J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. 1) JWJ Management, Inc., Individually and D/B/A Playmates And 2) Joe Wayne Feemster, Individually and D/B/A Playmates ( 2010 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-404-CV
J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC. APPELLANT
V.
1) JWJ MANAGEMENT, INC., APPELLEES
INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A
PLAYMATES; AND 2) JOE WAYNE
FEEMSTER, INDIVIDUALLY AND
D/B/A PLAYMATES
------------
FROM THE 352ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
------------
OPINION
------------
Appellant J&J Sports Productions, Inc. appeals from the trial court‘s
judgment dismissing its claims against Appellees JWJ Management, Inc.
(individually and d/b/a Playmates) (JWJ) and Joe Wayne Feemster (individually
and d/b/a/ Playmates) (Feemster). In one point, J&J Sports argues that the trial
court erred by concluding that the two-year statute of limitations from section
16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code1 applies to its claims.
Because we hold that the two-year statute of limitations does apply, we affirm.
I. Background
J&J Sports was authorized to sub-license the live telecast of a boxing
event held on May 28, 2005. On May 28, 2008, J&J Sports filed suit against JWJ
and Feemster for cable piracy under sections 553 and 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).2 In its petition, J&J Sports alleged that JWJ
and Feemster had shown a closed-circuit telecast of the event in their
commercial establishment without first obtaining the rights to show the event
from J&J Sports.
JWJ and Feemster filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the piracy claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of
limitations provided by civil practice and remedies code section 16.003(a). 3 J&J
Sports argued in response that the trial court should follow the Fifth Circuit‘s
holding in Prostar v. Massachi and apply the three-year statute of limitations
1
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp. 2010).
2
47 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2001) (―No person shall intercept or receive or
assist in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a
cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as
may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.‖); id. § 605 (West 2001) (―No
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.‖).
3
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a).
2
found in the federal Copyright Act.4 The trial court granted JWJ and Feemster‘s
motion, and J&J Sports now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment de novo.5 A defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on an affirmative defense if the defendant conclusively
proves all the elements of the affirmative defense.6 Limitations is an affirmative
defense.7
III. Discussion
Applicable Law
In J&J Sports‘s sole issue, it argues that the trial court erred by concluding
that the two-year limitations period in section 16.003 applies to claims brought
under the FCA, specifically 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. Congress has provided a
four-year limitations period for civil actions arising under federal statutes enacted
after December 1, 1990.8 For federal statutes enacted prior to that time that do
4
See Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 2001); see also 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101–1332 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
5
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844,
848 (Tex. 2009).
6
Chau v. Riddle, 254 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. 2008); see Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(b), (c).
7
Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308
(Tex. 2010).
8
28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 (West 2006); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1845 (2004) (holding that a cause of action
3
not specifically provide an applicable limitations period, the general rule is to
―‗borrow‘ the most closely analogous state limitations period.‖9 Courts have also,
though more rarely, borrowed an analogous federal limitations period in certain
circumstances.10
The United States Supreme Court has discussed at length the analysis
courts should use in determining the applicable statute of limitations for a federal
statute that does not expressly provide an applicable limitations period. In
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, the Court considered the
appropriate statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).11 The Court began
by noting that in the past, it had ―generally concluded that Congress intended that
the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state
law,‖ but that courts are not always required to apply a state statute of limitations
whenever a federal statute is silent on the question of limitations.12 The Court
then articulated the initial inquiry in determining the appropriate limitations period:
―arises under‖ an act after December 1, 1990, ―if the plaintiff‘s claim against the
defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment‖).
9
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson,
545 U.S. 409, 414–15, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 2448 (2005).
10
Id.
11
483 U.S. 143, 144, 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2761 (1987); see also 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1961–1968 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010).
12
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 146, 107 S. Ct. at 2762.
