Robert Vernon Hudley v. State ( 2010 )

i i i i i i
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-09-00225-CR
Robert Vernon HUDLEY,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas
Trial Court No. 08-07-00082-CRK
Honorable Ron Carr, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Sitting: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 3, 2010
AFFIRMED
A jury convicted appellant, Robert Vernon Hudley, of assault on a public servant. In a single
issue on appeal, Hudley contends there was evidence at trial that he was guilty only of the lesser-
included offense of assault, and therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to include his requested
instruction on the lesser-included offense in the jury charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
04-09-00225-CR
BACKGROUND
Sergeant James Tanner, a correctional officer employed by the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ) at the Connally Unit, testified that on the morning of January 14, 2008, he was in
uniform and performing his duty of bringing Section 2 inmates off the recreation yard and back into
their cells. He noticed Hudley, a Section 3 inmate, attempt to enter with the Section 2 inmates.
Tanner testified that Hudley was “out of place,” and let Hudley know that he would either send
Hudley back to the recreation yard to wait with the other Section 3 inmates, or write Hudley a
disciplinary report for being out of place. Tanner then asked Hudley for his identification. Hudley
refused to present his identification, which Tanner saw was in his right hand. Tanner held out his
hand as if to say, “give it to me,” and Hudley pushed his hand away and struck Tanner on the right
side of the face. Tanner attempted to place Hudley against the wall. Hudley hit Tanner a few more
times and Tanner struck Hudley three times with a closed fist in an attempt to defend himself.
Correctional Officer Raul Guerra then sprayed both men with tear gas and broke up the fight. Guerra
testified that he witnessed Hudley slap Tanner’s arm away and then punch Tanner in the face. The
only thing Guerra heard was Tanner requesting Hudley’s identification. Further testimony evidenced
that all inmates have identification cards which they are required to carry with them whenever they
are outside their cells. TDCJ staff can demand an inmate’s identification at any time and inmates
can be disciplined for refusing to present their identification cards.
Several inmates observed the altercation and testified on Hudley’s behalf. The first four
inmates could not hear the words, if any, exchanged between Tanner and Hudley because they were
in their cells at the time the fight occurred. Carry Tucker stated that he witnessed Tanner grab
Hudley and then swing at him as he attempted to pull away. Tucker was sure Tanner swung at
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Hudley first. Robert Jackson testified that he saw Tanner reach for Hudley in an aggressive manner
and swing at him. Hudley then swung back and the two men fought until sprayed by Guerra. Gary
King stated that he witnessed Tanner grab for Hudley; when Hudley pulled back, Tanner swung at
him. Hudley and Tanner fought until Guerra sprayed them. Raul Reyes testified in a manner similar
to the other inmates. Jimmy Green was the only inmate to hear what occurred during the altercation.
He was with Hudley when they attempted to enter with the Section 2 inmates. He stated that Tanner
demanded Hudley’s identification and Hudley refused. At that time, Tanner reached to grab Hudley
and hit Hudley in the face. Green admitted that he and Hudley were out of place.
After both sides rested and closed, the trial court presented its proposed charge, which
included an instruction on self-defense. Hudley reiterated his objections to the court’s denial of his
request for an instruction on the lesser-included offense of assault and the definition of “lawfully
discharging an official duty.” The court overruled the objections. The jury convicted Hudley of
assault on a public servant. Hudley timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review the trial court’s decision regarding inclusion of a lesser-included offense in the
jury charge for abuse of discretion. Brock v. State, 295 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The
Court of Criminal Appeals has articulated the two-prong Aguilar/Rousseau test to determine whether
a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction in the jury charge. R. Hall v. State,
158 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985) and Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). This test
requires (1) that the lesser offense must actually be a lesser-included offense of the charged offense,
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as defined by article 37.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) that the record must contain
some evidence that permits a rational jury to find that the defendant is guilty only of the
lesser-included offense. Id.; A. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Applying the Aguilar/Rousseau test to the offenses of assault on a public servant and
misdemeanor assault, the test requires that “there must be some evidence from which a rational jury
could acquit the defendant of the greater offense while convicting him of the lesser-included
offense.” R. Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 473. The evidence must demonstrate that the lesser-included
offense is a “valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.” A. Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536. In
determining whether the instruction on the lesser-included offense is appropriate, the reviewing court
“evaluates the evidence in the context of the entire record, but does not consider whether the
evidence is credible, controverted, or in conflict with other evidence.” R. Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 473.
“Anything more than a scintilla of evidence may be sufficient to entitle a defendant to a lesser
charge.” A. Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536. When a trial court erroneously refuses a properly requested
instruction on a lesser-included offense, such that the jury’s only option is to convict or acquit on
the main charge, a finding of harm is automatic, Robalin v. State, 224 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.), because the jury was denied the opportunity to convict the
defendant of the lesser offense. Brock, 295 S.W.3d at 49; see Ray v. State, 106 S.W.3d 299, 303
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing Saunders v. State, 913 S.W.2d 564, 571 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995)).
