Ian William Vanburen v. State ( 2010 )


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    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-08-00836-CR
    Ian William VANBUREN,
    Appellant
    v.
    The STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2007-CR-2746
    Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Sitting:          Karen Angelini, Justice
    Steven C. Hilbig, Justice, concurring in the judgment
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: February 3, 2010
    AFFIRMED
    A jury found Ian William Vanburen guilty of murder and, after making an affirmative finding
    that Vanburen acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate
    cause, assessed punishment at thirteen years imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine. In two issues,
    Vanburen contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s implicit
    rejection of his self-defense claim. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    04-08-00836-CR
    BACKGROUND
    During the early morning hours of October 31, 2006, Vanburen shot and killed Jeremy
    Lathem. On the night of the murder, Vanburen and Andrew Garza had been drinking at a sports bar,
    and left at approximately 2:00 a.m. After leaving the sports bar, Vanburen called Janice Gonzales,
    whom he had met a few weeks earlier. He asked her if he could join her at Lathem’s house, where
    Lathem’s birthday party was occurring, and she agreed. Although Gonzales and Lathem were close
    friends, Vanburen had never met Lathem. Vanburen and Garza arrived at the party at approximately
    3:30 a.m., but Garza decided to stay in the truck because he felt ill. Vanburen went inside. Inside
    the house, Lathem, Gonzales, and two other men, Joe Isaac and David Fernandez, were playing
    poker and drinking.1 Vanburen sat at the table with the poker players, but did not play. At some
    point, Garza came inside. He saw the group playing cards, and saw Vanburen seated at the poker
    table. After a while, an argument erupted between Gonzales and Vanburen, ending with Vanburen
    pouring a cup of beer on Gonzales. Gonzales and Vanburen went outside and continued arguing.
    At this point, the testimony of the eyewitnesses begins to conflict. However, the undisputed
    evidence shows that after Vanburen and Garza got into Vanburen’s truck, Lathem walked up to the
    truck and hit the taillight with a small bat. Vanburen testified he looked back and saw “somebody
    with a weapon that just smashed my car.” According to Vanburen, Lathem was approaching the
    driver’s side door with the bat. Vanburen felt like he was being attacked, and when Lathem was in
    front of his window, he reached for his gun and shot in Lathem’s direction three times. Vanburen
    1
    … Although there was testimony that Lathem was drinking, autopsy results showed no drugs or alcohol in his
    system.
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    04-08-00836-CR
    then drove off and was pulled over by law enforcement officers as he was taking Garza home. The
    officers immediately took Vanburen in for questioning regarding Lathem’s murder.
    Vanburen was charged by indictment with the offense of murder. At trial, the jury heard
    testimony from five eyewitnesses to the shooting, including Vanburen, who claimed he shot Lathem
    in self-defense. The jury found Vanburen guilty of murder, implicitly rejecting his self-defense
    claim.
    DISCUSSION
    In two points of error, Vanburen contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
    to support the jury’s implicit rejection of his self-defense claim. According to Vanburen, his
    testimony that Lathem was a huge man, who bashed his taillight with a bat and verbally threatened
    him, supports his claim of self-defense because a reasonable person would have been afraid for his
    life. As a result, no rational trier of fact could have found he did not act in self-defense, and the
    State’s evidence is too weak and goes against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence
    to support the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim.
    Texas law categorizes self-defense as a defense, not an affirmative defense. Zuliani v. State,
    
    97 S.W.3d 589
    , 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To support a defense like self-defense, a defendant
    bears only a burden of production, which requires him to produce some evidence in support of his
    claim. Id.; Saxton v. State, 
    804 S.W.2d 910
    , 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Once the defendant
    produces such evidence, the burden shifts to the State, and the State bears the burden of persuasion
    to disprove the raised defense. 
    Id. Unlike the
    defendant’s burden of production, the State’s burden
    of persuasion requires it to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. When a
    fact finder
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    determines that a defendant is guilty, there is an implicit finding rejecting any defensive theory raised
    by the defendant. 
    Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594
    ; 
    Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914
    .