4
―whether all claims arising out of the federal statute ‗should be characterized in
the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon
the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual
case[,]‘‖13 that is, whether one uniform limitations period should be applied to all
claims that arise out of the statute. Once the court has made this determination,
the court must decide whether a federal or state limitations period should apply to
such claims.14 The federal Rules of Decisions Act15 generally requires the
application of a state limitations statute, but in some limited circumstances,
―‗state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement
of federal law,‘‖ and in those circumstances, ―‗it may be inappropriate to conclude
that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or
operation of federal substantive law.‘‖16
The Court stated that ―the mere fact that state law fails to provide a perfect
analogy to the federal cause of action is never itself sufficient to justify the use of
a federal statute of limitations.‖17 But it may be appropriate to borrow a
limitations period from another federal statute ―when a rule from elsewhere in
13
Id. at 147, 107 S. Ct. at 2762.
14
Id.
15
28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (West 2006).
16
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147, 107 S. Ct. at 2762–63 (quoting
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2289 (1983)).
17
Id., 107 S. Ct. at 2763.
5
federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and
when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule
a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.‖18
Due to the nature of RICO claims, the federal courts had been inconsistent
in how they approached selecting a statute of limitations to apply. 19 To be liable
under § 1962 of RICO, a person has to have engaged in a ―pattern of
racketeering,‖ meaning at least two acts of racketeering activity. 20 The term
―racketeering activity‖ encompasses numerous and diverse topics, across many
areas of law, including nine state law felonies and over twenty-five federal
statutes.21 The types of acts constituting ―racketeering activity‖ range from
actions such as mail fraud and embezzlement to acts ―generally associated with
professional criminals such as arson, bribery, theft[,] and political corruption.‖ 22
Thus, in trying to determine which state limitations period applies, a court could
analogize a RICO claim to numerous causes of action with a multiplicity of
applicable limitations periods.23 The Court therefore needed to set a uniform
18
Id. at 148, 107 S. Ct. at 2763 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171–72,
103 S. Ct. at 2294) (emphasis added).
19
Id.
20
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.
21
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 149–50, 107 S. Ct. at 2763–64.
22
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.
23
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 149–50, 107 S. Ct. at 2763–64.
6
statute of limitations for RICO claims to avoid ―intolerable ‗uncertainty and time-
consuming litigation.‘‖24
After determining that it needed to set one uniform limitations period to
apply to all claims arising out of RICO, the Court ultimately concluded that the
applicable limitations period should come from the federal Clayton Act 25 rather
than from state law.26 The Court placed particular importance on the ―similarities
in purpose and structure between RICO and the Clayton Act‖ and ―the clear
legislative intent to pattern RICO‘s civil enforcement provision on the Clayton
Act,‖ which the Court stated ―strongly counsel[ed] in favor of‖ applying the
Clayton Act‘s limitations period.27
The Court remarked that ―[t]his [was] especially true given the lack of any
satisfactory state law analogue to RICO.‖28 Unlike, for example, a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983—the predicate acts of which ―plainly sound[] in tort,‖ making
claims under that statute amenable to the application of a state‘s statute of
24
Id. at 150, 107 S. Ct. at 2764 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
272, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1945 (1985)).
25
15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 2009).
26
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 150, 107 S. Ct. at 2764.
27
Id. at 150–52, 107 S. Ct. at 2764–65.
28
Id. at 152, 107 S. Ct. at 2765.
7
limitations for tort claims—the predicate acts that give rise to a racketeering claim
under RICO ―cannot be reduced to a single generic characterization.‖29
The Court also observed that because of the multi-jurisdictional nature of
RICO cases, the practicalities of litigation provided an additional compelling
reason for applying a federal statute of limitations.30 Not only could a single
claim be subject to multiple limitations periods within a jurisdiction, but because
RICO cases are commonly based on interstate transactions, any one RICO claim
could also be governed by the statute of limitations for multiple states. 31 In
summary, because a claim under RICO could encompass numerous acts that
would be subject to different statutes of limitations within a jurisdiction, the Court
needed to establish a uniform limitations period to apply to all RICO claims. 32
Because a claim could be based on predicate acts that occurred in multiple
jurisdictions, and because the statute itself was clearly patterned on a federal
statute, the limitations period for that federal statute should apply to RICO
claims.33
In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the Court
addressed the applicable statute of limitations for a private suit brought under
29
Id.