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DISCUSSION
The parties agree that assault is a lesser-included offense of assault on a public servant. See
TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).1 Thus, the first prong of the
Aguilar/Rousseau test is met as a matter of law. See R. Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 473. We next determine
whether there was some evidence presented at trial from which a rational jury could find that Hudley
was guilty only of assault, not assault on a public servant. To be entitled to a jury instruction on the
lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault, the record must contain some “affirmative evidence
. . . that negates one of the four additional elements of assault on a public servant, yet admits the
underlying assault.” Id. at 474. We evaluate the entire record without considering whether “the
evidence is credible, controverted, or in conflict with other evidence.” Id. at 473; see A. Hall, 225
S.W.3d at 536 (stating that anything more than a scintilla may suffice to entitle a defendant to a
lesser charge); see also McKinney v. State, 207 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“If . . .
facts are elicited during trial that raise an issue of the lesser-included offense, and the charge is
properly requested, then a charge must be given.”).
Hudley claims that he presented evidence affirmatively negating the last element of assault
on a public servant—that Sergeant Tanner was “lawfully” discharging an official duty at the time
of the assault. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 22.01(b)(1). Specifically, Hudley asserts he offered
some evidence that Tanner acted unlawfully by striking Hudley first without provocation, and Tanner
1
… A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. T EX .
P EN AL C O D E A N N . § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Such an offense is a Class A misdemeanor. Id. at § 22.01(b)
(Vernon Supp. 2009). The offense becomes assault on a public servant and is a felony of the third degree if, in addition,
it is committed, as alleged in the indictment in this case, against a person the actor knows is a public servant while the
public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty. Id. at § 22.01(b)(1). The actor is presumed to have known the
person assaulted was a public servant if, as here, the person assaulted was wearing a distinctive uniform or badge
indicating employment as a public servant. Id. at § 22.01(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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therefore acted outside the lawful performance of his official duties. To determine whether a
correctional officer was lawfully discharging his official duties, we look to section 9.53 of the Penal
Code, which provides that a correctional officer is justified in using reasonable force against an
inmate to maintain the officer’s own safety, the safety of others, or the security of the prison as a
whole. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 9.53 (Vernon 2003).2 Accordingly, if a correctional officer’s use
of force falls within these parameters, he is lawfully discharging his official duties, and an inmate
who assaults the officer at this time is guilty of assault on a public servant rather than mere
misdemeanor assault. R. Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 474. To be entitled to a lesser-included instruction
on misdemeanor assault, there must be some evidence in the record, from any source, that would
show that the officer was criminally or tortiously abusing his status as a public servant by using
unjustified force or engaging in official oppression or civil rights violations at the time of the assault.
Id. at 474-75.
Here, Hudley relies on the testimony of inmates Tucker, Jackson, King, Reyes, and Green,
who all stated that Tanner struck Hudley first without provocation. Only Green heard the words
exchanged between Hudley and Officer Tanner; Green stated that he and Hudley were “out of place,”
Tanner ordered Hudley to present his identification, and Hudley refused before Tanner struck
Hudley. Taking such testimony by the defense witnesses at face value, there is still no evidence that
a command was not given by Officer Tanner and refused by Hudley before Hudley was struck. As
noted, supra, there are instances where a correctional officer is justified in using reasonable force
2
… “An officer or employee of a correctional facility is justified in using force against a person in custody when
and to the degree the officer or employee reasonably believes the force is necessary to maintain the security of the
correctional facility, the safety or security of other persons in custody or employed by the correctional facility, or his own
safety or security.” T EX . P EN AL C O D E A N N . § 9.53 (Vernon 2003). The trial court appropriately included a jury
instruction on section 9.53.
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to maintain security as part of the lawful discharge of his official duties. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN .
§ 9.53; see also R. Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 475-76 (inmate’s refusal to obey legitimate order by officer
justified officer’s pushing of inmate to maintain his own and others’ safety, and therefore officer was
acting within scope of his lawful duties). Here, there is no dispute that the location of the assault was
a prison, and Officer Tanner was in uniform, on duty, and engaged in moving inmates inside from
the recreation yard. Moreover, there is evidence that Hudley was “out of place” and Tanner gave
Hudley a command to present his identification, which Hudley refused to obey, before any physical
contact occurred. On this record, there is no evidence that Sergeant Tanner criminally or tortiously
abused his status as a public servant by using unjustified force at the time of the physical altercation,
and therefore he was lawfully discharging his official duties. Accordingly, there is no evidence that
Hudley was only guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault. Therefore, the second prong of the
Aguilar/Rousseau test was not satisfied, and Hudley was not entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction. A. Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 535. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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