trial court entered an order of non-suit disposing of the claims against Drs.
    Magel, Stuckey, Caro, and Nelson on January 24, 2009. On February 9, 2009, the trial
    court granted Spohn’s plea to the jurisdiction.       The order granting the plea to the
    jurisdiction, when combined with the earlier order of non-suit, disposed of all parties and
    issues in this case. Accordingly, the operative date for determining this Court’s jurisdiction
    is February 9, 2009.     See TEX . R. CIV. P. 306a.       On March 12, 2009, appellants
    electronically filed their motion for reconsideration and new trial. Appellant’s notice of
    appeal was electronically filed on May 8, 2009.
    This Court sent a defect letter to appellant, notifying her that it appeared that the
    notice of appeal was late because the motion for new trial was untimely. Appellant was
    required to file a motion for new trial within thirty days after the judgment was signed. 
    Id. at R.
    329b(a). Appellant’s deadline for filing the motion for new trial was March 11, 2009.
    
    Id. at R.
    4. Rule 306a(1) provides that the “date of judgment or order is signed as shown
    of record shall determine the beginning of the periods prescribed by these rules for the
    court’s plenary power to grant a new trial . . .” 
    Id. at R.
    306a(1). Likewise, Texas Rule of
    2
    Civil Procedure 329b(a) provides that “[a] motion for new trial, if filed, shall be filed prior to
    or within thirty days after the judgment or other order complained of is signed.” 
    Id. at R.
    329b(a). Further, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 provides that the deadline for
    any motion is calculated from the signing of the judgment. See TEX . R. APP. P. 26.1(a).
    Appellant responded to the notice of defect, arguing that because the trial court
    notified her of its grant of the plea to the jurisdiction by facsimile on February 10, 2009,
    “three days were added to the time period for filing a motion for new trial.” This is incorrect
    because it ignores the clear dictates of rules 306a and 329b(a) of the rules of civil
    procedure and rule 26.1 of the appellate rules. Similarly, appellant’s reliance on the Waco
    court’s decision in In re Marriage of Brown,187 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. App.–Waco 2006, no
    pet.) is not persuasive. In Brown, the motion for new trial was timely filed pursuant to the
    mailbox rule. 
    Id. at 144.
    Here, however, the motion for new trial was electronically filed
    one day late. An untimely filed motion for new trial does not extend the deadline for
    appeal. See TEX . R. CIV. P. 329b(a) (providing that a motion for new trial “shall” be filed
    within thirty days after the judgment is signed).
    Because the motion for new trial was untimely, appellant’s notice of appeal was also
    untimely. See TEX . R. APP. P. 26.1(a). Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to consider
    this appeal and dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction.
    ROSE VELA
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the 25th
    day of February, 2010.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-09-00260-CV

Filed Date: 2/25/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015