City of San Antonio v. James Caruso ( 2011 )

OPINION
No. 04-10-00894-CV
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,
Appellant
v.
James CARUSO, Jason Cosby, Chris Jackson, Janis Vogt, Rogelio Tamez, Stanton Guenther,
James Rea, Michael Ploch, Melisse Turner, Mark Diamond, Ray Bylen, George Wood, Jose
Ledesma, Daniel Martinez, Travis Thornton, Edward Torres, John Chavez, Collis Boone, Allan
Nussbaum, Eddie Shear, Joel Urdiales, Carlos Madero, Jarrard Secrest, Carlos Garcia, Gregory
Galloway, LaSonya Madison, David Reed, Robert Hughes, Robert Salazar, Andrew Lopez, Jose
Montes, Jackie Nelson, and San Antonio Airport Police Officers Association,
Appellees
From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2010-CI-12409
Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 15, 2011
AFFIRMED
This is an interlocutory appeal arising out of a suit for back pay and monetary benefits
brought by the San Antonio Airport Police Officers Association and thirty-two airport police
officers (“Appellees”). The City of San Antonio appeals the partial denial of its plea to the
jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-10-00894-CV
BACKGROUND
Appellees sued the City claiming they were required to work extra hours because they
were “on call” during their lunch and break times, but were not paid overtime. Appellees alleged
violations of section 142.0015(f) of the Texas Local Government Code and sought recovery of
overtime pay pursuant to the statute and for quantum meruit. Appellees also sought a declaratory
judgment that the City was violating chapter 142 of the Texas Local Government Code.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction and asserted the appellees could not “offer any
pleading to support waiver of immunity because there is no clear and unambiguous legislative
waiver of sovereign immunity for the alleged causes of action.” The appellees argued in the trial
court the City’s immunity was waived by section 180.006 of the Texas Local Government Code
for any claim arising under chapters 141, 142, or 143 of the Texas Local Government Code. The
trial court granted the plea on appellees’ quantum meruit and declaratory judgment claims, but
denied the plea as to appellees’ suit for back pay under section 142.0015(f). 1
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bland
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether a trial court possesses
jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. City of Houston v. Williams, No. 09-0770,
2011 WL 923980, at *3 (Tex. Mar. 18, 2011); Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the
pleadings, we determine whether the plaintiff met its burden by pleading facts affirmatively
demonstrating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We
1
All further references to specific chapters or section numbers are to the Local Government Code unless otherwise
noted.
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construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the plaintiff’s intent. Id. The
governmental entity must show that an incurable jurisdictional defect, which appears on the face
of the pleadings renders it impossible for the plaintiff to amend and confer jurisdiction on the
trial court. City of Mont Belvieu v. Enter. Prod. Operating, LP, 222 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Mulvey v. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M., Inc., 147
S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied); Rylander v. Caldwell, 23
S.W.3d 132, 135 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.).
Sovereign Immunity
“‘Sovereign immunity protects the State from lawsuits for money damages.’” Reata
Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006)(quoting Tex. Natural Res.
Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). This immunity, referred to
as governmental immunity, is extended to cities unless it has been waived by the Legislature.
City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Tex. 2007). The “Legislature has mandated that
no statute should be construed to waive immunity absent ‘clear and unambiguous language.’”
Id.; See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West Supp. 2010)(“In order to preserve the
legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute
shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear
and unambiguous language.”); see also Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 370 (Tex.
2006). As a general rule, ambiguity as to waiver is resolved in favor of retaining immunity.
Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 844 (Tex. 2009).
Texas Local Government Code Section 180.006
Appellees contend section 180.006 expressly waives immunity for suits claiming
violations of the police and fire pay provisions in chapters 141, 142, or 143. The City contends
section 180.006 creates a limited waiver of immunity only as to claims for monetary benefits
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brought pursuant to those provisions of chapters 141, 142, and 143 that specifically authorize a
right to recover back pay.
Statutory construction is a question of law. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621,
625 (Tex. 2008). We construe statutory language to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s
intent. Id. “[W]e construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning,
unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to
absurd results.” Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted). Every word included in a statute must be
presumed to have been used for a purpose and every word excluded for a purpose. Laidlaw
Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995); Cameron v. Terrell
and Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981). The statute must be read as a whole and we
interpret it to give effect to every part. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25-
26 (Tex. 2003). We may also consider legislative history in construing a statute whether or not it
is ambiguous. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023(3)(West 2005). With these principles in mind,
we turn to the statute to determine whether the Legislature waived immunity for the appellees’
suit for back pay under section 142.0015(f).
Section 180.006 provides in pertinent part:
(a) This section applies only to a firefighter or police officer covered by:
(1) Chapter 141, 142, or 143 or this chapter;
. . .
(b) A firefighter or police officer described by Subsection (a) who alleges the
employing municipality’s denial of monetary benefits associated with the
recovery of back pay authorized under a provision listed in Subsection (a) . . .
may seek judicial review of such denial only as provided in Subsections (e) and
(f), provided that if there is no applicable grievance, administrative or contractual
appeal procedure available under Subsection (e), the firefighter or police officer
may file suit against the employing municipality directly in district court under
the preponderance of the evidence standard of review.
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(c) Sovereign and governmental immunity of the employing municipality from
suit and liability is waived only to the extent of liability for the monetary benefits
or monetary civil penalties described by Subsection (b).
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 180.006 (West 2008). The City agrees section 180.006 is an
express waiver of immunity for some claims, but contends it waives immunity only for claims
arising under provisions of chapters 141, 142, and 143 that specifically “authorize recovery of
back pay.” Because there is no mention of “back pay” in section 142.0015, nor any express
authorization to recover such back pay, the City contends there is no waiver of immunity for the
recovery of overtime not paid by the City.
Neither party has cited any case that has construed section 180.006. Reading the words
and phrases in context and according to rules of grammar, we understand the statute to waive
immunity for claims to recover monetary benefits that are authorized by a provision of chapter
141, 142, or 143. Appellees here are seeking monetary benefits expressly authorized by section
142.0015(f). Section 180.006(b) does not require an express provision authorizing the recovery
of back pay.
Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of section 180.006, which was
introduced as House Bill 1473. The Urban Affairs Committee report states “[t]he purpose of the
proposed complete committee substitute for House Bill No. 1473 is to make clear that sovereign
or governmental immunity does not bar suit by fire fighters and/or police officers to recover pay
and benefits required by certain statutes, charter provisions and ordinances.” House Comm. on
Urban Affairs, Bill Analysis (substituted), Tex. H.B. 1473, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007). The report
went on to state section 180.006 “grants fire fighters and police officers authority to sue for
monetary benefits, including back pay, under the provisions of the committee substitute.” Id. The
Jurisprudence Committee report states “C.S.H.B. 1473 waives a political subdivision’s sovereign
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immunity for claims arising from an employee alleging violation of a state statute or local
ordinance affecting employment rights or benefits.” Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, Bill
Analysis (substituted), Tex. H.B. 1473, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
By enacting section 180.006, the Legislature waived immunity for suits for monetary
benefits fire fighters and police officers are entitled to receive under provisions of chapters 141,
142, and 143. The appellees affirmatively pled facts demonstrating the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. The trial court order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction on the
appellees’ back pay claim under section 142.0015(f) of the Texas Local Government Code is
affirmed.
Steven C Hilbig, Justice
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