    When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s implicit
    rejection of a defendant’s claim of self-defense, “we look not to whether the State presented evidence
    which refuted appellant’s self-defense testimony, but rather we determine whether after viewing all
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have
    found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against
    appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914
    . When
    a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s implicit rejection
    of a defendant’s claim of self-defense, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and ask “whether
    the State’s evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt,
    although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.”
    
    Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595
    (citing Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    , 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
    A person is legally justified in using force against another person when and to the degree he
    reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or
    attempted use of unlawful force. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 9.31(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).2 A person
    is legally justified in using deadly force against another person when and to the degree: (1) he would
    have been justified in using force as set out in section 9.31 of the Texas Penal Code, (2) a reasonable
    person in his position would not have retreated, and (3) he reasonably believed the use of deadly
    2
    … W e recognize section 9.31 has been amended since the commission of the offense in this case. See Act of
    April 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S. ch. 190, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1919, 1919, amended by Act of March 20, 2007, 80th
    Leg., R.S. ch. 1, § 6, 2007 Tex. Gen Laws 1, 2 (current version at T EX . P EN AL C O D E A N N . § 9.31 (Vernon Supp. 2009)).
    However, the amendment did not change the portion of 9.31(a) cited in this opinion. See 
    id. Accordingly, we
    cite to
    the current version of the statute with regard to this portion of section 9.31(a).
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    04-08-00836-CR
    force was immediately necessary to protect himself against the other person’s use or attempted use
    of unlawful deadly force. Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S. ch 900, §1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
    3586, 3598, amended by, Act of March 20, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S. ch. 1, § 3, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws
    1, 2 (current version at TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 2009)).3 “‘Deadly force’ is
    force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is
    capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 9.01(3) (Vernon Supp.
    2009).
    In this case, the jury was instructed to acquit Vanburen if the jury found, or had a reasonable
    doubt, that Vanburen was justified in using deadly force. The language of the jury instructions
    tracked the language from the self defense statute in effect at the time of the offense, and the
    language regarding the use of deadly force to protect oneself.
    The jury heard testimony from five eyewitnesses to the shooting. Garza testified that after
    Vanburen threw a cup of beer on Gonzales, he heard Gonzales tell Lathem “to fuck ‘em up.” Garza
    and Vanburen were already outside when Garza heard Gonzales make this statement. Garza testified
    that as he and Vanburen walked toward Vanburen’s truck, Gonzales and Vanburen continued yelling
    profanities at one another. Garza testified that when he got into the truck, he saw Lathem come
    outside with a bat. Garza then turned around and saw Lathem break the truck’s back windshield,
    3
    … Section 9.32 was amended effective September 1, 2007. Act of March 20, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S. ch. 1, §
    6, 2007 Tex. Gen Laws 1, 2 (current version at T E X . P EN A L C O D E A N N . § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 2009)). For offenses
    committed after September 1, 2007, the justification to support self-defense no longer requires a finding that a reasonable
    person would have retreated. See 
    id. § 3.
    However, the offense in this case was committed on October 31, 2006, before
    the effective date of the current version of section 9.32. W hen the statute was amended, it specifically provided that the
    amended version would apply only to offenses committed on or after the statues effective date; the former law would
    remain in effect and apply to offenses committed before the effective date of the amended statute. 
    Id. § 5.
    Accordingly,
    we apply and cite to the version of section 9.32 that was in effect at the time of the offense, and that version of the statute
    requires a finding that a reasonable person would have retreated. See Act of M ay 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S. ch. 900,
    §1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3598, amended by, Act of March 20, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S. ch. 1, § 3, 2007 Tex. Gen
    Laws 1, 2 (current version at T EX . P EN AL C O D E A N N . § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 2009)).
    -5-
    04-08-00836-CR
    though he later admitted it could have been the taillight. Garza testified Vanburen ducked down as
    Lathem approached the front of the truck with the bat raised. According to Garza, Vanburen
    retrieved a gun from beneath the driver’s seat, put the magazine into the gun, and shot it three times.