30
Id. at 153–54, 107 S. Ct. at 2766.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
8
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5.34 The Court reiterated that borrowing a limitations
period from a federal statute is a closely-circumscribed exception to the general
rule of borrowing from state law.35 From its previous cases, the Court distilled a
three-step, hierarchical inquiry for determining the appropriate limitations
period.36 First, a court must consider the need to establish one uniform
limitations period to apply to the federal cause of action.37 Does the federal
cause of action ―encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics . . .
such that a single state limitations period may not be consistently applied within a
jurisdiction‖?38 If so, ―federal interests in predictability and judicial economy
counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for borrowing
purposes.‖39
Next, a court considers whether to use a state or federal source, giving
particular consideration to the geographical character of the claim—that is, if the
34
501 U.S. 350, 352, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2776 (1991); see 15 U.S.C.A. §
78j(b) (West 2009); 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1990).
35
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 356, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
36
Id. at 356, 111 S. Ct. at 2778–79.
37
Id. at 357, 111 S. Ct. at 2779.
38
Id.
39
Id.
9
claim is multistate in nature.40 The concern is that if a plaintiff‘s claim could be
brought in more than one state, each with a different limitations period, this could
give rise to forum shopping and would ―‗virtually guarantee complex and
expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward matter.‘‖41 We note
that the Court expressed concern about whether a single claim could possibly be
subjected to statutes of limitations in multiple states; the Court made no mention
of concern about whether a plaintiff who pursues claims against different
defendants in separate lawsuits might be subjected to different statutes of
limitations based on where those lawsuits are filed.
As a final consideration, a court looks to see if a federal limitations period
has a ―closer fit‖ than a state law limitations period.42 Even if the multistate
nature of a claim points toward borrowing a federal statute, the court still must
look to see if the analogous federal source truly affords a closer fit with the cause
of action at issue than does any available state-law source.43
The Court once again considered the issue of borrowing in North Star
Steel Co. v. Thomas.44 In that case, the Court determined the applicable statute
of limitations for claims under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining
40
Id.
41
Id. (quoting Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 154, 107 S. Ct. at 2766).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 357–58, 111 S. Ct. at 2779.
44
515 U.S. 29, 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
10
Notification Act (WARN).45 The Court again noted that a statute of limitations
should be borrowed from a federal source, rather than a state source, ―when the
state limitations periods with any claim of relevance would ‗frustrate or interfere
with the implementation of national policies,‘‖ or be ―at odds with the purpose or
operation of federal substantive law,‖46 but that borrowing from a federal source
is a ―‗a closely circumscribed . . . [and] narrow exception to the general rule‘‖ of
borrowing from state law.47 The Court held that the claims at issue ―[fell]
squarely inside the rule, not the exception.‖48
Although the defendants in North Star Steel argued that litigation under
WARN presented a risk of forum shopping, the Court declined to adopt a uniform
federal rule for all WARN claims. The Court acknowledged that ―the practice of
adopting state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action can result in
different limitations periods in different States for the same federal action‖ and
that ―some plaintiffs will canvass the variations and shop around for a forum.‖ 49
But, the Court observed, ―[T]hese are just the costs of the rule itself, and nothing
45
Id. at 31, 115 S. Ct. at 1929; see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101–2109 (West
2009).
46
North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34, 115 S. Ct. at 1931 (quoting DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 161, 103 S. Ct. at 2289, and Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 2455 (1977)).
47
Id. at 34, 115 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488
U.S. 319, 324, 109 S. Ct. 621, 625 (1989)).
48
Id. at 35, 115 S. Ct. at 1931.
49
Id. at 36, 115 S. Ct. at 1931–32.
11
about WARN makes them exorbitant.‖50 That is, the fact that a federal statute
could be subjected to one limitations period in one state but a different limitations
period in another state does not by itself justify adopting a uniform federal
limitations rule for a federal cause of action.
