Cameron Michelle Lawson v. State ( 2011 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-10-00684-CR
Cameron Michelle LAWSON,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 301497
Honorable Karen Crouch, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 14, 2011
AFFIRMED
Cameron Lawson appeals her conviction for the offense of evading arrest or detention.
In two issues, Lawson claims the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and that she
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On September 1, 2009, members of the San Antonio Police Department executed a “no-
knock” search warrant on a residence suspected of manufacturing methamphetamine. Officers
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arrived at the residence at approximately 9:00 a.m., driving a vehicle marked as an official San
Antonio Police Department vehicle. The team of officers did not use a covert approach to
execute the warrant because they were aware that the residence had multiple security cameras.
The officers approached the residence in a methodical, predetermined manner, wearing attire
visibly identifying themselves as the police. The officer responsible for serving the search
warrant, James Foster, wore a standard San Antonio Police Department uniform, while the five
officers responsible for executing the warrant wore protective suits underneath vests bearing the
word “POLICE” in large letters on both the front and back.
When the officers reached the front door of the residence, they entered the residence with
a battering ram and shouted “Police! Search Warrant!” to notify the occupants of their official
presence. The officers immediately began searching for the residence’s occupants because they
needed to detain them and ascertain whether they possessed weapons or contraband. Several of
the officers heard footsteps following their show of authority and proceeded upstairs to
investigate. Detective Chris Losha knocked loudly on a locked bedroom door and shouted
“Police! Search Warrant!” Receiving no response from anyone, Detective Losha breached the
bedroom door and shouted that he was with the police and had a search warrant for the residence.
The bedroom appeared empty when Detective Losha and the other officers entered the
locked room. Upon further investigation, however, the officers found a safe room hidden behind
a false wall, which secreted Lawson and several other individuals. When the officers saw the
individuals, one of the officers shouted “Police! Search Warrant! Let me see your hands!” None
of the individuals complied, however. Officers thereafter had to physically remove each of the
individuals from the safe room, including Lawson. Lawson was subsequently charged with
evading arrest or detention.
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Lawson entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to trial. At Lawson’s trial, the officers
who had executed the search warrant gave substantially similar accounts of the events that
transpired on September 1, 2009. Each of the officers testified they had made multiple shows of
authority to which Lawson and the other individuals refused to yield.
Lawson testified in her own defense at trial and gave a different account of the events
than the officers. She testified she was walking past the window when she saw “one guy running
towards the door with a gun and a mask, and two other guys in gray shirts.” Lawson stated she
screamed “gun” and ran upstairs to the safe room with the other occupants of the residence.
Although Lawson testified that she could hear the officers break down the front door and also
heard when the officers came upstairs, Lawson denied hearing any of the officers shout “Police!”
or “Search Warrant!” According to Lawson, she would have opened the door had she known it
was the police. The record shows Lawson had her cell phone with her when she entered the safe
room, but did not attempt to call 9-1-1 even though she thought there were intruders invading the
residence.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Lawson guilty of the charged offense.
Lawson received a probated one-year term of imprisonment and was fined $500 for her conduct.
This appeal followed.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In her first issue on appeal, Lawson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
her conviction for evading arrest or detention. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a) (West
2011) (providing that a person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if she
“intentionally flees from a person [s]he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or
detain [her].”). According to Lawson, the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction
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because the prosecution failed to establish she: (1) knew the individuals entering the residence
were police officers; and (2) was aware that the individuals were attempting to detain her.
During a sufficiency review, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “‘This
Court may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence and . . . substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder.’” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (citation omitted). Thus, we give deference to “‘the responsibility of the trier of fact to
fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (citation omitted). Direct and circumstantial evidence
cases are treated equally during our review of the evidence: “‘Circumstantial evidence is as
probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence
alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.’” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007).
Turning to Lawson’s contention concerning whether the evidence is sufficient to show
that she knew the individuals entering the residence were police officers, we believe there is
ample evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding in this regard. The record shows the
jury heard the officers’ testimony indicating they arrived at the residence driving a vehicle
marked as an official San Antonio Police Department vehicle and wearing clothing clearly
identifying them as the police. The jury also heard that the officers made their official presence
known to the residence’s occupants by repeatedly shouting “Police! Search Warrant!” upon
entering the residence. The jury was well within its bounds to believe the officers’ version of the
events and discredit Lawson’s testimony that she neither heard the officers shouting “Police” nor
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saw anything on the officers’ clothing identifying them as the police. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d
at 750. Moreover, the jury could have concluded that a reasonable person in Lawson’s situation
would have used her cell phone to call 9-1-1 had she truly believed a home invasion was
occurring as opposed to a police raid. We conclude the evidence detailed above, together with
any reasonable deductions or logical inferences drawn from it, is sufficient to allow a jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson knew the individuals entering the residence were police
officers.