    Garza testified he did not see Vanburen shoot Lathem, but believed Vanburen shot the gun into the
    air to scare Lathem. Garza later testified he told police officers Lathem was not facing the truck
    when Vanburen shot at him. Garza stated Vanburen put the truck into reverse and hit another
    vehicle; however, Garza admitted he told police Vanburen put the truck in reverse to try and hit
    Lathem before Vanburen shot him.
    Gonzales testified that when Vanburen arrived at Lathem’s house, he appeared drunk. She
    stated Vanburen became agitated, and after becoming upset with her, poured a cup of beer over her
    head. Gonzales testified she became upset and began yelling at Vanburen, telling him to leave.
    Lathem and Vanburen began exchanging words, and Lathem told Vanburen to leave. She walked
    outside and Vanburen followed her, and they continued cursing at one another in Lathem’s driveway.
    According to Gonzales, she began walking toward the neighbor’s yard and both Vanburen and
    Lathem followed her. Lathem asked her if she needed any help, and she said “yes.” Gonzales then
    testified she called Vanburen crazy, and Vanburen replied, “We’ll see who’s crazier.” Gonzales said
    that when Vanburen got into his truck, she went behind it to record his license plate information.
    At that point, Vanburen shifted the truck into reverse and revved the engine. Isaac, who was outside
    by this time, pulled Gonzalez away from the truck, and she saw Lathem walking toward the back of
    the truck with a bat. Lathem smashed the taillight of Vanburen’s truck. Gonzales testified she
    turned back toward the house and heard shouting, a loud noise that sounded like metal on metal, and
    the truck’s tires squealing. She was pushed to the ground, and when she looked up, she saw Lathem
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    stumbling toward the neighbor’s porch, where he collapsed. Gonzales testified she never heard any
    gun shots.
    Isaac testified that after the poker game ended, he and Fernandez went upstairs to bed.
    Minutes later, someone called for Fernandez, and Fernandez ran downstairs. Isaac testified
    Fernandez called him, and he too went downstairs. Isaac and Fernandez were standing in the front
    doorway watching Gonzales and Vanburen yelling at one another. Isaac testified he went to get
    Gonzales when he saw Vanburen and Garza get into Vanburen’s truck. He also recalled the sound
    of the engine starting because it was loud, and while the truck was running, he noticed the rear lights
    were on and brighter than normal. Isaac testified he pulled Gonzales away from the curb, and he saw
    Lathem walking toward Vanburen’s truck with “a small souvenir bat.” Isaac testified he told Lathem
    “not to do it” and “it wasn’t worth it,” but Lathem hit the taillight on Vanburen’s truck. After that,
    Lathem backed up toward the neighbor’s driveway. Isaac testified Lathem was ten to twelve feet
    away from the driver’s side back door and was holding the bat at waist level when Vanburen shot
    him. This testimony is supported by the medical examiner’s testimony that because no soot or
    gunpowder was on Lathem’s clothes, Lathem was not shot at close range. Isaac testified that after
    he heard four shots, he panicked and ran.
    Similarly, Fernandez testified that after he called Isaac downstairs, he and Isaac stood in the
    front doorway and saw Gonzales and Vanburen arguing. Fernandez testified Isaac went to get
    Gonzales, and around the same time, Lathem came out of the house, carrying “a small wooden bat.”
    Fernandez testified Lathem walked toward Vanburen’s truck, but Fernandez focused on Isaac and
    Gonzales, who were walking toward the curb. Fernandez then heard something breaking and saw
    the taillight of Vanburen’s truck was broken. He then turned toward Gonzales and heard three
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    04-08-00836-CR
    gunshots, tires squealing, and saw Vanburen’s truck back up into a parked vehicle. Fernandez
    testified he did not see Vanburen shoot Lathem.
    Vanburen agreed he got into an argument with Gonzales and poured a cup of beer on her
    head. He said Gonzales then went outside, and he decided to leave. Vanburen testified he heard
    someone say, “fuck ‘em up.” Although he believed the statement came from Gonzales, Vanburen
    testified he was unsure to whom she made the statement, but he was scared and wanted to leave.