The Court acknowledged that it had previously adopted a uniform federal
rule for RICO claims and that in doing so, it was influenced by the ―practicalities
of litigation‖ of RICO claims.51 But, the Court pointed out, claims under WARN
are based on an act or acts at a single site and, unlike RICO violations, ―do not
‗commonly involve interstate transactions.‘‖52 The Court concluded by holding
that because WARN did not share the ―multistate nature‖ of RICO and is
so relatively simple and narrow in its scope, that ―no [comparable]
practicalities of litigation compel us to search beyond state law for a
more analogous statute of limitations[.]‖ Since, then, a state
counterpart provides a limitations period without frustrating
consequences, it is simply beside the point that even a perfectly
good federal analogue exists.53
Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined the applicable
limitations period for claims under the FCA, the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
have reached the issue. The Fifth Circuit held that the limitations period from the
50
Id. at 36, 115 S. Ct. at 1932.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 36–37, 115 S. Ct. at 1932.
53
Id. at 37, 115 S. Ct. at 1932 (citations omitted).
12
federal Copyright Act applies to civil actions under the FCA.54 In Prostar, the
Fifth Circuit considered whether to apply a Louisiana limitations period to claims
brought under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605.55 The court concluded that the closest
analogue under Louisiana law to the plaintiff‘s cable piracy claim was the tort of
conversion.56 The court declined, however, to apply Louisiana‘s one-year
limitations period for conversion claims. Instead, emphasizing the need for
national uniformity in enforcing the FCA, the court held that the application of
Louisiana conversion law would undermine the implementation of the FCA
because ―[t]he application of state conversion law in each of the fifty states would
result in widely varying limitations periods,‖ which would require national cable
companies to ―‗make fifty separate decisions‘ in their efforts to investigate and
pursue cable policy.‖57 Thus, the court appeared to interpret the ―uniformity‖
consideration set out by the Supreme Court as a consideration of whether
implementation of the cable piracy statutes‘ policies and the practicalities of
litigation required a limitations period that was uniform across jurisdictions, rather
than merely uniform within a jurisdiction. The court concluded that a single
federal standard should apply to cable piracy claims and that the federal
54
Prostar, 239 F.3d at 677.
55
Id. at 671.
56
Id. at 675.
57
Id. at 676–77.
13
Copyright Act provides an appropriate federal law analogue to such claims. 58
Accordingly, the court applied the Copyright Act‘s limitations period of three years
to the cable piracy claims.59
Both the Third and Ninth Circuits reached a different conclusion than the
Fifth Circuit did in Prostar and held that the applicable limitations period should
be one borrowed from state law. In Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Corp. v. 898
Belmont, Inc.,60 the Third Circuit noted that Pennsylvania, the state in which the
claims were brought, has a cable piracy statute similar to the federal statute; that
statute has a two-year statute of limitations.61 Although the plaintiff in that case
argued that the three-year limitations period of the federal Copyright Act should
apply, the Third Circuit determined that no special considerations relevant to
bringing FCA claims would be frustrated by a two-year limitations period.62 The
court observed that ―[t]he overall purpose of the FCA is to ―‗regulat[e] interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make
available . . . to all the people of the United States . . . a rapid efficient . . .
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges[,]‘‖ and that
the specific provisions of §§ 553 and 605 were passed ―to prevent unauthorized
58
Id. at 677.
59
Id. at 678.
60
366 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 2004).
61
Id. at 219.
62
Id. at 225.
14
interception of cable transmissions, including interception through unauthorized
use of decoding devices.‖63 Because there was no evidence that the
practicalities of litigation under those sections required a longer statute of
limitations, and because the application of the state law limitations period did not
frustrate the purpose or implementation of the FCA, the court found no reason to
apply a longer limitations period.64
In DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb,65 the Ninth Circuit determined the statute of
limitations for a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. The court pointed out that California
has a piracy statute ―remarkably similar to § 605 in purpose and structure.‖ 66 In
contrast to the Fifth Circuit‘s analysis in Prostar, the court held that the
consideration of a need for uniformity does not refer to ―a litigant‘s preference for
a single limitations period in multiple lawsuits across multiple jurisdictions.‖ 67 Nor
does the consideration relate to whether the borrowed limitations period should
come from federal rather than state law.68 Rather, the issue of uniformity arises
when the federal cause of action is so complex that ―a single state limitations
63
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151).