As for Lawson’s alternative sufficiency complaint, we are likewise unpersuaded.
Lawson claims that even if she knew the individuals raiding the residence were police officers,
there is no evidence showing that she was aware the officers were attempting to arrest or detain
her. The jury could have determined that when the officers made their initial show of authority
by shouting “Police! Search Warrant!,” Lawson was put on notice that the officers were seeking
to detain the occupants of the residence for investigative purposes. When the officers continued
to make shows of authority after they entered the residence, the jury could have determined that
it was unreasonable for Lawson to think that the officers were not seeking to detain everyone in
the residence, including her. Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude a jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The instant case presents a factual scenario unlike that presented in Redwine v. State, 305
S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet ref’d), which is the main case cited by
Lawson in support of her sufficiency challenge. There, the evidence showed that sheriff’s
deputies met appellant’s car traveling in the opposite direction on a rural road. Redwine, 305
S.W.3d at 361. The deputies turned their vehicle around and pursued appellant for driving too
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close to the center of the undivided road. Id. “From a distance, they followed appellant’s truck
along the county road and then onto [a] dirt driveway.” Id.
Initially, one of the deputies testified they had activated the patrol car’s emergency lights
and siren. Id. at 364–65. This deputy’s testimony, however, conflicted with the testimony of the
other deputy, who testified the officers opted not to activate the lights and siren so that they
would not prompt the appellant to elude them. Id. at 361. When the officers arrived at the end
of the dirt driveway, they discovered appellant’s unoccupied truck and began shouting “Sheriff”
to identify themselves as peace officers. Id. at 362. Appellant, who had exited the truck and fled
into the woods, returned to his truck after he heard the deputies shouting and was arrested. Id.
On appeal, the State relied on appellant’s written statement showing he had turned onto
the dirt driveway to avoid further contact with the police as evidence appellant knew the deputies
were attempting to arrest or detain him. Id. at 364. The court disagreed, making a distinction
between hoping not to see the deputies again and knowing that the deputies were attempting to
detain him. Id. Central to the court’s analysis was the evidence that suggested the deputies had
not activated their emergency lights or siren. Id. at 365–67. The only evidence that suggested
appellant had failed to yield to a show of authority was the uncertain testimony of the one deputy
regarding the activation of the emergency lights and siren. Id. at 367. Because the deputy
himself was uncertain as to whether the lights and siren were activated, the court concluded there
was legally insufficient evidence that appellant had evaded arrest or detention using a vehicle.
Id. at 367–68. In the absence of other evidence, the court stated that “the jury could not translate
[the deputy’s] uncertainty into belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 368.
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Redwine is thus factually distinguishable from the case at bar because the record in the
present case shows the officers testified consistently that they had made multiple shows of
authority to which Lawson failed to yield. Lawson’s first issue on appeal is therefore overruled.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In her second issue, Lawson claims defense counsel was deficient based upon his failure
to request a jury instruction on a mistake of fact defense. 1 Lawson argues that defense counsel’s
failure to request a mistake of fact instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel
because the evidence allowed for an instruction on mistake of fact and “the result of the trial
would have been different” had the jury heard such an instruction. We disagree.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel entails two components. State v. Morales,
253 S.W.3d 686, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984)). An appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must establish both that her
trial counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Id. For
appellant to meet her burden, she must prove her attorney’s representation fell below the
standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney’s deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Tong v. State,
25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We review the effectiveness of counsel in light of
the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. Thompson v.
State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Even if we assume defense counsel should have requested the mistake of fact instruction,
we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the result of
1
“It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if
[her] mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 8.02(a) (West 2011). “A defendant is entitled to an affirmative defensive instruction on every issue raised by the
evidence regardless of whether the evidence raising the issue is strong, weak, unimpeached, contradicted, or
unbelievable.” Hernandez v. State, 198 S.W.3d 257, 270 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d).
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the proceeding would have been different. Lawson, as her primary defense, testified at trial that
she did not know the men entering the house were police officers because she did not see
anything on the officers’ clothing indicating their police affiliation or hear any of their shouts of
“Police.” Given the nature of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear that the jury was
required to resolve the issue of Lawson’s knowledge concerning the identities of the police
officers before finding her guilty of the alleged offense. The jury’s guilty verdict demonstrates
that the jury rejected Lawson’s version of the facts and thus inferentially resolved the issue that
would have otherwise been addressed via the requested instruction. Because there is no
indication that including a mistake of fact instruction would have changed the outcome of the
proceeding below, we are unpersuaded by Lawson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal. See generally Sands v. State, 64 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.)
(concluding the absence of a mistake of fact instruction did not deprive appellant of the right to
have the jury consider her defense). Lawson’s second issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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