    Vanburen testified he and Garza continued moving toward his truck, and when he was in the truck,
    he heard a banging sound on the back of his truck. Vanburen testified that as he was seated in the
    truck, he looked back and saw “somebody with a weapon that just smashed my car.” At that point,
    he reached for the gun underneath his seat, pulled the slide back, loaded a round into the chamber
    three times, and shot in Lathem’s direction. Contrary to the testimony of several other witnesses,
    Vanburen testified he started the truck after he fired the gun. He claimed he mistakenly put his truck
    into reverse and backed into another vehicle. When he shifted into drive and drove away, he got lost
    in the neighborhood and could not recall whether he drove by Lathem’s house again.
    Chief Medical Examiner for Bexar County, Dr. Randy Frost, testified Lathem was shot three
    times, two of the gunshots were on his left arm and the third gunshot was to his chest. The wounds
    to Lathem’s arm were not fatal. However, the bullet that caused the wound to his chest pierced the
    left side of Lathem’s chest, passed through a rib, and went through his left lung and heart. As a
    result of the chest wound, Lathem died. Frost also testified no soot or gunpowder was on Lathem’s
    clothing or body, indicating he was not shot at close range. A toxicology test showed no drugs or
    alcohol in Lathem’s system.
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    04-08-00836-CR
    Although Vanburen argues no rational juror could have found he did not act in self-defense,
    we disagree. The evidence shows conflicting accounts of the events. Although Vanburen testified
    he fired the gun three times before starting the truck’s ignition, two eyewitnesses, Isaac and
    Gonzales, testified they were certain Vanburen started the truck before he shot Lathem. Gonzales
    testified Vanburen shifted gears and revved the truck’s engine before Lathem approached the truck
    with the bat. Isaac testified he remembered Vanburen started the truck because it was loud and the
    lights were brighter than normal. Additionally, Lathem’s position with regard to the truck was in
    dispute. Isaac testified he thought Lathem was walking away from the truck toward the neighbor’s
    yard when the shots were fired. Garza, on the other hand, testified Lathem was approaching the front
    of the truck with the bat raised at the time Vanburen fired. Garza also testified it would have taken
    Vanburen less time to start the truck and drive away than the time it took for Vanburen to prepare
    to fire his gun. Garza added he would have handled the situation differently. Accordingly, there is
    evidence from which the jury could conclude a reasonable person would have retreated and deadly
    force was not immediately necessary to protect himself because he could have simply driven away.
    See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 9.31(a); Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S. ch 900, §1.01, 1993
    Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3598, amended by, Act of March 20, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S. ch. 1, § 3, 2007
    Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 2 (current version at TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 2009)).
    Vanburen contends he did not have time to retreat by driving away, and Lathem was
    approaching him with a deadly weapon; however, his testimony is conflicting. On the one hand,
    Vanburen testified he did not have time to drive away, but on the other hand, he described the time
    it took him to locate his handgun underneath his seat, check the magazine, rack the slide, load a
    round into the chamber, and hold the handgun out the window to fire three shots in Lathem’s
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    direction. Additionally, the evidence shows that although Vanburen told law enforcement officers
    Lathem had a bat, during trial, Vanburen testified he did not see the weapon or know what the
    weapon was, but it “could have been anything the size of a bat.” Vanburen went on to testify he did
    not know what Lathem had, but he was sure Lathem had “an object in his hand.” When asked to
    explain where Lathem was in proximity to himself, Vanburen at one point testified Lathem was
    approaching the driver’s door; however, Vanburen also testified he did not exactly see where Lathem
    was when he fired the weapon. There was evidence Lathem was ten to twelve feet away from
    Vanburen when he fired. He went on to testify he fired the gun in Lathem’s direction.
    After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude
    any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable
    doubt and the same rational trier of fact could have found against Vanburen on the self-defense issue
    beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914
    . Furthermore, after giving due deference
    to the jury’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and resolution of evidentiary conflicts, we
    cannot conclude the State’s evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding or that the proof
    of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the
    evidence. See 
    Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595
    . Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is legally and
    factually sufficient to support Vanburen’s conviction, and we overrule his two points of error.
    CONCLUSION
    Because we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    DO NOT PUBLISH
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Document Info

Docket Number: 04-08-00836-CR

Filed Date: 2/3/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015