64
Id.
65
545 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2008).
66
Id. at 848 (citing Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358, 111 S. Ct. at 2779 (instructing
that ―commonality of purpose and similarity of elements‖ are relevant
considerations when selecting a statute of limitations period to apply)).
67
Id. at 850–51.
68
Id. at 851.
15
period may not be consistently applied within a [single] jurisdiction.‖69 The court
also noted that, in that case, the piracy claims against the defendant were not
multistate in nature in that they did not stem from predicate acts spanning
multiple jurisdictions.70 And furthermore, the court held, ―[G]eographic
considerations do not counsel for the adoption of a federal limitations period less
analogous than a state counterpart.‖71 Thus, the court concluded that the statute
of limitations applicable to the California cable piracy statute should apply to the
plaintiff‘s claims.72
Analysis
We now turn to the claims in this case. J&J Sports argues that this court
should follow Prostar. Precedent of the Fifth Circuit, though persuasive, is not
binding on this court.73 We therefore conduct our own analysis to determine
what limitations period applies.74
J&J Sports contends that Texas does not have a state statute analogous
to the FCA‘s statutory scheme protecting against unauthorized reception of cable
transmissions. J&J Sports is incorrect; unlike Louisiana, Texas has a closer
69
Id. (citing Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357, 111 S. Ct. at 2779).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 848.
73
Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993).
74
See Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848 (reviewing summary judgment de novo).
16
analogue to the federal cable piracy statutes than common law conversion. As
with the federal provisions at issue here, Texas provides for both criminal and
civil liability when a person uses a device to obtain cable or satellite services
without authorization. Under section 31.12 of the penal code, a person commits
an offense of theft of or tampering with multichannel video or information services
if the person, without authorization, intentionally or knowingly uses an
unauthorized access device to obtain services from a multichannel video or
information services provider.75 The term ―access device‖ means ―an access
device, connection, or device wholly or partly designed to make intelligible an
encrypted, encoded, scrambled, or other nonstandard signal carried by a
multichannel video or information services provider.‖76 The term ―multichannel
video or information services provider‖ means ―a licensed cable television
system, video dialtone system, multichannel multipoint distribution services
system, direct broadcast satellite system, or other system providing video or
information services that are distributed by cable, wire, radio frequency, or other
media.‖77 With respect to civil liability for such actions, the Texas Theft Liability
Act (TTLA) makes certain theft offenses subject to civil penalties as well. 78
75
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.12(a)(4) (Vernon 2003).
76
Id. § 31.12(b)(1).
77
Id. § 31.12(b)(3).
78
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 134.001–.005 (Vernon 2005).
17
Section 134.002 specifically provides for a civil cause of action against a person
who commits an offense under section 31.12.79 As with 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and
605, under the TTLA, a plaintiff may recover both actual damages and statutory
damages for a violation of section 31.12.80 Thus, Texas has a state law
analogue that parallels the federal cable piracy statutory scheme. We must now
determine whether we should apply the Texas limitations period applicable to
section 134.002 to J&J Sports‘s federal claims or whether we should instead
borrow from a federal law analogue.
We agree with the reasoning of the Third and Ninth Circuits. The federal
Copyright Act does not truly afford a closer fit to the federal cable piracy statute
than the Texas cable piracy statutory scheme. And the practicalities of litigation
under the cable piracy statute do not make the application of the federal
Copyright Act (or any other federal law) significantly more appropriate.81 The
cable piracy statutory scheme does not address a range of topics and subtopics.
It does not base liability on multiple acts, each with its own limitations period,
creating confusion as to which limitations period should be applied. And the
predicate act or acts that subject a person to liability do not occur across multiple
79
Id. § 134.002.
80
See id. § 134.005(a)(1); see also 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 553(c)(3), 605(e)(3)(C).
81
See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 356, 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (noting that a court
should apply a federal rule only when federal policies at stake and practicalities
of litigation make that rule significantly more appropriate than borrowing a
limitations period from an analogous state law).
18
jurisdictions. Instead, the piracy claims are based on ―a localized violation in a
single jurisdiction.‖82
Furthermore, borrowing Texas‘s two-year statute of limitations does not
frustrate either the purpose or the implementation of the FCA‘s cable piracy
provisions. We agree with the Third Circuit that having a two-year statute of
limitations does not impede the FCA‘s purpose of preventing the unauthorized
interception of cable transmissions, including interception through unauthorized
use of decoding devices.83 Because the federal policies at stake are not
frustrated by applying a two-year statute of limitations, and because the
practicalities of litigation under the FCA‘s cable piracy provisions do not counsel
against borrowing Texas‘s two-year statute of limitations, we decline to follow
Prostar.
J&J Sports argues that cable piracy ―clearly implicates several areas of the
law, such [as] fraud, theft of services, conspiracy to breach contract, unjust
enrichment, or interference with economic advantage.‖ But whereas cable piracy
could possibly be compared to any of these causes of action, proving a claim
under the cable piracy statutory scheme does not require establishing those
82
See DirecTV, Inc., 545 F.3d at 851.
83
See Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Corp., 366 F.3d at 225.
19
other claims. The fact that those other causes of action have varying statutes of
limitations is therefore irrelevant to our analysis.84
J&J Sports also argues that cable signals and satellite communications are
multistate operations. It points out that it is a California corporation with an
exclusive license with a Nevada-based promoter and that the defendants in this
case were in Texas. J&J Sports misconstrues the geographic consideration
requirement set out by the Supreme Court.85 The ―multistate nature‖ of a claim
does not refer to whether the parties are in different jurisdictions. The
consideration relates to whether the predicate acts of the defendant occurred in
different jurisdictions.86 J&J Sports‘s claim is based, as most cable piracy claims
will be, on an act at a single site. And the Supreme Court has pointed out that
even if the claim is multistate in nature, before borrowing a federal limitations
period, a court must determine that an analogous federal source truly affords a
closer fit with the cause of action at issue than does any available state-law
84
Cf. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 149–50, 107 S. Ct. at 2763–64
(discussing RICO, which lists more than thirty acts or offenses and makes the
commission of any two a violation of RICO).
85
See Prostar, 239 F.3d at 676 (determining that Prostar‘s claim illustrated
the ―multistate nature‖ of FCA actions in that Prostar was a Texas corporation
suing for signal piracy conducted in Louisiana).
86
See North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 37, 115 S. Ct. at 1932 (noting that
WARN‘s obligations are triggered by activities that, unlike RICO violations, ―do
not ‗commonly involve interstate transactions‘‖).
20
source.87 The federal Copyright Act does not afford a closer fit to the federal
cable piracy statutes than does the Texas cable piracy statutes.
Section 134.002 of the civil practice and remedies code, which
incorporates section 31.12 of the penal code, is the Texas statute most closely
analogous to the cable piracy provisions of the FCA. Accordingly, we hold that
the statute of limitations applicable to section 134.002 applies to the federal
causes of action asserted here. Under section 16.003(a) of the civil practice and
remedies code, except where otherwise provided, a two-year limitations period
applies to a claim for trespass to or the taking of personal property.88 Because
section 134.002 addresses theft of personal (intangible) property, section
16.003(a) applies to section 134.002 claims. Accordingly, we hold that a two-
year statute of limitations applies here.
J&J Sports brought its claims more than two years after the alleged
unauthorized interception. The trial court therefore did not err by granting JWJ
and Feemster‘s cross-motion for summary judgment based on the application of
the two-year statute of limitations in section 16.003(a).89 We overrule J&J
Sports‘s sole issue.
87
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357–58, 111 S. Ct. at 2779.
88
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003.
89
See Chau, 254 S.W.3d at 455.
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IV. Conclusion
Having overruled J&J Sports‘s sole issue, we affirm the trial court‘s
summary judgment.
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DELIVERED: September 23, 2010
22